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This thesis considers how India negotiates international rules and why it ratifies certain 
international rules but not all. To date, the scholarly coverage on this question has not 
captured the texture of India’s interactions with the international order, specifically the 
process through which India negotiates international rules on key issues. This lacuna is 
unfortunate since India has been widely involved across the international order working 
to influence, shape, evade and resist international rules that have an effect on its 
development and security.  
 
In this study, I argue that India’s approach toward international rules is 
determined by three factors – what the interests are toward a particular rule; how 
adeptly institutions like the bureaucracy, legislature and executive understand the policy 
problem being negotiated and adopt policy actions given state interests on the issue; and 
how effective domestic interest groups are in articulating their respective preferences to 
state institutions responsible for international negotiations and coordinate with them 
thereafter to secure policies in their favour.  
 
Empirically, I consider India’s behaviour negotiating four specific international 
rules - Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and GATT’s 
Uruguay Round Trade Agreement. Through detailed case studies, I demonstrate that 
political economy considerations, specifically how interests, institutions and interest 
groups interact, affects how India negotiates international rules and the decision taken 
thereafter to ratify or not. The empirical findings of the thesis also call us to question 
prevailing claims of India being a rising power that has the ability to manage its rise in 
the international order that involves interacting with various aspects of the order 
including the negotiation of international rules. We might require a new conceptual 
vocabulary to consider and explain the behaviour of key states like India that are rising 
powers when measured in aggregate terms and systemic impact but less so when 
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Chapter One - Introduction  
 
India is commonly regarded as one of the key states in international politics. India’s 
economic ascent has generally been a positive development in world affairs. For better 
or worse, India’s rise will affect major power relations on international policy issues. 
Fundamental questions of war, peace, economic development and social welfare could 
hinge on how India fits into the current international order and whether India is willing 
to work with existing international organisations and major powers to address pressing 
global concerns like climate change, nuclear proliferation, public health crises and 
development writ large.  
 
 India has also placed considerable premium on matters of international politics, 
especially matters related to war and peace, decolonisation, human rights and economic 
development, as evidenced by its leadership at the United Nations and other multilateral 
forums.1 To be sure, India’s internationalist impulses have ebbed, over time; 
intermittently, India has participated in regional wars.2 Looking across several issue 
areas – international trade, climate change, nuclear disarmament, arms control and 
public health - India has been generally resistant to international constraints, but where 
applicable, it has sought to engineer coalitions between developing countries to shape 
and ratify international rules. When such rules conflict with or undermine India’s 
interests, India has openly rejected or abstained. In a nutshell, despite being firmly 
embedded in the international order, India manages its relationship strategically – 
shaping and accepting rules that advance its interests, collaborating with like-minded 
                                                
1This claim is generally made by both scholars of India and IR scholars studying international order. For 
more, see G. Perkovich, “Is India a Major Power?” Washington Quarterly, 27, 1 (2003): 129-144; Xenia 
Dormandy, “Is India, or will it be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?” Washington Quarterly, 30, 3 
(2007): 117-130. For two lucid accounts on India’s early internationalism, see Manu Bhagavan, 
Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2012) and Nayantara 
Sahgal, Jawaharlal Nehru: Civilizing a Savage World (New Delhi: Penguin, 2012). C Raja Mohan 
describes this early phase as a period of ‘expansive multilateralism’ that distinguished independent India 
from other nations given its desire to function ‘as a champion of Asian solidarity and decolonization, 
opposition to racism and apartheid, rejection of militarism and call for general and complete 
disarmament, contributor to international peacekeeping, and proponent of peaceful coexistence between 
different political systems.’ See C. Raja Mohan, “The Changing Dynamics of Indian Multilateralism,” in 
Shaping the emerging world: India and the multilateral order, ed. W.P.S. Sidhu et al. (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 27. 
2For a brief survey of India’s regional troubles, see Kanti Bajpai, ‘India’s Regional Disputes’ in Shaping 
the emerging world: India and the multilateral order, ed. W.P.S. Sidhu et al (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2013), 115-130.  
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developing countries through coalitions to produce rules that protect and advance their 
interests while rejecting or abstaining from rules that harm existing interests.  
 
However, we still do not have a robust understanding of how India negotiates 
international rules and why India ratifies certain rules but not all. There is scant 
evidence to suggest countries like India will not be interested in interacting with various 
aspects of the international order to propel its rising economic trajectory and fortify its 
position as a key state. But when and how will India negotiate and ratify international 
rules and when will India resist or reject them? 
 
This thesis focuses on addressing this gap. In this study, I focus on domestic 
political factors driving India to negotiate and, at times, ratify international rules. 
Specifically, I unpack the political economy around negotiations to ascertain what 
India’s interests were in negotiating that rule, whether key institutions effectively 
understood how to advance India’s interests and if they relied on interest groups to 
eventually determine whether to ratify the international rule or not. This way, we can 
better understand India’s approach negotiating and ratifying international rules.  
 
The Argument – Political Economy of India’s Approach to International Rules  
 
To better understand India’s approach toward international rules, I argue that we need to 
grapple with the contingent political economy around international negotiations for a 
particular rule. By political economy, I am referring to three aspects – interests, 
institutions and interest groups; these three factors determine India’s approach and tack 
at international negotiations and whether India ratifies the rule or not. What is critically 
important to cover is the broader politics around a particular international rule and how 
it affects India’s overriding economic trajectory and security outlook. These domestic 
political factors constrain and condition India’s behaviour toward international rules.  
 
 I argue that India’s approach toward international rules is determined by three 
factors – what the core interests are toward a particular rule; how adeptly institutions 
like the bureaucracy, legislature and the executive effectively understand the policy 
problem being negotiated and adopt policy actions given core interests on the issue; and 
how effective domestic interest groups are in articulating their respective preferences to 
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institutions responsible for international negotiations and coordinate with them 
thereafter to secure policies in their favour. When the interests and objectives of the 
bureaucracy overseeing international negotiations and interest groups affected by the 
international rule converge, India will likely seek to shape and ratify the international 
rule. Conversely, when international rules clash with or compromise core interests of 
the Indian government and interest groups seeking to influence the government’s 
position are putatively split on the rule, India will not be proactive at negotiations to 
influence the rule leading to possible rejection after negotiations. 
 
It is important to stress that this thesis seeks to understand a problem in the 
study of Indian foreign policy. Till date, the literature on Indian foreign policy has 
uncovered how foreign policy is formulated and what some of the key driving factors 
are. Yet, certain gaps remain in describing how policy processes and various groups 
involved have contributed to foreign policy outcomes. In terms of multilateral 
negotiations, specifically, there is a dearth of coverage chronicling how the Indian 
government negotiates rules and treaties alongside other states, who takes the lead in 
overseeing such negotiations and whether there is a strategy behind India’s approach at 
negotiations. Concretely, this thesis and the core problem looks at how various 
institutions, particularly the bureaucracy overseeing international negotiations and the 
executive and legislative branches, and interest groups have attempted to determine 
India’s approach toward international rules and how, and if, that particular approach 
influenced the final outcome.  
 
Importantly, this study is not framed as a problem in International Relations 
theory that could be pertinent to states like India due to concerns emanating from the 
applicability of IR theory to consider the core problem in this thesis. Historically, Indian 
scholars have sparsely engaged with International Relations theory that has been largely 
irrelevant and inapplicable given its inability to explain developments in Indian foreign 
policy. Some scholars feared that relying on IR theory could produce knowledge that 
would be, in effect, biased and divorced from the Indian context since most theoretical 
work in IR has generally been Eurocentric in nature.3 This situation led to the 
dominance of area studies and diplomatic history in works of Indian IR at the expense 
                                                
3Mallavarapu, Siddharth. "Development of international relations theory in India." International 
Studies 46, no. 1-2 (2009): 165-183 
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of detailed theoretical and empirical work.4 Another consequence of this development 
has been the abundance of relational studies in Indian IR that describe India’s relations 
with other countries.5 
 
That said, some Indian scholars have attempted to link their research with 
broader IR debates. Two edited volumes on India and International Relations Theory by 
Kanti Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu dealt with concerns related to realism, 
postcolonial theory, political economy, Marxism and how IR theories could help make 
sense of issues like the India-Pakistan conflict, Indo-Chinese border negotiations and 
using regime theory to help map India’s international political economy.6 
Unsurprisingly, ‘high politics’ issues related to war, security and nuclear weapons 
attracted much attention.7 In a related piece, E. Sridharan points out the paucity of 
Indian IR work exploring how domestic politics and developments from the subnational 
level affect Indian foreign policy; in his view, the unitary state approach that featured 
heavily in most Indian IR research has limited utility in the Indian IR context given the 
importance of domestic politics as an explanatory factor.8 
 
 Another key lacuna is the dearth of IR research on India’s international political 
economy, India’s approach at international regimes and institutions and regional 
cooperation. Taking the issue of international regimes and multilateral behaviour, core 
theoretical paradigms in IR theory – Realism, Constructivism and Institutionalism - 
presage that countries like India will either – not be interested in participating in 
                                                
4Rana, A. P. "Reconstructing International Relations as a Field of Study in India: A Program for the 
Disciplinary Development of International Relations Studies." (1988). 
5A large literature has emerged on this front with studies covering India’s relations with major powers, 
South Asian countries, Southeast and East Asian countries and extra-regional countries like Israel, etc. 
Bajpai, Kanti. "Obstacles to good work in Indian International Relations." International Studies 46, no. 1-
2 (2009): 109-128. 
6Bajpai, Kanti P., and Siddharth Mallavarapu. International Relations in India: Theorising the region and 
nation. Vol. 2. Orient Blackswan, 2005.; Bajpai, Kanti P., and Siddharth Mallavarapu. International 
Relations in India: Theorising the region and nation. Vol. 2. Orient Blackswan, 2005. Also see, 
Mallavarapu, Siddharth. "Development of international relations theory in India." International 
Studies 46, no. 1-2 (2009): 165-183.; Bajpai, Kanti. "Obstacles to good work in Indian International 
Relations." International Studies 46, no. 1-2 (2009): 109-128.; Behera, Navnita Chadha. "Re-imagining 
IR in India." International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 341-368. 
7 Other notable high politics accounts of Indian IR include Basrur, Rajesh. ‘International Relations 
Theory and Minimum Deterrence’, in Sridharan, ed., 2007, The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship. 
New Delhi, Routledge, pp. 130; 146.; Rajagopalan, Rajesh. Second strike: Arguments about nuclear war 
in South Asia. Viking Penguin Books India, 2005.; Behera, Navnita Chadha. International Relations in 
South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradigm. SAGE Publications India, 2008. 
8Sridharan, Eswaran. The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International 
Relations. Routledge India, 2007, p. 26-29. 
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multilateral negotiations for structural reasons; will seek to cooperate within 
international institutions and organisations on policy issues due to rational motivations 
since the trade-offs for not doing so would be high; and finally that India would be 
socialised or persuaded to work with international organisations out of normative or 
value based reasons, not material interests per se.9 However, India’s behaviour in this 
regard suggests that there is more to how and why India engages within international 
regimes than IR theory can reveal. Compounding this difficulty is that most IR research 
on international political economy and global governance focuses on Western countries 
whose experiences are generally inapt when it comes to understanding and explaining 
how a country like India behaves in the international order, particularly with respect to 
international rules.10  
 
The empirical variation when observing India’s multilateral behaviour suggests 
that we may need to focus more narrowly within the Indian state and probe its foreign 
policy to examine and explain why India behaves differently here. Moreover, the 
literature within IR theory covering rising powers, that could be relevant to explain 
India’s behaviour in this context given consistent economic output and growth records, 
is curiously silent on the question of multilateral negotiations.11 Scholars working in 
this paradigm have suggested that power transitions are generally characterised by war 
and simmering tensions between rising powers and less focused on issues of order and 
cooperation.12 Put simply, power transition theory claims that rising powers like India 
will not be interested in negotiating international rules given their singular focus on 
                                                
9Three main theoretical works covering theoretical coverage of international cooperation include Grieco, 
Joseph M. Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade. Cornell 
University Press, 1990.; Keohane, Robert O. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world 
political economy. Princeton University Press, 2005.; Wendt, Alexander. Social theory of international 
politics. Cambridge University Press, 1999.;  
10There is a large literature on international political economy that considers how domestic political 
factors influence state behaviour within international regimes and institutions. Some recent work has 
emerged on Chinese IPE in the last decade but, nonetheless, most theoretical and conceptual work focus 
on western countries in North America and Western Europe. See, Milner, Helen V. Interests, institutions, 
and information: Domestic politics and international relations. Princeton University Press, 1997.; 
Katzenstein, Peter J. Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe. Cornell University Press, 
1985.; Frieden, Jeffry A. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of 
global finance." International Organization 45, no. 04 (1991): 425-451.; Rogowski, Ronald. "Commerce 
and coalitions: How trade affects domestic political alignments." Princeton, NJ (1989): 1965-1985. 
11 See A.F. K. Organski. World politics (New York City: Knopf, 1958) and A.F. K. Organski and Jacek 
Kugler, The war ledger.(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Also see J. Dicicco and J. Levy, 
“Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Paradigm,”  Journal 
of  Conflict Resolution, 43, 6 (1999): 677.  
12 Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 12-19. 
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economic growth and geopolitical competition. But this may not be the case. 
Consequently, considering this issue as an Indian foreign policy problem allows us to 
map and analyse whether and how domestic political factors compel countries like India 
to negotiate and ratify international rules. 
 
 Empirically, the thesis focuses on four case studies - Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement. 
While the cases are specific to India and the study of Indian foreign policy, the 
approach used here could, at some point, be deployed to study how other states that are 
similar to India, particularly rising powers like Brazil, China, etc., negotiate 
international rules. This possibility is explored in the concluding chapter. Now, it is 
important to ask why a new approach was needed to consider and explain India’s 
approach to international rules. Before we do that, a brief look on definitions of the 




By international rules, I refer to international treaties and agreements, both legally 
binding and voluntary, that states collectively negotiate to address a mutually shared 
problem. Treaties and different types of international agreements are also referred to as 
commitment rules.13 These rules generally result in policy commitments that states 
reciprocally adopt to address a shared collective action problem. I adopt this definition 
and refer to commitment rules as international rules in this thesis. Defining 
international rules this way makes it easier to empirically measure how states behave 
toward them and map them accordingly. It is also important to distinguish international 
rules from international institutions and international regimes that do not form the 
focus of this thesis but are occasionally referred to as international rules. From an IR 
                                                
13In the World of Our Making, Nicholas Onuf identifies three types of international rules - Instruction-
rules that confer a particular status on people and institutions by drawing and assigning value to 
distinctions which define status groups or cohorts; Directive-rules that confers authority or set of rights 
and responsibilities usually arranged by rank within a particular organization; Commitment-rules that 
confer specific roles or commitments for organisations or states that are either voluntarily assumed or 
committed to. These rules are likely to take form through a multilateral treaty. See, Nicholas Onuf, World 




standpoint, international institutions are defined as ‘sets of rules, norms, practices and 
decision-making procedures’ that allow states to iteratively interact and cooperate.14 
International rules, seen this way, are a function of international institutions. 
International regimes are defined as ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.’15 Regimes 
are more expansive than institutions and rules, encompassing both and other aspects like 
norms, principles, conventions and other social practices that enable states to interact.  
 
 It is also important to define what an international order is. For Hedley Bull, an 
international order was equivalent to an ‘international society’ characterised by different 
forms of inter-state interactions that expand through time.16 Robert Gilpin instilled a 
heavy dose of hegemony into this idea. Gilpin argued that the international order 
amounts to a series of institutions and practices created by the hegemon, or the 
dominant state, ‘to advance particular sets of interests.’17 It is thus imposed; hierarchy, 
not anarchy, serves as the principal structural constraint for other states. Under 
hierarchical conditions, the relative capabilities of states and their economic trajectories 
affect their international position and behaviour. Gilpin also argues that governance of 
this order rests on three factors: distribution of power among leading states, hierarchy of 
prestige or authority to govern, and finally, set of rules and institutions that make up 
inter-state interactions.18 Of importance to this study is the third factor - how 
international rules are determined which this thesis focuses on. I adopt Gilpin’s 
definition of international order in this study to denote the political environment where 
states gather to negotiate international rules.  
 
Research Design – Case Selection, Sources, Methodology 
 
In Chapter 2, I have listed the entire universe of cases applicable and reasons behind 
why these cases were covered in this thesis. Briefly, I have chosen cases or international 
rules where India has taken a strong position on issues that have a bearing on its 
                                                
14Robert. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 5-6. 
15Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
16Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Palgrave, 2002), 8.  
17Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 9-
10.  
18Gilpin, War and Change, 10.  
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national security and economic prosperity and where it is possible to discern the 
contingent political economy around the issue to determine why and how India 
negotiated the rule and whether it ratified the rule. The four rules on which I track 
India’s behaviour are the 2004 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC); 
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); 1996 Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and the 1994 Uruguay Round Trade Agreement.  
 
Some of these cases have been covered by International Relations scholars and 
other literatures and their choice here might appear as redundant. But for two reasons 
they are appropriate. First, I have focused on cases that show differences insofar as 
Indian behaviour toward international rules are concerned. On climate change, India has 
shown a zeal to establish and entrench certain principles to manage the problem 
internationally, importantly the need to differentiate climate responsibilities among 
countries based on historic emission contributions even as this position has evolved 
since 1992. However, this energy is not witnessed on two other cases – trade 
negotiations at GATT under the Uruguay Round and at negotiations leading to the 
FCTC, where India worked with certain constraints to shape rules. On nuclear 
disarmament, i.e. CTBT, India contested and rejected the treaty after initially endorsing 
it. Given the range and variation of the cases, there is leeway to test the framework and 
hypotheses to make sense of India’s behaviour. All four cases covered are also 
important to India’s economic or security interests. As a result, negotiating these rules 
should elicit clear involvement from key political actors, both state institutions and non-
state actors, allowing us to trace and analyse their actions. The policymaking context is 
generally comparable in the four cases given the time period which facilitates the task 
of assessing how state institutions and interest groups behave before and during 
international negotiations.  
 
Methodologically, I have relied on process tracing to chart and explain how 
India negotiated these rules. Then, to generate findings given the research objectives of 
the thesis, I employ the method of structured-focused comparison that has been widely 
used to study historical experiences to build generic knowledge of particular foreign 
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policy challenges.19 Scholars have used this method to study issues like nuclear 
deterrence to generate generalised knowledge of the phenomena by asking specific 
questions to a series of cases.  
 
I have relied on a variety of sources for this thesis. First, I have consulted and 
drawn from several internet archives and one institutional archive (Wellcome Trust 
Library) detailing how negotiations transpired on each of the rules with an emphasis on 
India’s behaviour there. For the FCTC, I have drawn from the Wellcome Trust’s Global 
Health Archives in London and two internet archives - World Health Organization’s 
records of FCTC negotiations and the International Tobacco Control archives that are 
virtually housed at the University of California San Francisco; FCCC – I have drawn 
from two internet archives - UNFCC Secretariat that holds records of FCCC 
negotiations and UN General Assembly archives; Uruguay Round Trade Agreement – I 
have drawn from GATT’s internet archives virtually housed at Stanford University 
where details of negotiations on each GATT round can be accessed; CTBT – I have 
drawn from the Conference on Disarmament and UN Disarmament Commission’s 
archives where the records of CTBT negotiations are housed. To gather how the Indian 
parliament acted or reacted toward these rules, I have drawn from the records of Indian 
Lok Sabha (lower house) and Rajya Sabha (upper house). Second, I conducted 
interviews with 20 officials and stakeholders that have shaped India’s position at 
negotiations or have an intimate understanding of the context and rule being negotiated. 
This list includes former government officials, diplomats, officials from international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations, think-tank practitioners, academics 
and journalists. I have managed to speak with members that were a part of the Indian 
delegation at all four negotiations including officials (FCCC and FCTC cases) who 
served as chief negotiators. It is important to mention that deducing from elite 
interviews can be risky. Ethically, researchers have to be mindful of certain implications 
when conducting and documenting interviews. In the next chapter, I elaborate on how I 
am planning to use the interview method, the measures taken to insure against bias and 
                                                
19For a good overview of Structured-Focused Comparison, see Alexander L. George and Andrew 
Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Boston: MIT Press, 2005), 67-73. 
Also see Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured 
Focused Comparison.” in Diplomacy: new approaches in history, theory, and policy. ed. Paul Gordon 
Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68. To get a good understanding of Process Tracing see David 
Collier, “Understanding process tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, 04 (2011): 823-827. 
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how I plan to manage the ethical considerations. Near the end of this thesis, I have 
appended an annexure with details of interviews conducted.  
  
Structure of the Thesis  
 
This thesis demonstrates that India does have a good understanding of what its core 
interests are before heading into negotiations covering international rules. In other 
words, there is a strategic logic to how India behaves on multilateral issues and, in 
particular, international rules. Moreover, there are clear and identifiable domestic 
sources that precipitate stances taken during negotiations leading to the eventual 
outcome. Here, the central argument focuses on the political economy around 
negotiations for particular rules to make the point that interests, institutions and interest 
groups matter in generating the approach taken by the Indian delegation at negotiations 
and the decision thereafter to either ratify the rule or not. Simply put, Indian negotiators 
have a strategy at negotiations determined by institutional knowledge around the issue 
being negotiated and political support given by relevant interest groups domestically 
affected by the rule. The findings of the thesis reveal that India can strategically think 
through and address foreign policy issues, something that scholars like George Tanham 
and K.Subrahmanyam have argued against.20 The four case studies in subsequent 
chapters that sketch the process through which India negotiates international rules 
demonstrate that key state institutions like the executive, bureaucracy and the legislature 
have the ability to marshal a pertinent approach and Indian negotiators can ably 
articulate and defend positions at negotiations given core interests on the issue.  
 
After this introduction, Chapter two delves into the literature review covering 
pertinent debates in Indian foreign policy, elaborates more on the research design and 
approach adopted and states the ethical considerations involved in the research.  
 
Chapter three considers India’s ratification of the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC). Indian health officials realised it was in their interest to 
negotiate a tough framework convention to stem the rising tobacco use problem at 
                                                
20Tanham, George K. Indian Strategic Thought. Rand Corporation, 1992.; Also see Inder Malhotra, ‘Our 
Strategic Asset,’ Indian Express, 3 February 2011 to see why K.Subrahmanyam thinks India’s foreign 
policy is strategically bereft. 
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home. The Indian health ministry acquired a robust understanding of domestic tobacco 
use having worked extensively with tobacco control advocates to pass and enact a 
comprehensive tobacco control law – COTPA. The thrust at home coincided with 
FCTC negotiations where Indian health officials exported the strong domestic approach 
to shape the core of the FCTC, prioritising tobacco regulation and control over tobacco 
production and promotion. The Prime Minister and health ministers politically backed 
tougher tobacco control at home and abroad. Various domestic tobacco control groups 
simultaneously worked to inform Indian health officials to pass COTPA at home and 
negotiate a tough FCTC abroad.  
 
Chapter four looks at India’s ratification of the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. India’s interests vis-à-vis climate change were not clearly laid out 
given internal knowledge gaps on the issue. Research on climate change moved 
developed countries to call for global action to mitigate rising carbon emissions. But 
this objective was thwarted by developing countries at FCCC negotiations led by India. 
At negotiations, the Indian delegation sought to entrench an alternate agenda that was 
informed by a political view of global warming that stressed equity and justice. Under 
this approach, the goal was to exempt developing countries from accepting climate 
mitigation commitments of any sort given historical emission patterns. This tack was 
supported and refined by two Indian environmental groups – Tata Energy Resources 
Institute and Centre for Science and Environment who pushed Indian negotiators to tilt 
the climate change discourse toward the interests of developing countries.  
 
Chapter five explores India’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
At the outset, Indian negotiators pushed for a strong test ban agreement that banned 
nuclear tests for all. But this view was consistently snubbed by nuclear weapon states 
who wanted to retain some space within the treaty for ancillary tests. The Indian 
delegation gradually shifted its outlook and positions on the treaty once it became clear 
their positions were ignored and interests were undermined. Several groups and 
interests sought to influence the government’s position and approach at negotiations but 
their advocacy was blunted by fragmentation and variant positions on the treaty that 
spanned from accepting the treaty unconditionally to accepting under certain conditions 
and rejecting the agreement altogether given how negotiations snubbed Indian concerns 
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and undermined Indian interests. After they received political consent, Indian officials 
rejected the treaty.  
 
Chapter six covers India’s ratification of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement. 
India ratified the trade agreement having understood the implications of international 
trade barriers being imposed on Indian firms coupled with concerted advocacy from 
business lobbies representing those firms given material benefits that stood to be 
incurred from market access concessions at trade negotiations. This focus led to a 
prioritised agenda at the Uruguay Round captured by a desire to secure additional 
foreign market access, protect space for domestic subsidies and engage cautiously on 
trade in services and intellectual property rights. The senior political leadership in the 
government endorsed this tack and so did several business lobbies representing 
domestic industry both keen on deepening liberalisation.  
 
The conclusion in Chapter seven describes the key findings of the thesis and 
their implications toward the literatures covering India’s multilateral behaviour and 
rising powers and explores whether we might need a new conceptual approach to 
deduce the behaviour of states like India that have systemic effects due to their 
economic size and output but are also, concurrently, developing countries constrained 
by fragile institutional and political capabilities.  
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Chapter Two – How does India Negotiate?  
 
Political Economy of India’s Approach toward International Rules  
 
India’s approach toward international rules is not monolithic. The literature on India’s 
multilateral behaviour does not rigorously probe the factors that affect how India 
negotiates international rules and why India ratifies certain rules but not all. Moreover, 
the literature also does not capture the texture of how India negotiates such rules and 
how the negotiating approach influences the decision to ratify or reject the rule. As a 
result, India’s behaviour in this regard merits further scrutiny and explanation.  
 
Such international rules have an impact on India’s growth trajectory and broader 
security outlook. Rules are generally negotiated within international regimes or 
organizations that cover that particular issue. Powerful states like the United States 
normally have more sway in setting the agenda for international negotiations on key 
issues but that does not negate the role nor impact that other states like India can have. 
No doubt, developing countries like India do face domestic constraints that vary from 
that of the United States. But states like India do not remain passive nor should they be 
expected to be given their own interests on a proposed rule and the potential impact it 
could have on India’s development. But how does India behave and what factors 
contribute to India’s behaviour with respect to international rules? Very few detailed 
case studies exist that probe how and why India negotiated international rules and 
whether that process lead to ratification or not.1  
 
 In this thesis, I find that there is variation to India’s behaviour in this regard that 
are caused by certain institutional and political factors. What matters to India’s 
approach vis-à-vis international rules is the political economy surrounding India’s 
                                                
1There is very little detailed empirical work exploring how India negotiates particular international rules. 
The literature here focuses on issues (trade, climate change, nuclear disarmament, World Bank), etc with 
a focus on describing the rationale behind India’s behaviour. However, there is little empirical work 
connecting the strategy adopted at negotiations, reasons for adopting that approach and how it leads to 
eventual outcome, ratification or not. To be sure, there are some practitioner (Ghosh) accounts that detail 
how that particular individual conducted negotiations but these accounts do not capture the totality of 
negotiations from an Indian perspective. For practitioner accounts, see Ghose, Arundhati. "Negotiating 
the CTBT: India's security concerns and nuclear disarmament." Journal of International Affairs (1997): 
239-261.; Reddy, K. Srinath, and Prakash C. Gupta. "Tobacco control in India." New Delhi: Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare, Government of India (2004): 43-47. 
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negotiation of these international rules. I focus on three particular aspects of the 
political economy – interests, institutions and interest groups. It is vital to map how key 
state institutions and domestic interest groups act and react and how they determine 
India’s core interests toward a particular rule. State institutions that interface on 
international negotiations greatly affect how India negotiates a particular international 
rule. Concretely, it is worth investigating if the ministry overseeing negotiations has a 
robust understanding of the policy problem necessitating negotiations and is able to 
coherently present and defend incumbent interests. Influencing state institutions during 
this process are relevant domestic interest groups that were or stood to be affected by a 
particular international rule, which, at times, triggers their advocacy to influence the 
government’s approach at negotiations. In the end, ratification or rejection of an 
international rule hinges on how key institutions and interest groups internally negotiate 
the incumbent trade-offs accompanying the rule. Political economy matters to explain 
how India negotiates international rules and why it ratifies or rejects them. Below, I 
reveal the contributing factors that help explain India’s approach toward international 
rules.  
 
Interests Matter  
 
When the Indian government has a clear interest in a rule being negotiated, they will be 
more inclined to negotiate and draft core provisions alongside other states. Interest is 
generally driven by the propensity of the rule to advance India’s security or economic 
interests. For instance, India’s desire to negotiate a strong Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control was driven by the urgent need to curb tobacco use at home. Similarly, 
India’s focused approach at GATT’s Uruguay Round trade negotiations was shaped by 
the exigent need to open up foreign markets for Indian exporters. When interests are not 
clearly specified or unclear, India’s approach varies at negotiations. As negotiations for 
a Framework Convention on Climate Change commenced, India was initially unsure 
how to best position itself since incumbent trade-offs on the issue were not sufficiently 
clarified. Interests can also change and evolve during negotiations that could affect 
India’s approach at negotiations and eventual decision. When nuclear weapon states 
moved to shift the focus of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty away from 
disarmament for all to disarmament for some, India’s interests and approach shifted to 
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avoid signing a treaty that harmed India’s core interest of reducing the nuclear gap 




Interests are articulated as objectives or positions to achieve at international negotiations 
by key political institutions. Generally, the bureaucracy, in charge of negotiations for 
India, leads in presenting and defending India’s interests at negotiations supported by 
the legislative and executive branch that are keen to craft provisions of that rule. What 
matters here is the bureaucracy’s ability to deftly understand the policy problem being 
negotiated and how it affects India. When that policy awareness is robust, institutions 
will be in a better position to negotiate the details of international rules and secure an 
agreement that advances India’s interests. On tobacco control, the Indian health 
ministry’s solid awareness of tobacco use in India and how it affected certain vulnerable 
segments of the population helped Indian negotiators craft strong tobacco control 
provisions in the framework convention. Likewise, the knowledge Indian trade officials 
acquired on protectionism around certain goods like textiles and services aided their 
efforts to negotiate and ratify a slew of trade agreements that secured additional market 
access for Indian exporters. Conversely, when capacity on a policy issue is limited 
given internal knowledge deficits, it complicates the ability of Indian negotiators to 
capably articulate India’s position that, in turn, affects India’s contributions to 
negotiations and possibly ratification. Complexities around global warming and how the 
problem affected India made it more difficult for Indian diplomats and environmental 
officials to proactively shape a strong framework convention on climate change, which 
resulted in an agreement that was weak in terms of carbon emissions reduction 
commitments from member states.  
 
Interest Groups Matter 
 
Interest groups also matter in determining how India negotiates international rules. 
Interest groups in India range from business lobbies and associations to more policy 
focused entities like think tanks, non-governmental organisations and other related 
groups. Within the domestic political ambit, interest groups generally work to lobby for 
or against policies that could harm their material or institutional interests. When 
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relevant interest groups involved on a specific policy issue endorse an international rule 
and convey their preferences to the bureaucracy negotiating that rule, the Indian 
government will be more likely to shape and ratify the rule. At times, interest groups 
buttress the bureaucracy’s knowledge and understanding of the policy problem 
underpinning negotiations, which increases the prospects of proactive engagement and 
possible ratification should the rule advance India’s interests. When tobacco control 
groups provided advice and counsel to the Indian health ministry on negotiations and 
how the proposed framework convention affected India, health officials were more 
inclined to push for a strong treaty that constrained tobacco use worldwide. Similarly, 
on trade and climate change negotiations, interest groups working on both issues 
compelled government negotiators to adopt particular stances given how their 
understanding of how India was affected by the rule which aligned with existing 
government thinking on both issues. The convergence led to India’s ratification of both 
rules. Conversely, when interest groups appear fragmented and do not deftly articulate 
their preferences to the bureaucracy given possible uncertainties around a rule, it could 
affect how the government negotiates the rule and the approach taken thereof. The 
range of split opinions on the CTBT gave the Indian government more leeway to 
determine whether to ratify the rule given uncertainties around how the treaty harmed 
Indian interests. If there is sufficient internal consternation around the rule and of 
possible risks through accession, ratification is unlikely. 
 
India’s approach toward international rules is shaped by three factors – interests, 
institutions and interest groups that constitute the political economy around multilateral 
negotiations. Each of these factors affect how India negotiates international rules and 
whether India ratifies or rejects the rules. Simply put, India’s approach toward 
international rules is shaped by institutional factors within the state that determine the 
national interest – executive consent, legislative support and bureaucratic leadership and 
political factors or how domestic interest groups influence state behaviour. This 
characterisation allows me to ask the key question this thesis is interested in: how does 
India negotiate international rules and what factors explain India’s behaviour in this 
regard? I move to consider this question by looking at the literature on Indian foreign 





This chapter will first explain why the literature on Indian foreign policy was reviewed 
to tackle the problem covered in this study. Next, I survey the relevant conceptual areas 
that could help us better understand India’s approach toward international rules with a 
focus on political economy or the role of interests, institutions and interest groups. I 
begin by reviewing the literature on Indian multilateralism to get a sense of India’s 
desire in negotiating international rules and treaties. Following that, I move to consider 
whether there was a strategic logic driving Indian foreign policy that could help explain 
India’s approach. Then, I focus on what the literature tells us about political institutions, 
specifically the executive, parliament and political parties and the bureaucracy, to gauge 
if they are relevant to how India negotiates international rules. Finally, the review 
covers the role that interest groups like business associations, think tanks and 
universities, media and the diaspora play in the determination of foreign policy and 
whether they have a role and policy space in setting the Indian government’s agenda on 
multilateral issues like climate change, international trade, etc. After this literature 
review, I move to explore the gaps in the literature in these areas and ascertain whether 
there is adequate scope to fill these gaps in this study. After elucidating the gaps, I move 
to elaborate the research design that lists cases covered in the study and explains why 
they were chosen, the sources and materials used, methods used to analyse data and 
yield findings, the limitations of the methods and the ethical implications associated 
with the methodological choices.  
 
Indian Foreign Policy – Existing Literature  
 
The literature on Indian foreign policy is instructive to survey for two reasons. First, 
India’s approach to international rules and other multilateral issues is a subset of India’s 
foreign policy and it is important to consult whether there is sufficient explanatory 
bandwidth to consider and explain the problem considered in this thesis. Moreover, we 
need to unpack what the fundamental characteristics – both institutional and political - 
of Indian foreign policy are to gauge their relevance and utility in the context of this 
study. The explanatory power of approaches from International relations theory or 
standard foreign policy analysis approaches could vary when analysing issues or cases 
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exclusive to Indian foreign policy.2 In other words, contextual differences could 
complicate this process of inquiry. It is worth reviewing the literature on Indian foreign 
policy since the institutional and political context under which foreign policy is 
formulated and implemented in India is distinct. Policy processes may differ. The study 
of Indian foreign policy could differ from that of other countries which merits a closer 
look at how foreign policy made in India and what the fundamental elements are. 
Conceptually, for instance, it might be difficult to transport categories or concepts from 
other literatures since the nature of Indian foreign policymaking and Indian politics tend 
to be distinct from conventional, more liberal, political categories. Surveying the 
literature allows us to trace and apply concepts that have relevance to the problem being 
studied. More importantly, the literature could provide pointers or hints to categories 
that could guide the process of inquiry. Euro-centric conceptual approaches may not 
adequately explain foreign policy decisions made by the Indian government since the 
political and institutional context is markedly different and the ways in which political 
institutions operate will probably differ. For instance, the avenues available for 
influencing political institutions in India tend to be limited which may not be the case in 
the United States or Western Europe where access is more liberal in this regard.3 We 
need to be sensitive to the context here.   
 
And second, there are methodological and data availability constraints to be 
mindful of when considering and analysing issues of Indian foreign policy. Most Indian 
foreign policy analyses rely on newspaper reports and clippings, interviews and 
available policy documents. Public opinion polls and surveys on core foreign policy 
matters are generally rare. A better understanding of data and methodological 
constraints compels us to be innovative and use a mix of various methods to tackle 
research objectives. For instance, there is very little work mapping key political 
institutions and their impact over Indian foreign policy; this lacuna makes it worthwhile 
                                                
2For a good overview of the gaps between International relations theory and Indian foreign policy, see 
Bajpai, Kanti. "Obstacles to good work in Indian International Relations." International Studies 46, no. 1-
2 (2009): 109-128. Standard foreign policy analysis is a subbranch within political science that studies 
how a state makes foreign policy. In the field, it is generally understood that foreign policy is made 
through a rational linear process composed of several stages where various groups and actors make sense 
of problems and devise approaches to achieve policy objectives. A classic study in this field is Graham 
Allison’s book on the Cuban missile crisis. See, Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of 
decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Vol. 2. New York: Longman, 1999. 
3 See Baru, Sanjaya. "The Influence of business and media on Indian foreign policy." India Review 8, no. 
3 (2009): 266-285.; Kochanek, Stanley A., and Robert L. Hardgrave. India: Government and politics in a 
developing nation. Cengage Learning, 2007. 
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to investigate how institutions affect and constrain foreign policy.4 There is a clear 
opportunity to be methodologically innovative to advance the growing corpus of Indian 
foreign policy. Next, I move to review the literature relevant for this thesis.  
 The literature on Indian foreign policy has grown to cover nearly every facet of 
India’s political, economic and military engagement with other countries, international 
and regional organisations and emergent plurilateral and minilateral initiatives that 
affect India’s diplomatic interests.5 Scholars have used various approaches and 
paradigms to explain why India behaves the way it does and what drives India’s foreign 
policy. In this review below, I map the literature around three conceptual arcs – 
focusing on interests and strategy, institutions and interest groups. After mapping these 
themes, I identify a few key gaps before moving toward a new approach focusing on 
why and how India negotiates foreign policy with a specific focus on international rules 
that follow in subsequent chapters.  
Interests 
Indian Multilateralism  
Given the empirical focus and research objectives of this thesis, it is instructive to first 
review the literature on Indian multilateralism and how it covers India’s approach 
within international regimes and international rules. The key question is whether India 
is open to participating within international regimes to address salient multilateral 
issues? Historically, India has been a keen supporter of the United Nations, raising 
awareness of issues and problems pertinent to developing countries.6 Several historical 
                                                
4 Sinha, Aseema. "Understanding change and continuity in India's foreign policy." International 
Affairs 93, no. 1 (2017): 189-198. 
5Though impossible to chart the entire literature, it is possible to identify certain recent volumes that 
cover this subject which testifies to the growing portfolio of Indian foreign policy that includes bilateral 
relations with major powers, neighbours and other key regional states, multilateral relations, growing 
impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, institutional impact on foreign policy and how history has 
shaped the evolution of India’s foreign policy. Some recent compendiums on the subject include Malone, 
David M., C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy. 
OUP Oxford, 2015.; Scott, David, ed. Handbook of India's international relations. Routledge, 2011.; for 
a good overview of India’s multilateral relations, see Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, 
and Bruce D. Jones, eds. Shaping the emerging world: India and the multilateral order. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2013.; Two good overviews of the subject that covers most key foreign policy issues 
include Ogden, Chris. Indian Foreign Policy. John Wiley & Sons, 2014, and Malone, David. Does the 
elephant dance?: contemporary Indian foreign policy. Oxford University Press, 2011. 
6Stanley Kochanek. “India's changing role in the United Nations.” Pacific Affairs 53, 1 (1980): 48-68.; 
For an evolutionary perspective on Indian multilateralism, see C. Raja Mohan, “The Changing Dynamics 
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accounts chart India’s record in the United Nations, emphasising the vigour with which 
India participated toward issues like development cooperation, decolonisation and 
human rights.7  
 
Some scholars believe a shift has taken place with the end of the cold war in 
terms of India’s multilateral behaviour that has become more proactive marked by a 
desire to work with international organisations to propel the growing economic 
trajectory at home. Ramesh Thakur claims that liberalisation at home has engendered an 
India that is willing to engage more openly with international organisations having now 
understood the economic gains accrued from clearing international bottlenecks 
particularly on issues like international trade and foreign investment.8 On the other 
hand, C. Raja Mohan argues that India’s shift post-liberalisation was normatively driven 
in that India, having now realised its interests reside in the international order, has 
decided to exert its contributions to the provision of global public goods to help address 
emergent problems like global warming, trade protectionism and nuclear proliferation, 
etc.9 Mohan’s argument expands from pure convergence to posit that India has become 
more willing to shoulder additional burdens in areas even where benefits might not be 
clear or imminent. Interests exist, in other words, but they are now balanced by 
normative pressures. Both Thakur and Mohan do not probe specific issues in depth to 
build their argument but instead make judgments based on how they see India behave 
within international regimes.  
 
Departing from Thakur and Mohan, Amrita Narlikar argues that India’s 
multilateral approach and behaviour hinges on the political strategies used at 
negotiations. Narlikar focuses on specific negotiation strategies to explain India’s 
                                                                                                                                          
of India’s Multilateralism,” Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order ed. W.P.S. 
Sidhu et al. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013), 25-42. 
7Swadesh Rana, “The changing Indian diplomacy at the United Nations,” International Organization 24, 
1 (1970): 48-73.; Manu Bhagavan, The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World (New Delhi: 
Harper Collins, 2012); Mark Mazower, No enchanted palace: the end of empire and the ideological 
origins of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 149-190. 
For an overview of India’s record and experiences as part of the Non-Aligned Movement and Global 
South broadly, see Chapter 3 and 4 in Vijay Prashad, The poorer nations: A possible history of the global 
south (London: Verso Books, 2013);  
8Ramesh Thakur, “India in the world: Neither Rich, nor Powerful, nor Principled,” Foreign Affairs 76, 4, 
(1997): 16-22; and Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of Indian Foreign Policy (London: 
Hurst, 1994) 
9C. Raja Mohan. “Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?” The Washington Quarterly 33, 
3 (2010): 133-148. 
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approach on specific issues like international trade and disarmament. For Narlikar, 
liberalisation has not, altogether, altered India’s multilateral persona which, in her view, 
is characterised by cultural traits like prickliness, inflexibility and an inveterate need to 
moralise.10 Narlikar claims that Indian negotiators settle on two strategies, either 
distributive or integrative, to further India’s interests at international negotiations. 
Distributive strategies are used to extract benefits from international negotiations and 
other member states without yielding commensurately in return. Politically, this strategy 
involves highlighting India’s challenges as a developing country to justify the need for 
special concessions. For instance, at trade negotiations, India attempts to secure various 
trade concessions like tariff reductions from other countries whilst refusing to provide 
reciprocal market access in return given expected losses to Indian firms and producers. 
Indian negotiators use integrative strategies to build coalitions uniting other developing 
countries within international regimes to increase their bargaining power against 
developed countries. The integrative approach rests on leverage gained from strength in 
numbers when negotiating tough provisions on issues like market access or subsidies. 
Invariably, given these two strategies, what is perhaps most prominent here when 
analysing India’s multilateral approach is the defensive tone adopted to protect and 
advance core national interests.  
 
But is this defensive and, at times, hectoring, tone of Indian negotiators a 
product of international regimes where negotiations take place or are they culturally or 
institutionally ingrained? Recently, Narlikar updated her earlier claim by tracing certain 
cultural traits shaping India’s prickly approach at international trade negotiations that 
she argues date back to the historical epic - The Mahabharata.11 The argument 
essentially attributes India’s behaviour within international regimes to certain 
longstanding domestic traits that then produce various strategies to achieve core 
interests. Stephen Cohen and David Malone argue that this behavioural trait is not 
caused by historical epics alone but are also a product of institutional environment in 
the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi. Cohen emphasises cultural factors to 
explain the defensiveness of Indian diplomats but attributes these tendencies to the 
                                                
10Amrita Narlikar, “India Rising: Responsible to Whom?”	  International Affairs	  89, 3 (2013): 595-614.; 
Amrita Narlikar, “Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a 
Rising India,” International Affairs 82, 1 (2006): 59-76. 
11The Mahabharata is a classic Sanskrit text that describes a tale of two warring clans who strive to fight 
for the public good. See Amrita Narlikar and Aruna Narlikar, Bargaining with a Rising India: Lessons 
from the Mahabharata (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
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institutional culture at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). David Malone largely 
concurs by claiming that India’s caution toward multilateral issues stems from a desire 
to protect sovereignty at all costs.12  
 
Such conceptual accounts are accompanied by myriad scholarly works that map 
India’s behaviour on specific multilateral issues like climate change13, international law 
and justice14, human rights15, finance16, international trade17 and nuclear disarmament.18 
A recent edited volume on Indian multilateralism comparatively mapped and explained 
India’s positions on a range of multilateral issues.19 Broadly, the volume posits that 
India’s interests have grown in the international order that merits more robust 
engagement with international rules and organizations, independent of whether it might 
be prudent to do so.20 
 
What is clear from the literature on Indian multilateralism is that the Indian 
government has demonstrated a desire to participate widely within international regimes 
and organisations and negotiate international rules. Moreover, all these scholars 
implicitly claim that India has a broad interest in negotiating international rules despite 
                                                
12Stephen P. Cohen. Emerging Power: India (Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 2001), 74; David 
Malone, Does the Elephant Dance: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 249-273. In a recent article, Kate Sullivan argues that such moralising tendencies in Indian 
diplomacy has clear historical and ideational foundations, namely Hindu renaissance thinkers like 
Vivekananda, struggles towards political independence and the legacies of the Indian foreign service. See 
Kate Sullivan, "Exceptionalism in Indian Diplomacy: The Origins of India's Moral Leadership 
Aspirations," South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 37, 4 (2014): 652. 
13Navroz K. Dubash, “Of Maps and Compasses: India in Multilateral Climate Negotiations,” in Shaping 
the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order, ed. W.P.S. Sidhu et al, (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2013), 261-280. 
14Bimal N. Patel, India and International Law: Introduction. Vol. 2. (Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008) 
15Manu Bhagavan, “A New Hope: India, United Nations and the Making of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,” Modern Asian Studies 44, 2 (2010): 311-347.; Bhagavan, The Peacemakers: India and 
the Quest for One World, 1-4. 
16John Echeverri-Gent, “Financial Globalization and India’s Equity Market Reforms,” India Review 3, 4 
(2004): 306-332.; Jason Kirk’s work details India’s relationship with the World Bank. See Jason. A. 
Kirk, India and the World Bank: The Politics of Aid and Influence (London: Anthem Press, 2011) 
17Narlikar, Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a 
Rising India, 59-76; Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar, “A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and 
India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” Global Society 20, 4 (2006): 415-433.; Narlikar, India Rising: 
Responsible to Whom? 595-614. 
18Dinshaw Mistry, India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Chicago: University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, 1998); Andrew B. Kennedy, “India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, 
Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb,” International Security 36, 2 (2011): 120-153. 
19W.P.S. Sidhu, P.B. Mehta, and Bruce D. Jones, Shaping the Emerging World: India and the 




the persistence of certain distinct cultural traits and strategies deployed to achieve core 
interests.  
Strategy 
Now that we have recognised that India has an interest in negotiating multilateral issues, 
it is pertinent to ask whether interests are derived from an overarching foreign policy 
strategy or template to get a better sense of the considerations compelling India to 
behave differently when negotiating international rules.  
 Is it possible to trace a strategic doctrine or template guiding how Indian 
policymakers devise foreign policy? Kanti Bajpai argues that there exists a loosely 
defined ‘strategic culture’ consisting of three distinct streams of thought – Nehruvians, 
Neo-Liberals and Hyper-realists that serve the core drivers of India’s foreign policies.21 
Each of these three streams advocate different precepts or ‘grand strategic prescriptions’ 
intended to advance India’s core interests.22 All three streams operate on a few basic 
assumptions – the primacy of a sovereign state; states are fundamentally rational in 
pursuing their national interests; and that all states seek to accumulate power through 
military and economic means.23 Beyond these assumptions, the streams differ in what 
they posit. Nehruvians, Bajpai claims, prefer cooperation and compromise over conflict 
and are marked by a proclivity to rely on international institutions, laws and 
negotiations to prosecute interests and resolve claims.24 War, simply put, is futile and 
avoidable. Neoliberals, on the other hand, emphasise economics or commercial and 
trade relations relative to military power; they believe that economic gains buttress 
military strength and advance national security.25 The hyperrealists view international 
relations in Manichaean terms filled with threats and risks to be mitigated through 
military strength.26 Bajpai provides a broad template of considerations affecting India’s 
strategic choices in the foreign policy domain. Problematically, however, there is no 
                                                
21Bajpai contends that that these three streams constitute India’s strategic culture in the post cold war 
period. Bajpai defines strategic culture loosely as ‘identifiable set of assumptions about the nature of 
international relations’ given George Tanham’s famous claim that Indian elites have not thought deeply 
about strategy in foreign affairs. See, Bajpai, Kanti. "Indian strategic culture." South Asia in 2020 (2002): 
245-304. To get Tanham’s view see, Tanham, George K. Indian Strategic Thought. Rand Corporation, 
1992. 
22Ibid, 250.  
23Ibid, 251. 
24Ibid, 252.  
25Ibid.   
26Ibid, 253.	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clear way to empirically track and demonstrate if and how postulates of Bajpai’s three 
streams drive foreign policy or shape state preferences; moreover, doubts remain as to 
whether these views are mutually exclusive. At best, the streams and core precepts serve 
as generic statements reflecting certain aspects of Indian foreign policy. More 
fundamentally, it is difficult to deductively infer what India’s interests are from broad 
strategic precepts. Instead, we could empirically gather what India’s specific interests 
are given the issue at hand.  
The need to identify what India’s interests are on particular issues is rendered 
important from works that repudiate notions that India is aware of its interests and able 
to devise a strategy to achieve its objectives. Harsh Pant argues that India’s foreign 
policy, particularly relations with the United States and Afghanistan, has been 
characterised by ad-hocism, plain incoherence and an inability to articulate what the 
vital interests are.27 In other words, there is no identifiable strategy driving foreign 
policy. Broadly, Pant contends that Indian foreign policy since the end of the cold war 
has been ‘reactive to the strategic environment rather than attempting to shape the 
strategic realities.’28 Instead Pant identifies an inability to adapt just when India is 
poised to play a role as a major power given rising material capabilities. Pant also 
identifies a gap between India’s desire to project itself a major power and the demands 
that desire imposes particularly in South Asia.29 Regional tensions, Pant argues, have 
placed India in a bind, ill-equipped to respond to concerns of its neighbours while being 
pilloried as aggressive when steps are taken; this predicament, Pant claims, has made 
India defensive, diffident to shape events in its periphery just as pressures beyond it 
impinge on its strategic space to effect change. With respect to the UPA’s foreign 
policy, Pant attributes some of its incoherence to ‘organisational dysfunction and risk 
averseness’ but also identifies the Congress Party’s historic affinity to non-alignment as 
another factor.30 Generally, Pant views India’s foreign policy, with an inordinate focus 
                                                
27Pant, Harsh V., and Harper Collins. India’s Afghan Muddle: A Lost Opportunity. 2014, 3-7.; Also see 
Pant, Harsh V. "A rising India's search for a foreign policy." Orbis 53, no. 2 (2009): 250-264. 
28Ibid, 251-252. 
29Pant, Harsh V. "India in the Indian Ocean: Growing mismatch between ambitions and 
capabilities." Pacific Affairs 82, no. 2 (2009): 279-297  
30Harsh Pant argues that India’s approach, under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, 
proved largely fitful driven by a sense of caution that set India back in terms of devising a strategy to 
manage growing strategic risks across the Asia-Pacific defined by China’s rise.30Pant, Harsh V., and Julie 
M. Super. "India's ‘non-­‐alignment’ conundrum: a twentieth-­‐century policy in a changing 
world." International Affairs 91, no. 4 (2015): 747-764. Also see, Pant, Harsh V., and Yogesh Joshi. 
"Indian Foreign Policy Responds to the US Pivot." Asia policy 19, no. 1 (2015): 89-114. 
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on the UPA government, as adrift, intellectually and strategically bereft in terms of 
responding to a rapidly shifting geopolitical terrain across the Asia-Pacific.31 The gulf 
between Bajpai’s claim of a strategic culture and Pant’s strategic deficit argument 
provides a space for scholars to mine to get better grasp of identifying a strategy derived 
from clearly mapped interests. In fact, using a historical approach to map India’s 
interests and strategy could retrieve an empirical reality that could help rethink 
analytical claims made on how India conducts its foreign policy. 
Institutions 
Executive Leadership 
How are India’s interests on a particular issue translated into strategy or series of 
actions? Interests and strategic considerations can be traced and mapped through 
institutions that manage Indian foreign policy. A focus on institutions and the policy 
process can help in revealing how interests shape strategies adopted by Indian officials 
at international negotiations. What matters here are the institutional features of Indian 
foreign policy and how these particular institutions affect India’s behaviour on specific 
issues. 
There has been a longstanding perception in the literature that Indian foreign 
policymaking tends to be highly centralised and elitist.32 Here Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
leadership weighs heavily. Not only has his direct involvement been detailed 
meticulously but more attention has been given to how he had an oversized impact. 
Andrew Kennedy argues that Nehru’s ‘bold diplomacy’ drew from certain ‘national 
                                                
31Pant appears to approve of the Modi government’s foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis major powers 
like United States and China. He identifies Modi as the architect of a hedging strategy that binds India 
closer to the US to counter China’s rise across the Asia-Pacific. See, Harsh Pant, ‘Out with 
Nonalignment, in with a Modi Doctrine’, The Diplomat, November 13, 2014, at 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/out-with-non-alignment-in-with-a-modi-doctrine/ (Accessed February 
24, 2017). For a good early overview of what Modi’s foreign policy entails, see Ian Hall, ‘Is a Modi 
Doctrine Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 69(3), 2015, 
pp. 247–252. 
32This claim does not mean that institutions responsible for formulating, monitoring and implementing 
foreign policy are not important. It signifies that the Indian prime minister and the growing office around 
the position has acquired considerable sway in foreign policy. There is a growing list of works that speak 
to the importance of the Prime Minister from 1947. See, Raghavan, Srinath. War and peace in modern 
India. Springer, 2016.; Kennedy, Andrew. The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National 
Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2011.; Also see Gopal, 
Sarvepalli. “Jawaharlal Nehru: a biography Vol 2: 1947-1956.” (1979) and Gopal, Sarvepalli. "Jawaharlal 
Nehru: a biography Vol. 3: 1956-1964." (1984). 
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efficacy beliefs.’33 In particular, Kennedy emphasises Nehru’s ‘moral efficacy’ or 
penchant to rely on diplomacy, not the threat of force or war, to elicit cooperation from 
other states on diplomatic issues like conflict and nuclear disarmament.34 Nehru also 
features greatly in Srinath Raghavan’s War and Peace in Modern India that explores 
how India prosecuted military conflicts soon after independence. After examining seven 
crisis situations from 1947-1962, Raghavan claims that India’s policies in each situation 
was influenced by shifting ground realities and Nehru’s own political views that 
Raghavan characterises as ‘liberal realist.’35 Rebutting competing claims that pin Nehru 
down as an ‘idealist’ or ‘arrogant hardliner,’ Raghavan portrays Nehru as a competent 
strategist and statesman who clearly understood war and diplomacy and deployed 
strategies, including force, to achieve desired objectives.36 Besides Nehru, there have 
been other Indian Prime Ministers like Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao 
who have taken a keen interest in foreign policy and attempted to engineer outcomes, 
economic or security, in India’s interest.37  
But what distinguishes Nehru from other Indian Prime Ministers was not just his 
dominant control over the levers of state power, particularly foreign policy, but also his 
ideas that some scholars claim reverberate to this day in various guises.38 The role of the 
executive can be accentuated through a pronounced reliance on certain ideas that help 
reveal the approach and strategy required to achieve foreign policy objectives. In the 
literature, Nehru’s impact was accentuated by his affinity to ideas of how he perceived 
India and what role she should play in the world. Andrew Kennedy underlines Nehru’s 
role and impact through his views on moral efficacy that underscored India’s autonomy 
                                                
33Kennedy, Andrew. The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the 
Making of Foreign Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 3-7. 
34Ibid, 15-19. 
35Raghavan, Srinath. War and peace in modern India. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 15-19. 
36Ibid.  
37To read more on each of these three Indian PM’s see Malhotra, Inder. Indira Gandhi: A personal and 
political biography. Northeastern Univ Pr, 1989.; Raghavan, Srinath. "At the Cusp of Transformation." 
In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, p. 117. OUP Oxford, 2015.; Sitapati, Vinay. "Half 
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in world affairs.39 Generally, such views fall under the strategy of ‘Non-alignment’ the 
paradigm that has ostensibly governed Indian foreign policy since 1947.40 At its core, 
non-alignment calls for eschewing alliances of any kind with other states while pursuing 
a pragmatic independent foreign policy in a world riven by power politics.41 Shashi 
Tharoor, scholar and politician who has himself written a biography on Nehru, claims 
that Non-alignment, in essence, led to Nehru’s so-called ‘messianic utopianism’ that 
disavowed sober consideration of national interests on core foreign policy issues.42 
What is generally clear from works that stress Non-alignment is that India over its 
history settled for a foreign policy marked by caution and a pronounced unwillingness 
to enhance its power and engage with great power politics.43 Broadly, it is clear that 
executive authority matters in Indian foreign policy and focused leadership on particular 
issues, whether backed by certain ideas or strategy to achieve incumbent interests, is a 
key institutional aspect of the practice of Indian foreign policy and should be traceable 
when measuring how India negotiates international rules.  
Parliament and Parties  
The Indian parliament is another important political institution that could either 
constrain or assist the executive’s role in foreign policy. Scholars have found instances 
where various political parties in the Lok Sabha, the lower house, have contributed to 
                                                
39Kennedy, International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru, 7.  
40In the last twenty years, the most common refrain to non-alignment has been strategic autonomy. The 
UPA government has professed to its utility in a world that is increasingly complex and interdependent. 
In 2014, several noteworthy Indian scholars produced a new document ‘Non-Alignment 2.0’ as a new 
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policy: selected speeches, September 1946-April 1961. Publications Division, Ministry of Information 
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Rana, A. P. "The Imperatives of Non-Alignment." A conceptual Study of India’s Foreign Policy in the 
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40 
debates on foreign policy issues like the crises in Kashmir (1948/49), China 1962 and 
East Pakistan (1971); interactions with the nuclear non-proliferation regime; US 
intervention in Vietnam and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan all the way to the recent 
Indo-US civil nuclear deal; of late, foreign policy issues that the Lok Sabha has 
considered has expanded to cover issues like climate change, global health and 
international property rights.44 There are few ways in which the Indian parliament can 
influence foreign policy - budgetary allocations that may affect relations with another 
state or by intervening procedurally in parliament through resolutions or motions to 
affect government actions on a particular issue.45 However, in practice, the Indian 
constitution grants ample leeway to the executive branch to conduct foreign policy. 
Political representatives have sought to increase parliamentary scrutiny over foreign 
policy through institutionalised interactions between MEA officials and parliamentary 
representatives, particularly from the Lok Sabha. But this trend has declined over time. 
In a chapter on how the Lok Sabha affects Indian foreign policy, diplomat turned 
scholar M.L Sondhi lamented on the state of relations between representatives and 
diplomats calling for the ‘urgent need to reduce the traditional prejudice and lack of 
confidence in the interaction between the officials and politicians.’46 No doubt, the 
parliament is a vector though which Indian politicians can have an impact on foreign 
policy matters and this could be relevant should the lower or upper house debate 
multilateral issues at any point. 
 Political parties can also affect domestic debates on foreign policy and their 
views on particular issues that become important to track and analyse should they 
subsequently gain power and form government. Historical work examining the 
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) and its forerunner the Jana Sangh’s (JS) foreign policy 
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views evidence the existence of multiple ideational strands in Indian foreign policy.47 
Mohammed Ali Kishore expounds on the JS’s foreign and security policies that were, in 
some ways, antithetical to the tenets of non-alignment particularly in terms of ‘military 
pacts and direct associations’ with states in the ‘Western bloc.’48 Kishore identifies 
China as the singular threat to India; a threat that he claims can only be remedied by a 
‘joint military front’ with nations like Japan, Australia, Malaysia and Thailand.49 Also 
noteworthy here is the Sangh’s approach to the United States and of the need for India 
to ‘seek an alliance’ with the US to address key foreign policy challenges like China 
and Pakistan which Nehru disavowed in public but attempted to arguably fashion in 
private during the Sino-India conflict in 1962.50  
Rahul Sagar and Ankit Panda challenge the existence of a ‘Nehruvian 
Consensus’ or a coherent strategic worldview amongst foreign policy elites until the end 
of the cold war when it was supposedly replaced by certain realist views.51 Through a 
close reading of India’s constituent assembly debates in the late 1940s, Sagar and Panda 
find that India’s political elites, even members of the Congress party, possessed 
dissimilar views on India’s foreign policy including some with realist beliefs.52 In a 
related work, Sagar emphasised that political and legislative debates around and of 
                                                
47Rahul Sagar maps the intellectual roots of the Hindu nationalist views of international politics through a 
careful reading of the works of several thinkers including Vinayak Savarkar and Madhav Sadashiv 
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Indian foreign policy did not merely surface as India’s power visibly increased in the 
1990s but were a part of the republic’s founding going back decades, even before India 
gained independence.53   
Similarly, Chris Ogden analyses the influence of Hindu nationalist views on 
Indian security policy. Drawing from constructivist theory, Ogden claims that certain 
identity-centric factors shape Hindu nationalist views on security or what he terms 
‘security identity’ that comprises of three elements - a political consensus, physical and 
geographical boundaries and perceptions of how India is regarded by other states.54 
Ogden then applies the framework to examine the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government’s foreign policy in Asia and with the United States that amounted to 
realignment ‘from the non-aligned ambiguity to a more assertive, sober and pragmatic 
foreign policy.’55 By tracing a distinct indigenous ideology shaping the party’s strategic 
views, Ogden concedes that an evolution has taken place from a foreign policy driven 
by ideals to one where pragmatism and power matter.  In a nutshell, political parties 
have the ability to affect foreign policy through their ideas and views on particular 
issues like relations with major powers like the United States and China, nuclear 
proliferation and international trade. 
Bureaucracy – The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
Ideas can also influence strategy and policy through the bureaucracy. The apposite 
bureaucracy in terms of foreign policy is the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) largely 
staffed by officers from the Indian Foreign Service (IFS).56  To be sure, the MEA is not 
alone in the formulation of foreign policy; the ministry works alongside other entities 
like the Prime Minister’s office (PMO) and the National Security Council (NSC) under 
the aegis of the Prime Minister.57 Other ministries like the Ministry of Finance or 
Ministry of Commerce chip in when specialist expertise is required. Coordination, as a 
result, becomes essential but complex when accommodating multiple entrants and their 
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preferences in the process.58 Nonetheless, most of the coverage in the literature 
pertaining to the MEA seldom focuses on how the ministry functions and the positions 
it takes on particular issues and whether there is a strategy in place to advance core 
interests. Instead, observations abound on the limited capacity of the MEA relative to its 
burgeoning agenda and widening policy commitments. These claims generally coalesce 
around either the lack of sufficient officers in the service to conduct business, 
suboptimal levels of expertise and knowledge to tackle specialised or technical issues, 
incapacity to engage with public opinion and policymakers on key issues and an 
inhospitable attitude toward external experts from think tanks, universities and the 
corporate sector.59 Institutional incapacities and deficits, however, does not necessarily 
imply that existing diplomats and officials lack the capacity to do the job but just that 
they might find the workload too onerous to shoulder. Some criticism is also directed to 
the distinct parochial culture that ostensibly pervades the MEA which scholars like 
David Malone and Stephen Cohen claim compels Indian bureaucrats to ex ante adopt 
positions that are invariably defensive or adversarial.60 According to Malone and 
Cohen, Indian diplomats have developed a proclivity to function as inveterate 
obstructionists who vitiate bilateral and multilateral negotiations through their hard 
nosed diplomatic disposition.61 It is, however, undeniable that the MEA and its 
diplomats serve as the principal interlocutor for most foreign policy issues and are 
generally involved when it comes to negotiating international rules. We can expect the 
MEA to have an impact on such negotiations, which makes tracking and analysing their 
role important.   
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A focus on the bureaucracy, particularly the MEA, allows us to see if some of 
the key ideas and ideologies covered above, namely non-alignment, have currency 
within the ministry and affect policy. Does non-alignment still resonate today in New 
Delhi? Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland argue that there appears to be a consensus 
amongst the putative Indian foreign policy elite that a broad strategic core exists around 
Indian foreign policy that emphasises ‘autonomy, flexibility, and a desire to avoid 
dependence on stronger powers.’62 What Narang and Staniland see is continuity in 
terms of foreign policy thinking and decision-making in New Delhi despite clear power 
shifts in the international system.  
However, not all scholars share this view. New evidence uncovered from 
various archives suggest that a foreign policy consensus did not exist in India and that 
claims to that end have missed the diversity of views surrounding Indian foreign policy 
discussions. Rudra Chaudhuri argues that there was a vigorous debate around the US-
India relationship from various domestic quarters, including political parties like the 
Swatantra Party, Communist Party of India (CPI) and Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) whose 
leaders sought to impress their contrarian views on non-alignment to Nehru.63 
Chaudhuri’s larger point that he makes in his broader history on US-India relations is 
that foreign policy ideas are not divorced from their political context and they often 
mesh with exigent interests to shape foreign policy.64 For far too long, Chaudhuri 
claims, Indian foreign policy analysts were too focused on dichotomies between 
ideational constructs and material interests when, instead, what was unfolding in 
practice was a complex interplay of both ideas and interests; the ideas-interests equation 
was illuminated by Chaudhuri through different crises in US-India relations where New 
Delhi and Washington engaged in a tussle to achieve each other’s interests surrounded 
by wide-ranging constraints.65 As a result, ideas and interests could form a part of the 
equation in the approach or strategy adopted by the institution overseeing negotiations 
to negotiate international rules that makes it worthwhile to consider.   
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It is also instructive to track and measure how the MEA acts on particular issues 
to get a better sense of whether India’s foreign policy has changed after the end of the 
cold war. Some scholars argue that the end of the cold war has engineered a shift in the 
tenor of Indian foreign policy or the ‘philosophical premises’ underpinning India’s 
approach to world affairs.66 C. Raja Mohan argues that from the 1990s India has 
adopted a more ‘self-assured diplomatic’ posture characterised by five clear policy 
shifts – revival of relations with the United States, incorporation of economic 
considerations in foreign policy having dispensed with the socialist paradigm, shift from 
shepherding interests of developing countries to a clear focus on self-interests, rejection 
of nativist anti-western modes of thinking that resulted in detrimental security and 
diplomatic choices and a more pragmatic attitude toward the international order that 
could advance India’s economic and political interests.67 Mohan argues that from an 
adversarial relationship with the international order and leading major powers, except 
perhaps the Soviet Union, India has pivoted to engage more confidently with the world. 
Mohan also claims that a sense of ‘responsibility’ bears on India’s shoulders to help 
address key collective action challenges like climate change, maritime piracy, 
peacekeeping and nuclear non-proliferation.68 International order and stability, Mohan 
argues, matter to India having realised how connected its economic and political 
trajectory is to the world and the international economy.69 Sumit Ganguly also believes 
that Indian foreign policy has changed after the end of the cold war. Ganguly claims 
that Indian foreign policy is now ‘growing up’ having shed its ‘ideological burden’ of 
non-alignment that had ostensibly limited its course for decades.70 
Unsurprisingly, there is a chorus of voices who claim Indian foreign policy has 
not changed and that culture and history, in different ways, weigh on the conduct of 
Indian foreign policy. Historical legacies, particularly colonial rule, have reared as a key 
factor causing India to behave as a ‘victim’ or a state that prefers to fixate on 
considerations of equity and justice instead of order and stability. Manjari Chatterjee 
Miller argues that to make sense of India’s foreign policy we need to comprehend how 
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colonialism has affected her sense of self and identity.71 Miller claims that Indian 
foreign policy elites are influenced by ‘post-imperial ideology’ or a belief that their state 
is a victim having suffered through the scourge of colonialism.72 This palpable sense of 
victimhood, Miller argues, leads India to focus on attaining recognition or status 
through various foreign policies, particularly on issues like nuclear weapons or military 
intervention.73 Likewise, Harsh Pant argues that no perceptive shift has occurred in 
terms of India’s foreign policy orientation. Pant claims continuities remain, quite 
doggedly so, in Indian foreign policy rendering it difficult for policymakers to ‘enhance 
their security by increasing their capabilities and their control over the external 
environment.’74 Following an institutional focus and approach when investigating how 
India negotiates international rules allows us to make empirically based judgments on 
the nature of Indian foreign policy, assessing whether the broad tenor has changed or 
remained the same.  
Interest Groups 
It is no surprise that the politics around Indian foreign policy has evolved. More actors, 
particularly non-state actors, have entered the fray and are looking to have an imprint on 
foreign policy issues affecting them. Alongside a focus on institutions, we can now 
robustly trace whether and how such interest groups have an effect on Indian foreign 
policy. Broadly, we can identify several types of interest groups in the Indian context - 
knowledge agents like think tanks and universities, corporate sector and related business 
associations, civil society comprising of domestic non-governmental organisations, 
labour unions and other social groups, the larger media contingent including print, 
radio, television and newspaper dailies and the Indian diaspora. Not all of these groups, 
of course, have an effect and those groups that manage to affect government thinking 
and policy may rely on different tools and methods and will probably have different 
motivations driving their actions.  
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Looking at the corporate sector, there is a view that the role and influence of 
particular corporate groups and lobbies on foreign policy has increased from the mid-
1980s when the Indian government initiated market reforms. This assertion does not 
mean that business interests were not organised or were politically irrelevant before that 
period. Stanley Kochanek points out that business associations like the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCHAM) and Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI) representing corporate interests have existed since the 
early 20th century and were ‘as well developed as their counterparts’ in the West.75 
Nonetheless, their relevance as voices of a distinct stratum were subordinate to the 
interests of the Indian government that had, at least until the 1980s, treated domestic 
business with hostility.76 But since then, their impact on foreign policy has been notable 
but not exceptional; material and distributional factors could trigger their agency but 
whether their views have credence is not always clear nor very well understood.  
Economist Rajiv Kumar argues that corporate sector’s interest in international 
trade negotiations, particularly from the Uruguay Round, was driven by select industries 
like technology and services and lobbies like Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 
who wanted more market access for their products and services.77 With this impetus, 
associations like CII began pushing the interests of the Indian corporate sector abroad 
through foreign trade missions and Track II diplomacy that the NDA and UPA coalition 
governments supported. Sanjaya Baru argues that the ‘investments CII and FICCI made 
in trade diplomacy was of great use for Indian business and the Indian government’ by 
staking business as a diplomatic partner.78 Despite their growing clout, Kumar adds that 
the influence of business lobbies should not be overstated; the tack adopted by business 
interests on foreign economic policies like the Indo-US economic dialogues, WTO 
negotiations, climate change negotiations and other trade forums generally comport 
with the positions of the government and influence is ‘tangible only when its own 
stance and direction is in sync’ with official policy.79 Nonetheless, these accounts do 
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suggest that private interests could affect the government’s position on a range of 
international issues, particularly multilateral negotiations.  
The global Indian diaspora has also become important as the Indian government 
engages robustly with the international economy and further embeds itself within 
transnational patterns of production, finance and trade. The Indian government has been 
notably entrepreneurial in its engagement of the wider Indian diaspora through various 
initiatives. Latha Varadarajan argues that since the late 1990s the Indian government 
has introduced various measures like the establishment of a new ministry to deal with 
diaspora affairs, capital investment incentives and new forms of dual citizenship with 
special privileges to ‘institutionalize the relationship between the nation-state and 
diaspora.’80 Varadarajan’s larger assertion is that such diaspora engagement policies are 
connected to broader shifts in the international economy and global capitalism that drive 
states to co-opt diaspora communities in their development.81 In a related work, Devesh 
Kapur analyses the economic and political consequences of international migration on 
the countries from which migrants originate.82 Looking at India, Kapur argues that 
international migration and the Indian diaspora has contributed in several ways via 
increased remittances, ideas and financial capital to India’s ongoing economic 
transformation.83 In terms of foreign policy, Kapur notes how the Indian-American 
community in the United States influenced the broader US-India trajectory toward 
greater engagement; the feedback effects of this influence in India, however, has not 
been adequately mapped.84  
Indian think tanks and universities are distinguished by their focused use of 
research and ideas to gain relevance and influence in the policy process. Knowledge is 
their currency. Despite the proliferation of universities and think tanks in India, there is 
very little evidence to suggest that they have meaningfully shaped India’s foreign 
policy. Generally, their position and policy relevance is determined by the political 
context, specifically the mind-set of relevant government ministries or key officials. 
Notwithstanding the government’s appetite for external knowledge, Dan Markey has 
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argued that India’s think tanks and universities suffer from a range of infirmities that 
prevent them from producing ‘high-quality, policy-relevant scholarship.’85 
Undoubtedly, financial and human resource constraints impede think tanks from 
producing quality research. Increasingly, think tanks have become outposts for former 
government officials and diplomats as they exit the civil service but it is unclear if this 
growing trend has closed the gap between both realms and pushed more policy relevant 
research to enter the policy process. Amitabh Mattoo and Rory Medcalf suggest that 
former government officials might not push for policy shifts given their proclivity to 
support the status quo.86 Nonetheless, think tanks are relevant as feedback mechanisms 
and vectors through which specific ideas or views acquire salience and possibly 
influence policy particularly in an age where the issues that governments face like 
global warming, public health pandemics, nuclear proliferation get more complex and 
technical. 
Finally, it is worth noting the final interest group of interest – the Indian media 
that covers organisations and individuals from news dailies, magazines and radio and 
television outlets. Though the India media landscape has expanded and fragmented over 
the past thirty years, there is little evidence to suggest they have tangibly influenced 
Indian foreign policy. Manoj Joshi claims that media influence and coverage is limited 
by the insular policymaking style of the Ministry of External Affairs that regulates the 
amount of information given to media entities on key issues.87 Moreover, the quality 
and consistency of coverage on issues differs which affects public understanding of key 
foreign policy issues. But when there is focused coverage, as witnessed on the US-India 
civil nuclear deal, debates on the issue get polarised which could constrain the space 
available for the government to adopt certain policies especially if a ‘clear-headed 
policy’ is missing.88 Moreover, similar to the influence of corporate interests, the 
importance of media groups is contingent on the government and the approach taken on 
particular policy concerns. Media influence is heightened by uncertainty and ineptness 
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and amplified when the government publically falters making it more susceptible and 
responsive to media pressure.89 Besides these interest groups, we also have to take note 
of certain pivotal individuals, likely to be experts on particular issues, who use various 
media avenues to inject their views into the policy domain to influence government 
thinking. Their role and advocacy on particular points of view could have a direct effect 
on how the government understands a foreign policy problem and the public debate 
around that problem.  
Gap – How Does India Negotiate International Rules? 
The literature review presented above does not represent the entire gamut of work on 
Indian foreign policy, just some key conceptual areas pertinent to this thesis and the 
empirical focus. The review traced several relevant components covering Indian 
multilateralism and Indian foreign policy with a focus on the political economy – 
interests and strategy, institutions including the executive, parliament and political 
parties and the bureaucracy and interest groups. These works have collectively 
expanded our understanding of Indian foreign policy. Yet collectively, these 
contributions are inadequate to understand and explain how India negotiates 
international rules and why it ratifies or rejects them. Nonetheless, these gaps also serve 
as opportunities to advance the literature on Indian foreign policy, India’s international 
political economy and Indian multilateralism. 
 First, we have very little understanding of what India’s interests are on particular 
issues like international trade, climate change, maritime security and nuclear 
disarmament and how those interests determine India’s approach at negotiations. Thus 
far, scholars who detail how and why India behaves on a particular multilateral issue 
like climate change, human rights or international trade tend to provide descriptive and 
post-hoc rationalisations of positions India adopted at particular junctures. It is 
important to highlight here that having a defensive or cautious attitude toward 
multilateral issues does not, in any way, negate the fact that an interest and desire exists 
to negotiate such policy matters. As a result, it is important to investigate further what 
the specific interests are on particular issues to better understand how they shape India’s 
approach at negotiations and how they influence the attendant outcomes, in this case 
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either ratification of international rules or not. Moreover, we need to carefully 
distinguish between India’s tendencies at international regimes that scholars like 
Narlikar and Malone and Cohen emphasise and actual policy outcomes when analysing 
India’s multilateral approach. For instance, can India be defensive at international 
negotiations and still ratify a particular treaty or agreement or does defensiveness 
portend rejection? There is an opportunity to link India’s positions during negotiations 
with eventual outcomes - ratification, abstention or rejection. 
 
 Second, there is an opportunity to carefully investigate the domestic politics 
around India’s approach toward international rules. The literature on India’s 
international political economy that should capture this dynamic offers little here.90 
Thus far, studies on India’s multilateral behaviour seldom unpack how domestic 
political considerations, particularly institutions, shape or constrain the policies 
adopted.91 This gap is disconcerting since institutions can and do affect Indian foreign 
policy. Even if one accepts prima facie the notion that institutional deficits exist in the 
conduct of Indian foreign policy, it should not preclude a sober consideration of how 
institutions function. We can better demonstrate how key institutions like the executive 
branch, various bureaucracies covering foreign and security policy and the legislature 
affect foreign policy. Leaders occupy a powerful role in studies of Indian foreign 
policy.92 There are studies that detail how institutions contribute to debates on key 
foreign policy issues, particularly related to conflict and intervention, but this process 
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can be explored further.93 We can build on this research by asking whether and how 
these institutions, like the executive or the bureaucracy responsible, influenced the 
approach taken at negotiations. Moreover, a focus on institutions allows us to gauge the 
importance of certain ideas and trace if and how they translate into policy. A focus on 
institutions also need not be one dimensional or focused on one particular institution 
like the Ministry of External Affairs or the Lok Sabha. On key foreign policy issues like 
arms control, climate change or military intervention, we can expect various institutions 
to have particular interests and adopt actions given their interests and positions.94 As a 
result, it is worth delineating how and whether relevant institutions cooperate or conflict 
on key issues and how this institutional balance affects foreign policymaking. To be 
sure, some institutions like the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) or the Ministry of 
External Affairs may have greater leverage or sway but even then we should be able to 
empirically depict how institutions function and respond in motion. Institutional 
effectiveness can be analysed more systematically. 
 
Third, tied to the question of institutions is the need to track and assess the 
effects of interest groups on Indian foreign policy. Can interest groups affect and 
constrain how India negotiates international rules? Very few studies have considered the 
effect of state-society relations on Indian foreign policy.95 Do Indian officials 
incorporate the views of relevant interest groups on matters of foreign policy? Existing 
research on interest groups in Indian foreign policy does not explore this question in 
depth even as the groups that participate in the policy process continue to rise. In the 
last twenty years, the number of interest groups in India has proliferated and they have 
become more politically active. The Quality of Government (QOG) Index rates India as 
high on civil society participation in the political process or the extent to which the 
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Indian government takes into account the interests of civil society actors. The index also 
rates India as high on interest group activity, which measures to what extent is there a 
‘network of cooperative associations to mediate between society and the political 
system.’96 Thus, we should be able to trace their agency on foreign policy issues. 
Interest groups also gain more relevance since India’s interactions with the international 
economy and the international order have increased.97 As a result, we should be able to 
trace whether interest groups are affected by such interactions and if they opt to respond 
or articulate their views to political institutions. There is an opportunity to investigate 
the political economy of foreign policy by considering how both interest groups and 
institutions shape policy. 
 
Finally, it is instructive to ask if it is possible to empirically link developments 
between the domestic and international levels. To be sure, links between domestic and 
international politics is well reflected in several studies in the literature on Indian 
foreign policy.98 The work on the Indo-US nuclear agreement has shown how domestic 
political factors affected India’s positions and negotiation of the agreement.99 Generally, 
studies that focus on domestic politics commence at the domestic level to explain Indian 
foreign policy positions and outcomes at the international level. Sequentially, the 
argument generally works from the domestic to the international level. Analytically, 
however, there is an opportunity to direct inquiry the other way around by exploring 
whether systemic factors and developments at the international level, specifically 
international negotiations in this study, have an impact on how key political institutions 
perceive the issue and how that awareness and capacity influences the approach taken 
thereafter. We can map the interactive effects of developments at the international and 
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domestic levels on foreign policy. Given constant interactions between the domestic and 
international levels, it is now possible to map these developments in a dynamic way that 
permits us to make assured empirical judgments on India’s foreign policy. Next, I move 
to describe the research design of the thesis that shows how I plan to achieve the 




The next task is to pick international rules that India has negotiated to gauge 
how it behaves while negotiating them. Below, I list the relevant universe of 
international rules that India has negotiated from 1991-2005.  
 
Table 1 International Rules India has negotiated 1991-2005 
 
Year Rule Outcome 
1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
Ratified 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention Ratified 
1994 United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification  
Ratified 
1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety Ratified  
1995 General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (Uruguay Round 
Agreement) 
Ratified 
1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Rejected 
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty Abstained 
1997 Kyoto Protocol  Ratified 
1998 Rome Statute on the International 
Criminal Court 
Abstained 
2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control 
Ratified 
2005 Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 





To maximise the chances of observing the impact of institutional and political 
factors as stated above in influencing India’s behaviour during international 
negotiations, I have tried to pick cases where India’s behaviour diverged. For that 
reason, I select two key cases where India’s approach and the outcome differed – 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) and Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1992). Like climate change and disarmament, international trade is a critical issue that 
countries engage on. The Uruguay Round was also the last major trade agreement 
negotiated by GATT (and WTO) till now. As a result, I have opted to consider Uruguay 
Round Trade Agreement. Having chosen cases on climate change and nuclear 
disarmament, I drop two other international agreements that cover the same issue - 
Kyoto Protocol and Convention on Nuclear Safety. I also drop three other agreements 
given their narrow technical character – WIPO Copyright Treaty, Convention to 
Combat Desertification, Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. 
Finally, I have chosen the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control over the Rome 
Statute on the International Criminal Court. This decision was taken for two reasons. 
First, by selecting the FCTC, the four issues examined in this thesis deal with different 
policy matters – nuclear disarmament, climate change, international trade and public 
health - allowing us to robustly consider India’s behaviour across a range of issue areas. 
And second, tobacco control matters more to India’s economic potential than the 
International Criminal Court given India’s demographic profile that is 
disproportionately young and the risks sustained tobacco use poses to economic growth. 
We can thus expect Indian negotiators to place more importance on the former than the 
latter.  
 
Empirically, I focus on four particular international rules in this thesis - 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Uruguay 






To generate findings, the thesis employs the method of structured-focused comparison 
across the four case studies.100 The method was developed to study historical 
experiences to add to the generic knowledge of key foreign policy problems. In the past, 
trends like nuclear deterrence or the ratification arms control treaties have been 
investigated through this method to yield explanations that would add to our 
understanding of theories concerning those two phenomena.101 Structured-focused 
comparison is structured in that the researcher asks a series of standardised general 
questions, reflecting the larger research objective, of each case. Questions are developed 
to reflect the underlying research objectives and conceptual focus of the thesis. And the 
method is focused in that delves into certain aspects of cases to yield cumulative 
findings. Case studies are undertaken with a specific research objective at hand.  
 
 
The following questions will be considered in each case:  
 
Bureaucratic Capacity: Does the relevant bureaucracy or ministry understand the issue 
being considered at international negotiations?  
 
Bureaucratic Initiative: Does bureaucratic understanding affect the approach taken at 
negotiations?  
 
Executive Power: Does the executive support the approach taken? 
                                                
100Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. (Boston: MIT Press, 2005), 67-73. Also see Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory 
Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in 
History, Theory and Policy ed. Paul Gordon Laren, (New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68. 
101Several scholars have used structured-focused comparison to study different historical episodes. 
Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell employ structured focused comparison to consider how domestic 
political factors (U.S. Senate) affects the ratification of arms control treaties in the United States in 20th 
century. Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell, (eds.) The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification (New 
York: Springer, 1992); Patrick Haney used the approach to study how U.S. presidents have organised and 
managed advisory groups during foreign policy crises and how these groups have functioned during those 
times. Patrick J. Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the 
Management of Decision Making. (Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Andrew Kennedy used 
the approach to study the diplomatic approaches of Mao and Nehru and how they sought to overcome 
hostile structural conditions through their own brand of diplomacy. See Andrew B. Kennedy, The 
International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy 




Division of Powers: Does the legislative branch support the government’s approach?  
 
Interest Groups: What are the relevant interest groups and what are their policy 
preferences?  
 
Informational Constraints: Do relevant interest groups have particular information or 
knowledge that influence the government’s position?  
 
Policy Advocacy: Do interest groups cultivate linkages with government officials in the 
policy area and effectively articulate their preferences to them?  
 
Sources and Materials  
 
I rely on various primary documents in each of the four cases covered. These documents 
- that include official positions of India toward the rule being negotiated, comments and 
memos from Indian negotiators and other officials representing India and position 
papers and other official documents submitted by the Indian delegation at international 
negotiations - were accessed from the internet archives of the regime covering each 
rule. For the CTBT, documents were accessed from the Conference on Disarmament’s 
and U.N. Disarmament Commission’s internet archives; Uruguay Round Trade 
Agreement from the GATT archives at Stanford University; FCTC from the World 
Health Organization’s FCTC archives, Wellcome Trust library archives in London and 
the Tobacco Control Archives at University of California San Francisco; and FCCC 
from the FCCC Secretariat and UN General Assembly archives.  
 
In each case, I also investigate the positions and actions of key political 
institutions – executive, legislature and bureaucracy to get a sense of their motivations 
before and as negotiations got underway. These views are obtained from a wide variety 
of sources – newspaper articles, memoirs, primary and secondary sources concerning 
the rule being negotiated. I have mined the Lok Sabha (Indian lower house) database to 
get a sense of how the Indian parliament acted as each rule was being negotiated. The 
proceedings and voting patterns of each parliamentary session from 1991 which detail 
speeches and positions of the house and individual members have been posted on the 
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Internet. In addition, I have relied on the Indian Government’s Public Information 
Bureau’s internet archive to access a range of sources on the policies and positions 
taken by the Prime Minister, Cabinet and each minister on the issues being covered 
here. I have also drawn from several Indian newspapers including the Times of India, 
The Indian Express and The Hindu that covered negotiations as they unfolded. 
 
Supplementing these primary and secondary materials, I have conducted 20 
interviews with relevant government and non-governmental officials involved during 
the course of negotiations or around the time of negotiations of each of the four rules 
investigated in this thesis. These interviewees include official Indian negotiators on all 
four cases who were present at negotiations, bureaucrats from the ministry representing 
India at negotiations some of whom had done preparatory work before hand, officials 
from relevant international and non-governmental organisations who have worked with 
Indian negotiators and have knowledge of India’s positions on each of these rules and 
journalists and academics who have conducted research and reporting on these four 
issues.  
 
Ethical Considerations and Implications 
 
At this moment, it is important to expound on the process of elite interviewing, the 
implications of drawing from the interview data gathered and describe the ethical 
implications of conducting the interviews. Before fieldwork, I applied for low-risk 
ethical approval to conduct research on this topic, which was granted. All the interviews 
were conducted either in person in New Delhi, telephonically or in one instance via 
email. The sample of interviewees consisted of current and former Indian government 
officials involved either in the run-up to or the process of international negotiations, 
officials from international organizations involved either directly or indirectly in each of 
the four sets of negotiations, officials from think tanks and non-governmental 
organizations in India who were either formally or informally involved advising the 
government on negotiations and finally academics and scholars who have expertise in 
that particular issue being negotiated. Participants were identified through a thorough 
review of primary and secondary literatures covering India’s negotiations of these four 
rules. Some interviewees were identified through the virtual archives in the international 
organization that document the proceedings of these negotiations including lists of 
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delegates who negotiated on behalf of member states and how many meetings they 
attended as official delegates. After the participants were identified, they were sent a 
uniform recruitment email that included the author’s institutional details, synopsis of the 
project and the ethical implications of participation, should they agree. Once 
interviewees agreed, they were given the choices of three options given their identity 
and the sensitivity associated with disclosing certain aspects of international 
negotiations. The options were – (i) disclose full name and institutional identity (past or 
current) (ii) withhold name but disclose institutional identity (past or current) (iii) 
anonymous. Most of the interviewees chose the first option with some picking the 
second and third. Before the interviews, the participants were given consent forms 
noting their consent for the interview.  
 
All the interviews were semi-structured. Broadly, the interviewees were asked 
questions regarding the background conditions, political and institutional, around 
international negotiations; what the process of negotiations was like and if they were 
involved either directly or indirectly; what their primary approach was during 
negotiations and how they went about trying to achieve their objectives. The process of 
elite interviewing allows the researcher to elicit rich perspectives on the process of 
negotiations and how they transpired. However, there are limitations to this approach 
and method; specifically, a key concern is the reliability of the interview data given the 
identities of the individuals involved. Some interviewees might attempt to inflate their 
role during negotiations or underplay the effect of other factors and individuals. To 
guard against this problem, I have taken some precautions. First, I have extensively 
mined the institutional/virtual archives for minutes of the proceedings at negotiations. 
These minutes generally provide the identity of the Indian negotiator present and their 
official remarks and statements. While synthesising and analysing the interviews, I have 
compared the proceedings with the interview data to gauge the veracity of the latter. 
Also, I have relied on newspaper materials that covered negotiations 
contemporaneously, official statements from the Indian government and parliament and 
other secondary sources including oral histories of Indian officials and negotiators to get 
a balanced perspective of each set of negotiations and how Indian officials presented 
India’s positions there. I have triangulated from all these materials to robustly recreate 





Through these various methods and materials, I strove to recreate the approach 
and position taken by Indian officials toward each international rule covered in this 
thesis. I employ structured-focused comparison and process tracing to help analytically 
chart the process through which Indian officials negotiated the rule and sketch the 
conditions that led to the final outcome. One potential flaw with this particular method 
is that it focuses with only certain aspects of case studies, which could make us ignore 
other factors that could have had an impact in the events being described. Nonetheless, 
it is a valuable tool to generate knowledge on particular historical problems. 
 
 The following four chapters test the framework against the four cases – 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Uruguay Round 
Trade Agreement. The final chapter provides concluding thoughts on the thesis and asks 




Chapter Three - India and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
 
Introduction  
This chapter covers India’s ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC). Through the FCTC, member states agreed to adopt a series of 
measures and standards to limit tobacco use worldwide. FCTC became the first 
international public health treaty negotiated by WHO member states more than sixty 
years after the international organisation’s inception. The chapter first provides a brief 
historical background of the developments leading to FCTC negotiations before 
describing India’s behaviour toward the framework convention. Next, the chapter asks 
why India’s ratification and leadership was puzzling with respect to the FCTC. After 
that, the chapter provides an analytical narrative that describes how interests, 
institutions and interest groups interacted to determine India’s approach at FCTC 
negotiations and subsequent ratification. Briefly, as the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MoHFW) learnt more of the deteriorating tobacco use problem in India, they 
sought to curb it through various policy measures. Health officials established close 
linkages with domestic tobacco control groups with whom they partnered with to 
solidify tobacco control at home through a comprehensive tobacco control legislation – 
COTPA. This process coincided with FCTC negotiations. Soon thereafter, armed with 
robust knowledge on tobacco use and control, Indian health officials sought to negotiate 
a tough framework convention that resembled the domestic legislation in intent and 
purpose leading to ratification soon after negotiations.  
 
Background 
By the mid-1990s, tobacco use was a leading cause of disease and premature death. A 
steep rise in cigarette smoking coupled with consumption of other tobacco products 
resulted in roughly 3.5 million deaths worldwide in 1999.1 Tobacco use also increased 
worldwide with tobacco companies moving to developing countries after confronting 
regulatory difficulties in the U.S. and Europe. Between 1975 and 1994, total cigarette 
                                                
1Prakash Jha, et al, “Tobacco Addiction,” in Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries. Ed. 
D.T. Jamison et al (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2006), 879. 
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sales in the U.S. dropped by 20 percent even as production grew by 11 percent.2 Laws 
on tobacco consumption were generally weaker in developing countries with some 
actively promoting tobacco cultivation and exports. With support from the U.S. and 
other industrialised countries, international tobacco companies found additional market 
access for their products through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
By 1994, tobacco exports were $200 billion (US) up from $50 billion (US) in 1975.3 
As the tobacco industry globalised and tobacco-induced deaths shot up, there 
was no clear impetus to curb tobacco use from international public health authorities. 
Though the World Health Organization (hereafter WHO) had the authority to tackle the 
troubling situation by negotiating an international treaty to regulate tobacco use, it chose 
not to exercise its treaty-making power enshrined in Article XIX of its constitution.4 
The WHO proved reticent to consider a tobacco treaty given little support for the idea 
from existing member states; member state support was difficult to obtain since only 
about ten countries had comprehensive tobacco control policies and almost none in the 
developing world.5 Some senior WHO officials found an international treaty unviable 
for this reason; instead, they preferred a softer non-binding instrument to regulate global 
tobacco use.6 But the idea of an international tobacco treaty had traction because it gave 
WHO the authority to stem the tobacco scourge instead of relying on other international 
organisations, like GATT, to act.  
In 1995, WHO officials began exploring strategies to draft a treaty on tobacco 
control.7 Strong support came from the newly elected WHO Director General Gro 
Harlem Brundtland who backed her officials to get on with the task.8 Soon thereafter, 
                                                
2Allan Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that Defined 
America (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 457. 
3American trade officials worked diligently to pry open foreign markets from the 1970s by challenging 
bans on tobacco imports and high tariffs. Concerted industry lobbying helped facilitate this cause; the 
industry had, since 1959, been committed to the idea of a “global smoker” and the promotion of “global 
brands.” Brandt, The Cigarette Century, 458-59. 
4Thomas Bollyky claims FCTC was not the first global health treaty. He points to the International 
Sanitary Regulations, a binding treaty, which later became the International Health Regulations 
negotiated in 1952 by the WHO. FCTC, however, was the first treaty negotiated through Article XIX of 
WHO constitution. Thomas Bollyky and David Fidler, “Has a Global Tobacco Treaty Made a 
Difference?” http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/02/has-a-global-tobacco-treaty-made-a-
difference/386399. 
5L.A. Reynolds and E.M. Tansey, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (London: Queen 
Mary, University of London, 2012) 
6K. Srinath Reddy, Public Health Foundation of India. Interview by author. February 10, 2015. 
7Brandt, The Cigarette Century, 472. 
8Ibid, 474.  
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the WHO devised an agenda for a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(hereafter FCTC) and areas it would cover.9 WHO member states agreed that the 
framework convention would pronounce certain core principles and policies on tobacco 
control that would be implementable through legislation and other policies by member 
states that ratified.10 States agreed the key focus should be ‘reduction in tobacco use’ 
through various policy measures like taxes, regulation, enforcement and education of 
the risks around tobacco use.11 A majority of delegates at the WHO called for a tough 
but general treaty that left enough room for member states to ratify and use that model 
to bolster tobacco control policies.12 
India was one such developing country that had an alarming tobacco use 
problem. In 1989, tobacco-attributable deaths in India were 630,000 per year with most 
deaths caused by smokeless tobacco use.13 By 2000, tobacco-related deaths in India 
nearly reached a million (920,000) per year with deaths rising among those who smoked 
cigarettes.14 Since existing tobacco laws did not regulate public consumption, levels of 
exposure to second hand smoke rose nearly 30 percent in the 1980s.15 The resultant 
health costs were severe. Among men, nearly half of all cancers were tobacco-related 
and among women, a quarter.16 A shorthanded focus on regulating cigarettes alone 
through the 1975 Cigarettes Act led to a meteoric rise in oral cancers, which nearly 
160,000 Indians developed each year from oral consumption.17 Treating these tobacco-
related diseases cost the Indian government approximately US$6.5 billion in 1999.18 
 
When the draft FCTC arrived in New Delhi for review, officials from the Indian 
                                                
9Until then, framework conventions were used to tackle environmental issues like climate change and 
ozone depletion beyond the scope of a single state to address. It was unclear, though, if tobacco control 
met the threshold for a framework convention since tobacco control policies were drafted and 





13K. Srinath Reddy and P. C. Gupta, Tobacco Control in India (New Delhi: Shree Om Enterprises, 2007), 
27. 
14Riti Shimkhada, and John W. Peabody, “Tobacco Control in India,” Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization, 81, 1 (2003): 49. 
15C.M. Singh, Amit Kaushik, and P. K. Jain, “Tobacco Control in India—Lots need to be done....” Indian 
Journal of Community Health 23, 2 (2011): 51. 
16World Health Organization. Tobacco or Health: A Global Status Report (Geneva: WHO, 1997), 2. 
17Kenneth E. Warner, “The Role of Research in International Tobacco Control,” American Journal of 
Public Health 95, 6 (2005): 977. 
18Shimkhada and Peabody, Tobacco Control in India, 49. 
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Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (hereafter MOHFW) proved enthusiastic and 
willing to negotiate a tough and instantly applicable framework convention. Tobacco 
use imposes considerable costs for developing countries like India when considered 
from an economic and public health perspective. Sustained tobacco use can result in 
illnesses that erode employee productivity; moreover, premature deaths from tobacco 
use deprive governments of tax revenues from citizens in their prime years. Such losses 
are further compounded by medical costs accompanying tobacco use. Consequently, 
international or domestic rules that curb tobacco use and lower the burden of medical 
and economic costs are crucial given the importance of economic growth to developing 
countries. India accepted the need for a treaty on tobacco control and that, broadly, 
provisions should constrain the international tobacco industry by enhancing tobacco 
regulations.  
At FCTC negotiations, Indian negotiators laboured alongside other developing 
countries to ensure provisions tightened rules around international tobacco commerce, 
particularly advertising and distribution of tobacco products. Indian officials also 
represented the interests of key Asian and other developing countries struggling to 
contain domestic tobacco use. Indian negotiators also pushed for the framework 
convention to provide financial and technical assistance to enable developing countries 
build capacities to reduce tobacco use and compensate citizens employed in the tobacco 
industry whose livelihoods were at risk from tougher international rules. India was 
among the first signatories of the FCTC, signing and ratifying the framework 
convention soon after negotiations.  
Puzzle – India’s FCTC behaviour 
 
India’s leadership while negotiating the FCTC and subsequent ratification is puzzling 
for two reasons. First, India was not widely regarded as a WHO member state keen on 
tobacco control. The Indian health ministry steered clear of regulating tobacco use or 
minimising its public health effects until the mid-1990s. Health officials had little 
knowledge of tobacco prevalence across the country with virtually no reliable statistics 
on tobacco use and if such use caused disease and death. For decades, the only piece of 
tobacco legislation was the 1975 Cigarettes Act that sought to restrict illegal trade and 
distribution of cigarettes across the country and ensure cigarette packages displayed 
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adequate health warnings.19 But the law, however, only regulated cigarettes, leaving out 
smokeless tobacco products that were heavily used across India.20 For a country with a 
bleak record on tobacco control, India’s behaviour at FCTC negotiations was a clear 
departure.  
Second, India’s behaviour is puzzling because the Indian government fostered 
tobacco production. From 1951-1991, the acreage provided to grow tobacco and 
subsequent production levels grew at a commensurate pace; no surprisingly, this surge 
generated significant excise revenues for the government.21 Subsidies, debt relief and 
other tax incentives were given to tobacco farmers across India.22 By 1992, India was 
the third largest tobacco-growing country, producing nearly ‘7 percent of the world’s 
total unmanufactured tobacco and 14 percent of the world’s total manufactured tobacco’ 
in the form of cigarettes and beedis.23 Combined, the industry contributed nearly 10 
percent of the Indian government’s total excise revenue in 1995 with potential to 
grow.24 With a booming domestic tobacco industry, India should have resisted 
negotiations and rejected the FCTC instead of leading to negotiate and ratify it. 
 
To address this puzzle and explain why India negotiated and signed the FCTC 
with such interest, we need to grapple with how key state institutions, particularly the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and domestic tobacco control activists and 
groups understood and acted on the problem of tobacco use in the mid-1990s. In short, a 
better understanding of tobacco consumption and its effects by the Ministry of Health 
generated a strong stance at FCTC negotiations. The Indian Prime Minister and tobacco 
control groups who wanted the government to upgrade domestic tobacco laws and ratify 
the FCTC endorsed this approach. Next, I provide an analytical narrative of how 
institutions and interest groups sought to make the government realise the importance of 
tobacco control leading to two notable political achievements – the passage of a 
comprehensive tobacco control legislation Cigarettes and Other Products Act (COTPA) 
and ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.  
                                                
19Ibid, 49. 
20Rahul Mehrotra, V. Mehrotra, and T. Jandoo, “Tobacco Control Legislation in India: Past and 
Present,” Indian Journal of Cancer, 47, 5 (2010): 75. 
21K. Srinath Reddy, “History of Tobacco in India,” (lecture, New Delhi, August 12 2004) 
22Ibid. 
23Shimkhada and Peabody, Tobacco Control in India, 50. Beedis are indigenous tobacco products 
generally consumed with heat.  
24Sharad Vaidya “Tobacco, a Health Issue First,” The Times of India May 01, 1977, 3. 
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Narrative – India and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control  
Understanding India’s Tobacco Problem 
By the early 1990s, the Indian government faced a major tobacco use problem but one it 
had little understanding of. As briefly mentioned, the health ministry did not have sound 
data or reliable statistics on tobacco use and how the situation affected public health. 
Concurrently, successive governments promoted tobacco as an export crop that yielded 
considerable revenues to government through excise duties and taxes. An abundance of 
tobacco resulted in the manufacturing of an array of tobacco products consumed in 
myriad forms. Distressingly, most tobacco products, particularly those consumed in oral 
or nasal forms, were largely unregulated.   
The parlous state of affairs spurred scientific research on tobacco use. New 
scientific research, from the early 1990s, vividly illuminated the social and public health 
consequences of tobacco consumption, in all forms. One of the pioneers responsible 
was P.C. Gupta, Indian epidemiologist turned public health activist, who uncovered 
several important aspects of the tobacco problem - particularly the rise of smokeless 
tobacco use25 and its health effects, levels of youth tobacco consumption,26 growing 
urban use of tobacco27 and the relationship between tobacco use and health conditions 
including TB, heart and lung disease.28 By 1995, Gupta’s research established that a 
‘clear and coherent link existed between tobacco use and morbidity.’29 Importantly, the 
failure of the existing 1975 Cigarettes Act that only regulated cigarettes came alive 
through grim morbidity and mortality figures. 
                                                
25Gupta’s research on smokeless tobacco use. See P. C. Gupta, D. K. Daftary, and Fali S Mehta, “Oral 
Submucous Fibrosis as a Precancerous Condition,” European Journal of Oral Sciences 92, 3 (1984): 224-
229.; P.C. Gupta, “An Intervention Study of Tobacco Chewing and Smoking Habits for Primary 
Prevention of Oral Cancer among 12 212 Indian villagers,” (1986): 307-18. 
26Gupta’s research on youth tobacco use. See P.C. Gupta, “Health Consequences of Tobacco Use in 
India,” World smoking and health 13 (1988): 5-10.; P.C. Gupta, and Keith Ball, “India: tobacco 
tragedy,” The Lancet 335, 8689 (1990): 594-595.; P.C. Gupta, Simon Chapman, Elizabeth. M Whelan, 
John James, and Aidan Macfarlane, “Teenage smoking,” The Lancet 346, 8978 (1995): 846-847. 
27Gupta’s research on urban tobacco use in India - See P.C. Gupta, Mangesh S. Pednekar, D. M. Parkin, 
and R. Sankaranarayanan, “Tobacco Associated Mortality in Mumbai (Bombay) India. Results of the 
Bombay cohort study,” International journal of epidemiology 34, 6 (2005): 1395-1402. 
28Gupta on tobacco and morbidity - See P.C. Gupta, R. Sankaranarayanan, and Jacques Ferlay, “Cancer 
deaths in India: is the model-based approach valid?” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 72, 6 
(1994): 943; P.C. Gupta, “Cigarette Smoking in China—A Message for India,” The National medical 
journal of India 10, 2 (1997): 74; P.C. Gupta, “Survey of Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Tobacco 
Use among 99,598 individuals in Bombay, India using handheld computers,” Tobacco control 5, 2 
(1996): 114-120. 
29P.C. Gupta, Indian Epidemiologist, Interview by author, February 6, 2015. 
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Scientists and epidemiologists building the evidentiary base for tobacco use 
cultivated linkages with physicians and non-governmental activists raising awareness on 
the perils of sustained tobacco consumption.30 Gradually, the collaboration led to 
several publications revealing the perils both of sustained tobacco use in India and 
government inaction.31 More research and civil society consultations with government 
made health officials realise the gravity of the tobacco problem. Two trends struck 
health officials as particularly problematic.32 First, they were alarmed by tobacco 
prevalence among particular groups - specifically youth and women.33 Research 
revealed young smokers started smoking before turning eighteen driven by targeted 
tobacco advertising and peer-pressure.34 Anti-tobacco advocates implored the 
government to limit tobacco use amongst the youth given focused marketing strategies 
of tobacco companies that ‘reinforced the social acceptability of smoking.’35 The 
second worrying trend was the meteoric rise in smokeless tobacco use that was laid bare 
through bleak oral cancer statistics.36 The rise in the number of women tobacco 
consumers was largely due to smokeless tobacco.37 Smokeless consumption, both oral 
or nasal, also cut across prevailing socio-economic divides – class, gender, age and 
urban-rural.38 
 
This understanding led to a major national conference on tobacco use in 1991 
steered by the Government of India that brought together WHO officials, state 
                                                
30Shoba John, Programme Director, Healthbridge. Interview by author. New Delhi, January 23, 2015. 
31K. Srinath Reddy. In 1992, Gupta organised a major international conference on tobacco use in Asia 
that highlighted the burgeoning problem in India. At the conference, several papers were presented 
around domestic and international tobacco control professionals working to raise awareness of the issue. 
See P.C. Gupta, Prakash C., and James E. Hammer, Control of Tobacco-Related Cancers and other 
Diseases: An International Symposium, January 15-19, 1990, (Bombay: Tata Institute of Fundamental 
Research, 1992). 
32Former Joint Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of India. Interview by author. February 11, 
2015.   
33Ibid.   
34P.C. Gupta, “Tobacco Control in the South Asia Region," Tobacco control 3, 2 (1994): 170.; P.C. 
Gupta, Simon Chapman, Elizabeth M Whelan, John James, and Aidan Macfarlane, “Teenage 
smoking,” The Lancet 346, 8978 (1995): 846-847.; Also see Kapoor, S. K., K. Anand, and Guresh 
Kumar. "Prevalence of Tobacco Use among School and College going Adolescents of Haryana." The 
Indian Journal of Pediatrics 62, 4, (1995), 462. 
35Rupa Chinai, “Anti-tobacco lobby opposes expansion of transnationals,” The Times of India, May 29, 
1997, 4.  36P.C. Gupta, “Smokeless Tobacco Use in India,”	  Smokeless Tobacco or Health: An International 
Perspective	  (1992): 19-25.	  
37Reddy, History of Tobacco in India. 
38P.C. Gupta, “Health consequences of Tobacco Use in India,” World smoking and health 13, (1988): 6.; 
P.C. Gupta, R. Sankaranarayanan, and Jacques Ferlay, “Cancer deaths in India: is the model-based 
approach valid?” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 72, 6 (1994): 943. 
 
68 
governments, epidemiologists, public health analysts and tobacco industry 
representatives. The MOHFW organised the conference and played a coordinating role, 
soliciting opinions and ideas on national tobacco trends from a range of stakeholders, 
including NGOs, scientists and the tobacco industry.39 Through the conference and 
discussions under the heading ‘Tobacco or Health,’ tobacco use was presented as a 
public health, not economic, issue that required an ‘inter-sectoral’ policy approach.40 
The framing was significant since the domestic tobacco industry had presented tobacco 
as a ‘socio-economic issue’ that had little attendant human costs; indeed, this claim was 
being steadily dented by research detailing tobacco-attributable mortality rates.41 
Delegates present suggested several policies to enhance tobacco control. Most 
importantly, they advised the government to examine how existing laws can be 
strengthened to reduce the demand, distribution and consumption of tobacco products. 
Given conflicting economic considerations that had often attenuated tobacco control, 
the health ministry was encouraged to institute an expert committee to investigate the 
economics of tobacco use.42 
Getting Tough on Tobacco – Bureaucracy Takes Charge  
After the conference, the MOHFW enacted several policy measures to tighten tobacco 
control. Since tobacco was predominantly consumed through smokeless unpackaged 
products, the MOHFW amended provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 
that mandated every tobacco package, especially in oral and nasal forms, display a clear 
warning sign.43 Then the cabinet secretariat issued an administrative order prohibiting 
smoking in specified public places including government hospitals, dispensaries and 
educational institutions; New Delhi also urged state governments to discourage the sale 
of tobacco products near educational and health institutions.44 These moves were, 
however, questioned by domestic tobacco manufacturers that expanded production and 
invested more on product marketing and distribution.45 Nonetheless, growing 
government interest on tobacco control signalled that more policies could be in the 
                                                
39Former Joint Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of India. Interview by author. January 22, 
2015.  
40Government of India, National Conference on Tobacco or Health. (New Delhi: Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare and World Health Organization, 1991) 
41Shimkhada and Peabody, Tobacco Control in India, 51. 
42Ibid. 
43Reddy, History of Tobacco in India, 2. 
44Ibid. 
45Arun Varghese, “India’s Future May Go up in Smoke,” The Times of India, May 27, 1997, 1. 
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pipeline to strengthen tobacco control.  
In 1995, the Parliamentary Committee on Subordinate Legislation reviewed the 
efficacy of 1975 Cigarettes Act. The committee recommended measures to extend 
warnings to cover all forms of tobacco and endorsed a complete ban on tobacco 
advertising at public places with additional emphasis on educating the public on the 
perils of sustained consumption.46 The MOHFW also formed an expert committee in 
1997 to investigate the economics of tobacco production and use.47 The committee’s 
mandate was to compare the trade-offs for government between public health costs 
from tobacco use and revenues generated by the tobacco industry.48 This dilemma had 
to be resolved before the MOHFW could draft a comprehensive tobacco control 
legislation. Politically, it was crucial since nearly 2 million Indians were employed by 
the tobacco industry, individuals who stood to be affected by enhanced controls; but, 
given the committee’s suggestion, decisions concerning their economic future would 
have to be made by accounting for the health of all Indian citizens.49 
The expert committee’s report, released in 1999, concluded that the ‘indirect, 
incidental, short run presumed benefits in terms of employment, output, foreign 
exchange earnings, tax revenue, etc., are there because consumers are in various ways 
induced and addicted’ on tobacco.50 Going further, the committee argued that ‘costs of 
medical treatment and other external costs incurred by the patients and society are even 
in their underestimated form so staggering as to dwarf the putative indirect financial 
benefits’ gained by the government through tobacco promotion.51 Put simply, financial 
gains from tobacco promotion and revenues generated through taxes paled in 
comparison to the costs, current and future, from the medical treatment of tobacco-
related diseases. The report proved vital since the MOHFW was relying on the 
committee’s imprimatur to reorient their policy approach that swung decisively in 
favour of tobacco control.52 The report also gave the ministry sufficient cover to 
                                                
46Mehrotra et al, Tobacco Control Legislation in India, 75. 
47Government of India, Order: Expert Committee on the Economics of Tobacco Use. Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare, 1996. 
48Ibid. 
49Ibid. 
50Government of India, Report of the Expert Committee on the Economics of Tobacco Use (New Delhi: 





enhance tobacco regulations given expected resistance from the tobacco industry.53  
Concurrently, the incoming National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government 
led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) moved to constrain tobacco promotion. Prime 
Minister Vajpayee urged tobacco farmers to grow alternate crops given the ‘health 
hazards caused by tobacco usage’ and impending difficulties tobacco companies faced 
from enhanced regulatory controls and negative publicity.54 Speaking to farmers in 
Andhra Pradesh, Vajpayee urged them to switch to other crops ‘because of financial 
constraints’ that New Delhi incurred by subsidising them.55 New Delhi also encouraged 
states like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh to cut subsidies given to the tobacco industry 
despite their reluctance.56 Excise duties on tobacco were increased in states like Tripura 
and Assam where tobacco companies had moved production.57 These measures suggest 
that the Indian government was preparing to disengage from the tobacco trade, albeit 
fitfully; however, this focus did not extend to domestic cigarette companies that were 
exploring joint initiatives with multinational tobacco companies to expand operations in 
India.58 Smokeless tobacco proved more pressing for the government to arrest than 
cigarettes, at least early on. 
 These policies were the immediate precursor to the Indian government’s larger 
tobacco control initiative. In January 2000, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Pramod 
Mahajan stated that the government was on the cusp of introducing a comprehensive 
tobacco control legislation to reduce tobacco use.59 Before tabling the bill, Mahajan 
shared the government’s reasoning, ‘an estimated 13,517 Crore Rupees would be 
required to provide treatment to persons suffering from tobacco control diseases which 
was much more than what was earned by the production and sale of tobacco products.’60 
The government acted in accordance with the expert committee report’s conclusion that 
ruled on the economics-health trade-off vis-à-vis tobacco use. With political support, 
the MOHFW drafted and submitted a comprehensive tobacco control legislation – 
Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (hereafter COTPA) for cabinet approval in 
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COTPA sought to better regulate the domestic tobacco industry by encumbering 
it with an array of rules covering the production, distribution and consumption of 
tobacco. As such, the bill was more an economic than a health legislation given 
underlying causes - abundance of regulated and unregulated tobacco products that led to 
sustained tobacco consumption. In less than a decade, health officials internalised the 
dangers of sustained tobacco use by conducting a major national conference on tobacco 
control and establishing various committees to study the problem and advise on 
remedial actions. These efforts served as the basis to draft a new comprehensive 
tobacco control law that renewed controls on tobacco advertising and production, in 
particular, to reduce smokeless tobacco use and cigarette smoking among the youth; 
emphasis was also given to enhance policies on prevention and cessation. COTPA was 
the culmination of several policy measures taken by the health ministry from 1991. 
Crucial here was the NDA government’s new health minister C.P Thakur who 
drove his ministry to complete the bill’s drafting upon entering office.62 Thakur’s 
arrival and understanding of tobacco use, being a physician himself, accelerated the 
bill’s completion. At a speech to launch the bill, Thakur was unambiguous on the need 
for a comprehensive legislation calling tobacco a ‘major public health problem’ and a 
‘killer’ that must be ‘curtailed, if it cannot be totally stopped.’63 Thakur also secured 
Prime Minister Vajpayee’s support for the bill.64 Not only was Vajpayee concerned of 
mounting health costs from tobacco use, he also had a personal interest in tobacco 
control. At the inauguration of a cancer institute in 2000, Vajpayee wistfully recalled 
the death of both his parents from cancer after chewing tobacco for decades, ‘it is my 
misfortune that both died of cancer.’65 
Executive support on tobacco control was significant since hitherto Indian Prime 
Ministers rarely acted on the issue, instead delegating matters to health ministers.66 
Vajpayee understood the importance of the costs of tobacco use to the Indian economy 
                                                
61“Health ministry sends draft bill on tobacco use for cabinet approval,” The Times of India, February 4, 
2000, 8. 
62Ibid.  
63C.P. Thakur, “Tobacco Control: Everybody’s Concern,” Press Information Bureau, February 11, 2000.  
64Bhavani Thygarajan. 
65“PM tells tobacco farmers to grow alternate crops,” The Times of India, 2000. June 23, 12.  
66Shoba John.  
 
72 
and effects the product was having on the youth, core targets of domestic and 
international tobacco companies.67 Vajpayee also endorsed strengthening international 
standards on tobacco control. In January 2000, the government convened an 
international conference in New Delhi to ‘obtain a developing country perspective’ 
toward the negotiation of an international treaty on tobacco use.68 The meeting, 
inaugurated by Prime Minister Vajpayee and WHO Director General Brundtland, 
sought to grasp the developing country context around tobacco use, understand the 
political and technical parameters of the issue and reiterate the importance of 
comprehensive approaches to tobacco control. In his speech, Vajpayee exhorted the 
assembled audience to take the tobacco problem seriously and look beyond ‘quick 
revenue generation from the sale of tobacco related products.’69 The Prime Minister 
stressed the widespread dangers tobacco posed to India that cut across fault lines 
including class, ethnicity, gender and caste.70 
 
Despite his clear commitment to tobacco control, Vajpayee did not entirely 
dispense with the concerns of Indian tobacco farmers. Quite directly, Vajpayee 
proclaimed international tobacco control to be inadequate unless ‘accompanied by 
alternative modes of income for those dependent on tobacco.’71 Politics also factored 
here; several trade unions submitted official memorandums imploring Vajpayee to 
reject the international tobacco treaty given ‘important economic consequences to the 
country’ which moderated his strong personal desire for tough tobacco control.72 Near 
the end of his remarks, Vajpayee called for the WHO to lead in weaning middle and 
lower income countries off the surging tobacco use problem; active international 
leadership alongside financial assistance, he added, was critical given sizeable tobacco 
constituencies in the developing world that had to be compensated.73 With this strong 
background and foundation, the MOHFW was set for FCTC negotiations.  
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Switching Gears – COTPA to FCTC Negotiations 
With COTPA drafted and tabled in parliament, the MOHFW switched gears to review 
the draft FCTC before negotiations. Incidentally, domestic progress leading to COTPA 
cohered with the draft framework convention that, likewise, sought to better regulate 
tobacco production and distribution and foster public awareness of tobacco use. The 
draft could not have arrived at a better time given the range of policy measures enacted 
by the government on tobacco control and efforts taken to reform existing tobacco laws. 
Using the knowledge and experiences, Indian health officials prepared a ‘solid and 
strong brief for negotiations.’74 According to Salim Habayeb, former WHO India 
director, ‘when FCTC materialised, the MOHFW was highly interested and enthusiastic 
about it. Our Indian counterparts proceeded by conviction and external persuasion was 
unnecessary.’75  
 
Assisting Indian health officials with the draft framework convention was the 
WHO India office that ‘provided legal consultants to the ministry who provided counsel 
and evidence on various aspects of tobacco control - advertising, warnings, packaging, 
nicotine content, and ran training and multi-sectoral workshops on tobacco control in 
the ministry.’76 Habayeb recalls ‘we assisted and engaged with actors in the whole cycle 
of work, starting with helping them develop their tobacco proposals and work plans. We 
strove to maintain the engagement, not only at the initial phases but also during the 
rollout, maintenance phases, and feedback time. We brought stakeholders together in 
workshops and seminars to network, to evaluate, and share good practices on tobacco 
control.’77 But even before that Habayeb noted that ‘the MOHFW was fully committed 
to the prevention of tobacco use, not just in rhetoric but actual deed, as demonstrated by 
the ministry’s myriad activities and its direct and full funding of the WHO’s Tobacco 
Free Initiative (TFI). These initiatives predate the FCTC.’78  
 
The Indian delegation at FCTC negotiations consisted of a rotating team of 
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bureaucrats from MOHFW and outside experts seconded to assist.79 The core 
negotiating team consisted of two seasoned bureaucrats, JVR Prasada Rao and Srinivas 
Tata, both of whom were involved in drafting COTPA. Both also had a key role in 
preparing India’s FCTC brief consisting of India’s positions on provisions covering 
tobacco regulation, advertising and marketing of tobacco products and tobacco outreach 
and advocacy.80 Srinivas Tata recalls that ‘once preparation for COTPA was complete, 
it became very relevant for the FCTC; essentially, the brief was influenced by the 
domestic law being debated. We had a progressive approach and stance, which helped 
FCTC preparations. COTPA was the culmination of several years of work and 
commitment from the health ministry. What we saw in parliament before the COTPA 
was the perception of an India that was a large tobacco growing state but this view 
changed with the bill.’81 
 
At FCTC negotiations, seconded public health experts bolstered the Indian 
delegation’s knowledge of tobacco control. One of these experts, K. Srinath Reddy, 
leading Indian cardiologist and tobacco control proponent, helped craft policy positions 
that India would present and defend at negotiations; combined, Reddy with Tata and 
Prasada Rao ensured India’s positions remained consistent through negotiations.82 
Dhirendra Sinha, WHO regional advisor for tobacco control in Asia, noted that ‘Reddy 
was a crucial figure in the Indian delegation. His expertise, articulateness, knowledge 
and political acumen advanced India’s contribution and leadership within both regional 
and international discussions.’83 Enhancing Reddy’s knowledge and experience, Sinha 
added, was the health ministry that had done ‘exceptional groundwork in preparing for 
the negotiations including drafting several position papers on important matters like 
advertising, regulation, illicit trade and financial assistance.’84 Reddy’s knowledge on 
tobacco control was well known from his experiences advocating for tightening 
domestic tobacco control, including his stint on the expert committee on the economics 
of tobacco use that ‘gave succour to the health ministry to draft a new legislation and 
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replace the ineffective Cigarettes Act.’85 The Indian delegation proved ready to 
negotiate a strong framework convention. 
 
Shaping FCTC Provisions in Geneva  
 
FCTC negotiations took place between WHO member states at six Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Body meetings (hereafter INBs) between 2000 and 2003. Negotiations were 
complex. From the outset, battle lines were drawn between most developing countries 
facing rising tobacco use and some developed countries that represented domestic 
tobacco interests. With international tobacco companies penetrating markets across the 
world with ease, the need for a multilateral consensus on tobacco control was palpable. 
This scenario also made the framework convention more relevant and urgent for 
developing countries that lacked the resources and institutional capacity to curb tobacco 
use. But this intent clashed with the interests of wealthier states like Germany, Japan 
and the United States where leading international tobacco companies were based.86 
Contests ensued over which international agreements, health or trade, would have 
precedence should WHO member states agree on rules that constrained the operations 
of tobacco companies; unsurprisingly, views were split with developing countries 
insisting the FCTC take precedence while developed countries like the United States 
and Japan preferred GATT.87 
 
One of the first debates at negotiations was over international financial 
assistance to help developing countries foster economically viable alternatives for 
domestic tobacco farmers and help implement FCTC provisions. India was at the 
forefront of these debates as a developing country that had a sizeable tobacco industry. 
With strides made toward enhancing existing tobacco controls through COTPA, the 
Indian delegation focused intensely on obtaining financial assistance for those citizens 
whose livelihoods were potentially harmed by tougher rules. Politically, this move 
would assuage anxieties of a domestic tobacco industry that could still foil COTPA. 
Indian negotiators lobbied for international financial and technical assistance, impelling 
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developed countries to ‘spell out necessary mechanisms for providing support’ since 
‘one could not simply wait the day when the reduced demand would automatically drive 
down the supply; one must proactively and progressively foster other economically 
viable channels.’88 Financial assistance requests from developing countries were placed 
in the context of inadequate regulatory capacities on tobacco control that would have 
undermined ‘practical achievement of the convention’s objectives’ for countries 
confronting the problem head-on.89 Nor did India want member states to wait until 
negotiations were complete to secure financial assistance; India’s chief negotiator 
Prasada Rao pushed for ‘assistance to be available to tobacco workers and growers 
immediately, without waiting for them to be affected’ by the framework convention.90 
To channel financial assistance, Indian negotiators championed the establishment of ‘a 
global fund financed by an export tax on manufactured tobacco products’ to help set up 
alternate livelihoods for citizens engaged in the farming and processing of tobacco.91 
Until the final INB meeting, Indian negotiators kept the pressure up for this fund, even 
invoking colonial legacies as reason for the endurance of the tobacco industry that now 
‘could only be remedied by clear and resolute international financial commitments.’92 
 
Indian negotiators also broadened the definition of tobacco at negotiations. At 
the second INB meeting, Reddy took to expand tobacco’s definition by clarifying that 
‘several categories of tobacco were consumed in non-smoking forms in India and 
elsewhere.’93 The expansive interpretation became more important not only because 
tobacco was being consumed in multiple forms in developing countries but to regulate 
levels of nicotine in all products since ‘some manufacturers were adding tobacco to 
several other products orally used.’94 At the third INB, Reddy asserted that the treaty 
should insert ‘raw tobacco materials’ to the text in addition to the focus on processed 
tobacco products.95 Again, the nub of the issue was that tobacco existed in several forms 
across the world, a fact the framework convention should reflect to be globally relevant. 
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Indian epidemiologist P.C. Gupta noted that ‘India insisted that all forms of tobacco be 
part of the final treaty, this move was a key contribution. If you see in the final treaty, 
everywhere, it is tobacco and tobacco products. This definition became clear because of 
India’s emphasis.’96   
India’s Regional Leadership 
At all six INB meetings, Indian negotiators represented WHO’s Southeast Asia bureau 
(hereafter SEARO) member state97 interests and concerns on FCTC provisions 
including financial assistance, advertising, illicit trade, outreach, liability and 
compensation. The Indian delegation bagged regional leadership for two reasons. First, 
regional consensus on core FCTC provisions would help India and other Asian 
countries with similar interests represent their concerns better against developed 
countries interested in negotiating a feeble framework convention.98 Issues like 
international financial assistance and advertising had real implications for developing 
countries waging a tough battle against an agile international tobacco industry. Second, 
India’s leadership arose out of convenience. Unlike other SEARO countries, Indian 
negotiators were relatively more knowledgeable on tobacco control, having drafted a 
tough domestic legislation, and were able to negotiate adroitly in English, the lingua 
franca of negotiations.99  
 
Indian negotiators chaired all four regional meetings from 2001-2003 to gather 
consensus on treaty provisions including advertising, financial assistance, oversight and 
taxation. In Jakarta, regional member states called for establishing ‘a global mechanism 
to monitor the trends and determinants of global tobacco consumption’ and help secure 
a global fund to assist developing countries meet the obligations of the proposed 
treaty.100 Under Indian insistence, the Jakarta meeting pushed for other tobacco 
stakeholders, notably non-governmental organisations, to work with governments to 
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‘create broad based partnerships’ and advance regional tobacco control.101 SEARO 
member states reaffirmed these pledges at the next meeting in Thimphu in 2002. After 
two days of intense negotiations, states hammered out the Thimphu Declaration that 
supported levying high taxes on tobacco companies.102 Also, the resolution reiterated 
the Jakarta meeting’s desire that adequate international support, financial and scientific, 
for developing countries be included in the final framework convention.103 
 
The Indian delegation was also requested by SEARO member states to act as 
their representative on advertising at FCTC negotiations. Developing countries were 
besieged by the marketing practices of an international tobacco industry venturing to 
their shores with zeal.104 India experienced this problem first hand. Srinivas Tata, one of 
the Indian negotiators, attributed developing countries’ persistent desire for a tough 
advertising provision to the global reach of international tobacco, ‘as smoking reduced 
in the west, tobacco companies moved to the developing world. This situation made the 
matter far more practical for countries like India. Moreover, international tobacco 
companies were allying with domestic tobacco farmers and growers and using India as a 
base for tobacco commerce for India and the region.’105  
 
The Indian delegation resolved to tighten provisions on tobacco advertising. At 
the first INB, Indian negotiator Srinath Reddy called for the framework convention to 
be indiscriminate against advertising or sponsorship of all kinds, urging the convention 
to institute ‘a complete ban on all direct and indirect forms of tobacco advertising.’106 
Partial bans, Reddy argued, were ‘ineffective in controlling tobacco consumption’ 
because existing evidence deemed it impossible to screen products based on groups that 
consume them.107 This position also rose out of discussions on COTPA that contained a 
provision prohibiting domestic tobacco advertising, except those at point of sale.108 
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Moreover, in developing countries, unlicensed sale of tobacco made it difficult to 
regulate consumption, leaving advertising as a vital lever to curb tobacco use. Reddy’s 
fellow delegate, Prasada Rao, reinforced this view at the fourth INB meeting, 
‘advertising should be banned universally, as it was a universal phenomenon.’109 India’s 
position on advertising, however, was contested by the U.S. and Germany that found a 
total advertising ban unconstitutional and antithetical to freedom of speech 
protections.110  
 
At the next regional meeting in Jaipur in 2003, member states agreed for 
compensation and liability to be an ‘integral part of a future draft protocol’ given 
difficulties countries would seemingly face harmonising domestic legal provisions.111 
To avoid domestic tobacco interests from thwarting progress on this issue and other 
sensitive matters, like advertising and marketing, SEARO member states agreed to 
prioritise ratification of the draft framework convention before turning to matters 
pertaining to licensing, subsidies and taxes, issues that affected the commercial 
prospects of tobacco producers.112 For them and other developing countries, the urgency 
of a ratified framework convention was integral given the rising costs of tobacco use.  
India’s position on the speed and duration of negotiations also became clear 
from regional consultations. Indian negotiators wanted a strong, reasonable and 
instantly applicable framework convention to restrain tobacco use and regulate the 
industry’s robust marketing strategies; and they wanted the text to indicate to that effect 
giving developing countries the necessary justifications to craft strong domestic tobacco 
control laws. The Indian delegation wanted to see negotiation of draft protocols or the 
legally binding components directing states to institute particular actions to be dealt 
with after ratification.113 Aware of resistance from domestic lobbies and other ministries 
should protocols be discussed, Indian negotiators pushed for accelerating negotiations 
to produce a final text ready for ratification. COTPA also factored here; Indian 
negotiators hoped to capitalise from the propitious tobacco control conjuncture, 
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exemplified by positive outlook from the Indian government toward COTPA and the 
FCTC.114  
Despite strong and well-prepared positions covering advertising, financial 
assistance, liability and compensation, Indian negotiators, however, resisted when 
discussing tobacco taxation, trade restrictions, institutional capacity and oversight. 
These matters, for Indian negotiators, had to be mulled over and determined by national 
authorities. Health officials were negotiating these issues, particularly taxation, with 
other Indian ministries through COTPA at the same time.115 When negotiations moved 
to consider price harmonisation, that would have created a uniform price for tobacco 
products, Indian negotiators balked claiming that rules on pricing ‘could only be 
influenced by the state’ through taxation.116 Instead, the Indian delegation pushed for 
broad principles on tax policies to reduce tobacco consumption since specific edicts 
‘would constitute an infringement of national sovereignty.’117 Doubts also existed on 
getting the necessary approvals from the Indian Ministry of Finance; these reservations 
made Indian negotiators oppose precise guidelines on taxation.118 When it came to 
product warnings on tobacco products, Indian negotiators proved hesitant to accept 
exact guidelines, instead insisting on broad principles on visual and written warnings 
that had to be ‘approved by national health authorities.’119  
Some of these provisions, particularly taxation and warning signs on packages, 
were being debated under COTPA and Indian negotiators were not keen to undo 
progress there by accepting precise commitments in Geneva. Even as other developing 
countries pushed negotiations to institute clear warnings and the terrain it should cover 
on tobacco products, India’s position was circumspect.120 COTPA, despite being 
drafted, was yet to be considered in parliament. For this task, Indian negotiators 
returned home from Geneva. Negotiators would soon witness how India’s positions at 
FCTC negotiations would affect COTPA that came up for parliamentary debate. To 
help pass COTPA and generate support for the FCTC, the MOHFW was supported by 
domestic tobacco control groups keen to strengthen existing tobacco controls and show 
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why India had to lead on international tobacco control.  
Passing COTPA and Finalising FCTC 
Interest groups working to enhance tobacco control in India influenced both COTPA 
and the FCTC. Historically, civil society activities on tobacco control date back to the 
efforts of physicians at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and its 
Health or Tobacco (HOT) group in the mid-1980s.121 The HOT group organised a 
national convention on tobacco control that led to the creation of two smaller groups - 
ACTION (Action against Tobacco: Indian Organizations Network) and NOTE 
(National Organisation for Tobacco Eradication) to shape and coordinate tobacco 
control advocacy. Both groups, however, proved ineffective in raising public awareness 
on tobacco use until the late 1990s due to a ‘lack of adequate financial resources to 
organise, do solid empirical research on the tobacco problem and use that evidence to 
call for action.’122 Shoba John, Indian tobacco control activist, argued that ‘though 
advocacy efforts started in the 1970s on tobacco control, we could not really string our 
efforts together until the late 1990s when the political moment shifted. We also 
struggled because our overwhelming focus was just Delhi; this gap made us realise that 
the rest of the country had to feature for a strong stand. Gradually, we started to focus 
on other parts of the country as well.’123 Substantively, both ACTION and NOTE also 
lacked concrete evidence detailing tobacco use across India; they focused largely on 
linking the rise in cancers to extant smoking patterns.124 Despite struggles, groups 
within the inchoate network worked to sustain pressure on the government vis-à-vis 
tobacco control.125 
Tobacco control groups also faced competing pressures from the domestic 
tobacco industry. The industry’s chief lobbyist was the Tobacco Institute of India (TII) 
that represented the interests of a range of domestic tobacco manufacturers, farmers, 
exporters and related ancillaries.126 The institute’s core mission was to protect and 
enhance the global competitiveness of India’s tobacco industry. The industry’s political 
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importance grew from its core structure. India has had a large integrated tobacco 
industry that involved ‘the cultivation of several varieties of tobacco, the manufacture of 
different tobacco products, including unprocessed and chewing tobacco, and an 
extensive distribution and retail system.’127 Through the years, strong prices, sustained 
domestic consumption, good export demand for tobacco and low prices of other crops 
powered the growth of tobacco from a fledgling crop to a full-fledged industry. More 
importantly, for the Indian government, the industry provided substantial employment, 
especially rural, and generated considerable revenues; in 2001, the tobacco industry 
contributed nearly $1.5 billion in taxes to the Indian government.128 These 
considerations generally trumped the advocacy of tobacco control advocates that were 
themselves hamstrung by internal divisions, resource constraints and questionable 
evidence on tobacco use.  
But this situation changed with more scientific research that laid bare the 
domestic effects of sustained tobacco use. As highlighted earlier, the MOHFW worked 
with various anti-tobacco groups and the WHO to upgrade their institutional 
understanding on tobacco use and control. These interactions gave way to the expert 
committee’s work on economics of tobacco use and other policy measures that the NDA 
government instituted to curb tobacco use. After decades, the interests of the Indian 
government and various tobacco control groups and organisations aligned and 
congruence meant that the tobacco industry’s interests were outweighed, at least 
momentarily, by public health considerations. The government’s resolve to bolster 
domestic controls and lead at FCTC negotiations was precipitated by focused 
deliberations that ruled on the trade-off between tobacco production and control, 
favouring the latter.  
As COTPA neared passing and FCTC underway, the TII attempted to stall the 
government’s tobacco control push by lobbying relevant Indian MP’s on the need to 
protect livelihoods of citizens in the industry.129 But their lobbying proved ineffective 
for two reasons. First, the key institutional interlocutor on both the FCTC and COTPA 
was the Ministry of Health and not the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) that had close 
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ties with tobacco industry and had worked to promote its interests. The MOC had no 
clear role at FCTC negotiations or COTPA. Politically, the pendulum shifted toward 
public health. And second, the TII’s claims on potential economic losses were refuted 
by the health ministry that provided evidence on trade-offs between health and tobacco 
production and of the costs incurred from sustained tobacco use.130 Health officials also 
reiterated their entreaties at FCTC negotiations for international financial assistance for 
domestic tobacco farmers and labourers.131 The tobacco industry’s efforts to stymie 
progress were dented by prevailing government attitudes that tilted toward tobacco 
control. 
These developments took place during FCTC negotiations where some Indian 
tobacco control groups were present, contributing to negotiations on various provisions. 
The WHO permitted select non-governmental organisations to participate at 
negotiations to allow for tobacco control groups in member states to have a say on the 
FCTC. Indian tobacco control groups were now simultaneously working to pass 
COTPA and nudge the government to sign the FCTC. To achieve both objectives, 
twelve Indian NGOs working on tobacco control formed a national coalition called the 
Advocacy Forum for Tobacco Control (AFTC) in 2001. The network was created as a 
‘coalition of organisations that work in the area of advocacy, awareness and research of 
tobacco control’ in India.132 The AFTC had one core mission – to generate mass support 
for tobacco control policies through evidence-based research and public advocacy.133 In 
contrast to its predecessors – ACTION and NOTE, the AFTC functioned as a loosely 
structured coalition designed to support each organisation in its tobacco control work.134 
The AFTC also worked to influence the government adopt stronger tobacco control 
measures when the government was more inclined to do so as evidenced by leadership 
on tobacco control from health officials, health ministers and Prime Minister Vajpayee.  
To get COTPA passed, the AFTC settled on four strategies. First, sustain media 
advocacy through articles, press releases, editorials and interviews on the merits of the 
bill to enable quick enactment. Some of these materials highlighted on-going FCTC 
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negotiations that placed considerable faith and expectations on India to domestically act 
on the issue.135 The forum also executed an advocacy plan targeting Indian 
parliamentarians with informative brochures on the bill ‘clarifying the benefits of 
having such a law’ in India by referencing India’s positions at FCTC negotiations.136 
Through spirited public advocacy, NGOs effectively ‘became the voice of tobacco 
victims, whose lives were being compromised by tobacco prevalence.137  
 
Second, AFTC maintained pressure on the government to enforce the Supreme 
Court’s 2001 decision that barred smoking in public places. Bhavani Thygarajan, 
former Indian health official, lauds AFTC for their judicial agency, ‘NGOs were useful 
to COTPA and concurrently FCTC through their legal advocacy. They repeatedly took 
tobacco companies to courts, challenging claims made by tobacco companies on 
tougher controls.’138 NGOs were aware that resistance from tobacco companies could 
derail the on-going push given the industry’s political clout. This awareness made 
groups under the AFTC particularly sensitive of research on tobacco use, particularly 
advertising and marketing, public consumption of tobacco and rural consumption, and 
leverage them to pass the law.139 At FCTC negotiations, Indian NGO representatives 
deployed latest scientific evidence on tobacco use to rebut industry arguments on key 
provisions including advertising and display warning signs.140 
 
Seven AFTC organisations also worked through the Framework Convention 
Alliance (FCA), a global network of anti-tobacco organisations formed to influence 
FCTC negotiations. The FCA worked to erect a strong framework convention by 
furnishing member state delegations with research and talking points on particular 
provisions as they were being negotiated.141 Independently, FCA organisations 
submitted requests to negotiators to ensure precedence was given to public health over 
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other issues and to have the framework convention focus on all groups affected, not just 
those most vulnerable. This move was in response to the efforts of tobacco companies 
that were advised to push the treaty to focus on children while leaving adult choice 
protected.142 Indian negotiator Srinath Reddy asserted that the ‘FCA was a key 
stakeholder during international negotiations in Geneva. They had a well-functioning 
base at INB meetings and used their time to educate delegates on important matters on 
tobacco control.143 Shoba John, Indian FCA member, pointed out that the FCA 
functioned as a think-tank ‘providing evidence on issues like advertising, smoking bans, 
tax measures, pictorial warnings and provisions that crossed the health-trade balance.144 
John added ‘we also helped delegates prepare policy positions and papers before the 
INBs since a lot of negotiators from developing countries had no idea of how an 
international treaty worked. FCA policy papers were a key resource for international 
negotiators.145  
 
In addition, the FCA endorsed and advanced developing country positions by 
‘translating provisions, bringing evidence to particular amendments that India and other 
developing countries brought forward like the advertising ban that the G-77 under 
India’s leadership pushed for, stronger warnings on tobacco products and tougher 
provisions to ban smoking at and around public places.’146 The advantage that Indian 
and other developing country NGOs had was evidence on the prevalence of tobacco use 
and its hazards that gave them leverage when member states debated specific provisions 
on issues like advertising, warning signs, taxes, etc.147 However, the FCA did not see 
eye to eye on all developing country interests. They differed on the matter of 
international financial assistance; while India and other developing countries preferred 
an independent global fund, the FCA demurred, calling for regular financial tranches 
from the WHO instead of an independent body to provide financial assistance to 
developing countries.148 Nonetheless, NGOs through the FCA had an impact on the 
international negotiating process and Indian groups, in particular, split their time 
working to get FCTC ratified and COTPA passed.  
                                                
142Brandt, The Cigarette Century, 166. 








Third, the AFTC relied on physicians to highlight the dangers accompanying 
tobacco use.149 Leading public health figures publicly endorsed the legislation; they also 
highlighted the expected public health gains from regulating tobacco use. Srinath 
Reddy, one of the leading exponents of this effort, publicly declared during COTPA 
discussions ‘it is in the nation’s interest that the bill is passed at the earliest in its current 
form. It will be a major advance for the public health efforts in India.150 Reddy, also 
India’s FCTC negotiator, underscored the parallel importance of FCTC negotiations 
‘that had many similar provisions to the India’s tobacco control bill.’151 Exhorting 
policymakers, Reddy argued that COTPA’s passage would ‘establish India as the 
pioneer nation to conform to WHO standards regarding tobacco.’153  
 
Fourth, the AFTC worked alongside the MOHFW during parliamentary debates 
to pass COTPA by ‘providing evidence and talking points when required for Health 
Minister Sushma Swaraj as she stood up to defend the bill.’154 In terms of influence, 
several AFTC groups had direct access to health officials and policymakers working to 
pass COTPA. Shoba John recalls, ‘just as the vote for COTPA was nearing, we had a 
clear and targeted plan in place regarding what tobacco control measures we wanted 
going ahead that included list of targets to be achieved, how the media campaign should 
be devised, how to bring more scientific evidence on tobacco related effects to bear. 
Each NGO had a particular task and they pitched in to support these efforts.155 This 
influence also extended to considerations on the FCTC that strove to establish clear 
rules on tobacco product regulation and distribution to help member states institute their 
own tobacco policies. Before and through negotiations, India’s FCTC negotiators 
worked closely with specific tobacco control groups and individuals like Srinath Reddy 
who also served as FCTC negotiator himself. The revolving door between health 
officials and public health activists on tobacco control, domestic and international, was 
clearly open.   
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Climax – COTPA and FCTC  
FCTC negotiations and India’s stances there influenced COTPA’s passage and vice-
versa. The NDA government approved recommendations made by the parliamentary 
standing committee on COTPA on February 19, 2003. The bill was then considered in 
the Rajya Sabha (upper house) and passed on April 9. The Lok Sabha (lower house) 
considered the bill on April 30. Despite dissent, sufficient multi-partisan support existed 
to pass the legislation.156 In fact, the impetus from FCTC redounded toward India; 
FCTC’s imprimatur mattered as it projected the tobacco scourge as a global problem 
that obliged WHO member states to act. Varkala Radhakrishnan, Indian Member of 
Parliament from Kerala, asserted that India was a ‘member of the WHO’ and as such 
was required to ‘champion the cause that humanity should be free from cancer, 
cardiovascular diseases, and even oral cancer. India champions a human cause.157 
Several Indian parliamentarians pointed to the international implications of not passing 
COTPA since the WHO was expending considerable effort moving the multilateral 
dialogue on tobacco control through the FCTC.158  
That the Indian government had been pursuing COTPA made FCTC ratification 
less arduous. Srinivas Tata, one of three Indian FCTC negotiators, argued that domestic 
currents decisively shaped India’s positions on FCTC, ‘India’s FCTC stance was 
determined by domestic tobacco control. Once you had a strong domestic foundation, 
FCTC was relatively easy to negotiate and ratify for India. It helps if the provisions of 
the convention are similar to domestic law. The providential part was that both 
processes were happening at the same time. Policy momentum at home made 
international negotiations manageable for us.’159 The FCTC also influenced the politics 
and passage of COTPA. As Indian health officials negotiated the FCTC, their resolve to 
pass COTPA increased, drawing courage and resolve from international negotiations. 
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Shoba John adds that ‘FCTC negotiations helped stimulate COTPA and domestic 
discussions on tobacco control in the Indian health ministry. Indian negotiators learned 
a lot from the international process and brought those experiences and knowledge back 
home to bear. The international process gave Indian negotiators an excuse to explain to 
other ministries of the need to upgrade domestic legislation.’160 Both processes 
influenced each other to strengthen tobacco control in India and abroad.  
On May 18 2003, COTPA became law.161 The law proved to be a significant 
upgrade to its predecessor, on paper. COTPA expanded the remit of tobacco products to 
be regulated, beyond just cigarettes.162 New rules were added to regulate tobacco 
commerce, direct and indirect advertising of tobacco products, and sale of tobacco 
products to minors and vulnerable segments and public consumption. The law also 
mandated tobacco manufacturers to follow a clear palette when designing warning signs 
on their tobacco products.163 
 
On May 21 2003, 192 member states of the WHO adopted the FCTC.164 India 
ratified the convention on February 5, 2004 becoming the eighth WHO member state to 
do so.165 The FCTC established a framework for signatories to follow when crafting 
policies to reduce tobacco use; WHO member states, that do ratify, are expected to 
reduce the demand and supply of tobacco products through various policy measures.  
 
As designed, the FCTC provides ample space for WHO member states to craft 
their own tobacco control policies. For India, this objective was met through COTPA’s 
passing.166 On three key issues - regulation of tobacco product disclosures, packaging 
and advertising, COTPA comports with the FCTC. On regulation, COTPA like the 
FCTC requires ingredients to be clearly indicated on all tobacco products.167 On 
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packaging, COTPA requires manufacturers to adhere to a strict advertising palette; this 
expectation coheres with FCTC provision requiring tobacco products to be properly 
described at sale.168 The FCTC also recommends ‘30-50 percent or more of the 
principal display area of packages’ carry legible health warnings; COTPA expects 
manufacturers to print health warnings that cover 40 percent of the display area of the 
product.169 Finally, on tobacco advertising, the FCTC encourages all signatories to 
implement a comprehensive ban with exemptions allowed for signatories that object for 
constitutional reasons.170 COTPA imposes a total ban on direct and indirect advertising 
of cigarettes and other tobacco products; though point of sale advertising is permitted, it 
needs to be controlled to fully comply with the FCTC.171 
 
Conclusion 
India led to negotiate and ratify the Framework Convention on Tobacco control to 
promote tough controls around tobacco consumption and production and lessen the 
escalating number of morbidities and premature deaths caused by domestic tobacco use. 
The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) concurred with the World 
Health Organization’s intent to negotiate a framework convention that would impose 
sufficient controls on how the tobacco industry operated worldwide. Having robustly 
grasped the problems caused by tobacco use at home that were largely driven by excess 
tobacco and weak regulations, Indian health officials strove to draft strong FCTC 
provisions on tobacco product regulation, advertising and prevention while striving to 
secure financial assistance for citizens dislocated by tougher rules. The approach taken 
by Indian negotiators was politically backed by Prime Minister Vajpayee who was keen 
to enhance domestic and international controls around tobacco and protect Indian 
citizens working in the tobacco industry. The government’s tobacco control approach 
was supported by a strong coalition of tobacco control groups that endorsed the 
tightening of rules around tobacco production, distribution and consumption and 
worked with health ministry to ensure these efforts come to fruition. Before 
negotiations, tobacco control groups helped the health ministry understand how deep 
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and widespread the problem of tobacco use was and the trade-off between adopting 
tough measures and resisting given economic considerations. Once negotiations for the 
FCTC commenced, these groups mobilised under the AFTC to forge a strong approach 
vis-à-vis tobacco control at both arenas pushing the government to pass the domestic 









This chapter covers India’s ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the first treaty signed by countries worldwide to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions. The chapter first provides a brief historical background 
breaking down developments leading to FCCC negotiations before describing India’s 
behaviour. Then I ask why India’s leadership on climate change and FCCC ratification 
was puzzling. Next, the chapter provides an analytical narrative describing how 
interests, institutions and interest groups interacted to determined India’s approach at 
FCCC negotiations and subsequent ratification. Briefly, the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests found themselves beleaguered facing a litany of environmental problems 
without adequate funding or enforcement authority to address the growing 
environmental crisis in India. As the global warming problem emerged on the 
international landscape, India found itself shorthanded given incumbent knowledge 
gaps on the issue within the Ministry of Environment. It was unclear at first what 
India’s interests were. Nonetheless, Indian diplomats understood the political 
importance of the issue and how India needed to respond. Working with domestic 
environmental research organisations, the Indian delegation, led by the Indian Ministry 
of External Affairs, adopted a defensive political approach at negotiations that 
exempted India and other developing countries from climate mitigation commitments. 
India’s strategy and positions hinged on securing necessary sufficient financial and 
technological assistance from developed countries for mitigation. India ratified the 




By the 1980s, burgeoning environmental awareness generated a widespread belief that 
the world environment was changing. Problems like the atmospheric build-up of 
greenhouse gases, hole in the ozone layer and the loss of biodiversity were understood 
to be emerging from human activities like deforestation, increasing vehicular use and 
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the release of chlorofluorocarbons.1 The most pressing problem to scientists working on 
such trends was global warming also known as the greenhouse gas problem.2 Scientists 
had, by then, established that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide had risen 
through the 1970s and 80s. A 1979 report from the U.S National Academy of Sciences 
concluded that if such carbon dioxide levels persisted, ‘there is no reason to doubt that 
climate change will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be 
negligible.’3 The climate, they argued, was changing.  
 
Although global warming was attributed to human activities it was unclear, at 
first, which countries were responsible for the problem or if all countries were. This 
question led to more targeted research to monitor and ascribe atmospheric carbon levels 
over several years.4 Workshops were then held in Villach, Austria in 1985 and Bellagio, 
Italy in 1987 to examine the science of climate change, consider costs of action and 
inaction and debate possible mitigation scenarios.5 Also discussed at both workshops 
were contributions of various countries to global warming. Through this exercise, 
scientists acknowledged the acute position of developing countries, in particular, to 
confront and address the growing problem given incumbent inadequacies, both 
technical and financial.6 Although both workshops did not lay blame on industrialised 
countries, it was regarded that these countries could, at the very least, confront and 
minimise activities inducing global warming.7 This question of contributions or 
responsibilities vis-à-vis global warming and greenhouse gas emissions would affect 
how the issue would come to be defined and tackled.  
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The notion that developed countries had greater burdens given their 
contributions to global warming acquired salience at the 1988 World Conference on the 
Changing Atmosphere.8 Consensus emerged that global warming was a serious problem 
that required more research and monitoring and, if possible, an international convention 
on the protection of the atmosphere. This judgment precipitated the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 established to ‘assess the 
state of existing knowledge about the climate system and climate change.’9 Global 
warming and climate change were now used interchangeably to mark the same 
phenomenon. The IPCC’s first assessment report, released in 1990, upheld existing 
scientific evidence on global warming, issuing stern warnings to the global public and 
policymakers of possible societal impacts from a changing climate.10  
 
The IPCC’s work was endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly that stressed the 
need for ‘global’ collective action without unpacking if this statement meant symmetric 
contributions from all countries. Developing countries, however, nursed doubts on 
global collective action that could potentially hinder their economic development if 
asked to reduce global warming emissions.11 At the 9th Non-Aligned Summit in 
September 1989, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi voiced these reservations, 
questioning the efficacy of developing country participation on global environmental 
issues given capacity concerns that would leave no them no choice but defy global 
warming commitments. Instead, Gandhi suggested that existing capacity constraints be 
addressed through a Planet Protection Fund (PPF) funded through fixed contributions to 
assist developing countries acquire technologies to advance development and protect 
the environment.12 The politics around carbon emissions and commitments had not fully 
crystallised but developing countries, India in particular, appeared sensitive to the 
linkages between the environment and development.13  
 
                                                
8Bodansky, The History of the Global Climate Change Regime, 31. 
9Ibid. 
10John Theodore Houghton and Bruce A. Callander, Climate Change 1992 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 65. 
11Rajan, Global environmental politics, 103. 
12C.S. Mehta, Environmental Protection and the Law (New Delhi: APH Publishing, 1991) 
13In fact, it was Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who first expanded on the relationship between 
development and environment at the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. See, 
Ved Nanda and W.R. Ris Jr, “Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to International Environmental 
Protection,” The Ecology LQ, 5, (1975): 291. 
 
94 
 On the other hand, developed countries supported a global climate conference to 
discuss how countries can begin to address climate change; importantly, G-7 countries 
felt that all countries regardless of development constraints should contribute.14 
Diplomatically, however, this desire was being chipped away by declarations 
sympathetic to the plight of developing countries. The Noordwijk Conference on 
Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change in November 1989 declared climate change 
to be ‘common concern for mankind’ and that developed countries had ‘specific 
responsibilities’ given incumbent financial and technical capabilities and past 
contributions to greenhouse gas emissions.15 The latter statement was crucial for it 
bifurcated, for the first time, countries confronting climate change and global warming 
based on levels of economic development. Developing countries present accepted the 
declaration even though ‘responsibilities’ were left vague but they did internalise one 
key message from Noordwijk - that of ‘specific responsibilities’ which they understood 
developed countries had vis-à-vis global warming.16  
 
This message was carried over to the U.N. General Assembly. In December 
1989, U.N. Resolution 44/228 was passed ‘recognising the global character of 
environmental problems, including climate change, depletion of the ozone layer, trans 
boundary air and water pollution.’17 The resolution affirmed that the ‘responsibility for 
containing, reducing, and eliminating global environmental damage must be borne by 
the countries causing such damage, must be in relation to the damage caused and must 
be in accordance with their respective capabilities and responsibilities.’18 Finally, the 
resolution established the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) to enable UN member states convene and debate global environmental 
issues.19  
 
Before UNCED, the IPCC’s first commissioned report was released in May 
1990. Troublingly, the report laid bare the effects of sustained global warming to the 
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planet; the report also estimated that average global temperatures would rise by about 
2°C by 2030 and 4°C by 2090 that would increase sea levels 18 cm by 2030 and 58 cm 
by 2090.20 The implications, the IPCC warned, were frightful especially for countries 
near coastal areas.21 The IPCC also recommended all member states institute national 
plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and negotiate a framework convention to 
establish international rules around global warming.22 But the report drew scepticism 
from several developing countries that felt the panel was speaking on behalf of 
developed countries, not research alone.23 Unintentionally, the report validated 
developing country suspicions on climate change. The question of responsibility in 
terms of tackling climate change emerged as the flashpoint particularly in the context of 
climate change negotiations for a framework convention.  
 
Developing countries laboured to transfer negotiations for a convention under 
the U.N. given tensions around the understanding of climate change and how it should 
be addressed. Their efforts proved successful when the U.N. General Assembly 
established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (hereafter FCCC) to negotiate a climate change 
convention containing ‘appropriate commitments’ in time for ratification at UNCED in 
June 1992.24 Negotiations were set to begin under the U.N.’s remit.  
 
India received news of negotiations with a healthy dose of scepticism. Climate 
change was a relatively new diplomatic issue. Till then, only a few intergovernmental 
meetings had been held on climate change. Scientific knowledge of climate change was 
poor in India with no systematic work done on whether the climate was changing and 
how. Environmental officials were focused on minimising pollution and its effects on 
the environment. Climate change and global warming had clear economic implications 
which heightened its importance for developing countries. Even as controversies 
surrounded the national origins of greenhouse gas emissions, it was undeniable from the 
outset that industrialisation and growth contributed to their prevalence. Suffice to say, 
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the Indian government was caught off-guard when climate change negotiations were 
announced. Nonetheless, the Indian delegation, notwithstanding deficits, negotiated to 
secure a framework convention that reflected and protected the interests of developing 
countries. Through conferences at Noordwijk and SWCC, Indian diplomats grasped the 
diplomatic trade-offs of climate change and its impact on developing countries ill-
equipped to reduce carbon emissions. Indian negotiators doubled down on the linkage 
between development and greenhouse gas emissions against the wishes of developed 
countries that were split over how much responsibility to accept. The end result was a 
framework convention that did little to confront climate change or its causes. But India 
was pleased with the outcome and of a framework convention that did not hamper its 
growth. India signed and ratified the FCCC soon after negotiations ended.   
 
Puzzle – India’s FCCC Behaviour 
 
India’s FCCC approach and behaviour at negotiations raises one key puzzle. Why did 
India adopt and sustain a strong diplomatic position that stressed differentiated 
responsibilities before countries decided on the type and nature of commitments they 
would accept? Indian negotiators were instrumental in shaping principles that enabled 
countries analyse and determine how climate change would be addressed. Equity 
featured heavily in India’s position. Mukund Govind Rajan claims that India’s position 
at climate negotiations was a product of the politics between industrialised and 
developing countries that compelled Indian negotiators to assume a defensive tack and 
agenda. Thus the politics of the global south and the need to protect ‘sovereign’ 
interests pushed Indian negotiators who then acted in consonance with other developing 
countries to protect mutual interests.25 Susanne Jakobsen attributes India’s position to 
domestic non-governmental organisations who worked behind the scenes to impress the 
importance of India’s development and the implications of accepting emissions related 
commitments that could harm India’s growth.26 What these two explanations fail to 
account for is an understanding of what India’s interests were on climate change as 
negotiations neared and how they were formed? Little thought has been given by 
scholars to understand India’s core positions at negotiations by unpacking the 
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institutional awareness and positions on climate change and how the issue affected 
India. Undertaking this exercise will help us appreciate how key institutions like the 
Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Environment and Forests and domestic 
interest groups like The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) and Centre for Science 
and Environment (CSE) perceived climate change as an issue and how those views 
shaped Indian interests and behaviour at negotiations.  
 
Narrative – India and the Framework Convention on Climate Change  
 
Managing a Deteriorating Environment – Institutional Inadequacies 
 
From the early 1970s, the environment was in rapid decline in India. A new report on 
the state of the Indian environment in 1982 claimed that ‘the misery of the human 
condition in our country is mirrored by the sweeping degradation of its environment.’27 
The trends flagged by the report were alarming - a quarter of agricultural lands under 
irrigation were expected to be out of cultivation due to water logging; seventy percent 
of available water resources were supposedly polluted; atmospheric pollution was 
severe especially in urban areas; deforestation was depriving poor citizens of energy 
given their reliance on firewood; wildlife and India’s biodiversity were imperilled by 
illicit trade.28 Inadequate environmental enforcement only made the problem worse. 
Nearly eighty percent of industrial establishments in India in the 1980s posed a threat to 
the environment for failing to meet minimum industrial safety standards; in cases where 
provisions existed, like the 1974 Water Act and 1981 Air Act, enforcement gaps 
abounded.29  
 
 The underlying problem was institutional. Environmental agencies were 
overwhelmed by the sheer range of environmental problems. From the mid-1970s, some 
institutions were created and others restructured to address these gaps. Before 1972, 
issues like sewage, water, sanitation and air were governed by different ministries 
without much coordination between them or between national and state ministries 
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managing the environment.30 In February 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
established the National Committee on Environmental Planning and Coordination 
(NCEPC) to function as the coordinating unit on environmental policy.31 Until 1980, the 
NCEPC worked with other ministries to mainstream environmental concerns into policy 
planning; it essentially had an advisory, not executive, role that dented its ability to 
address environmental problems.32 In November 1980, a stand-alone Department of 
Environment (DOE) was established with responsibilities over environmental policy 
planning, environmental guidelines for various sectors, environmental appraisals, 
environmental research and education and international cooperation.33 To raise 
environmental awareness among the public, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi established 
the National Committee on Environmental Planning (NCEP) in 1981 to prepare annual 
state of the environment reports, arrange public hearings on environmental issues and 
establish a national information system on environmental welfare.34 
 
There was a clear intent to shore up the state’s environmental machinery to 
address preponderant institutional gaps. But the government’s plan had limited utility 
since remedies failed to improve environmental enforcement even as the number of 
environmental laws increased. Both the 1974 Water Act and 1981 Air Act – enacted to 
prevent and control water and air pollution were ineffective due to enforcement 
difficulties, in particular the failure of agencies to sanction parties that violated rules.35 
Both laws also did not specify how state boards that managed air and water pollution 
levels would be funded.36 As a result, water pollution did not budge - close to 70 
percent of available water was polluted in 1985.37 By the early 1990s, India was the 
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fifth largest polluter to the world’s air with motor vehicles being a leading cause.38 
Adding to these problems, a gas leak from Union Carbide’s Bhopal plant triggered a 
major industrial disaster in 1984 that garnered international attention.39 The disaster led 
to the passing of the Environmental Protection Act in 1985 that established the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests (hereafter MoEF) to institute, manage and enforce 
environmental policies.40 
 
Despite the restructuring, certain institutional gaps remained. In 1987, the MoEF 
in an annual report stated ‘the modalities of protection have been to enforce 
environmental regulations through criminal courts of law but long delays in the courts 
and inertia of the prosecuting agencies have led to polluters escaping the full penalties 
and exposing the people and the environment to the adverse effects of pollution.’41 
Mostafa Tolba, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Director, attributed 
this laxity to the desire of most developing countries to “industrialise at any cost.”42 
Most developing countries, Tolba argued, were, at best, complacent and, at worst, 
hostile toward spending money for environmental protection.43 Resources, no doubt, 
were a concern. The environment had been chronically underfunded in the Indian 
budget. Records show spending allocations for environmental programs were 
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Industrialising at the Environment’s Expense  
 
Enforcement and funding were both constraints but more problematic was the Indian 
government’s inability to see how economic growth was evolving and if an unfettered 
focus on industrialisation and growth had environmental implications. No systematic 
study was conducted on the cumulative environmental impact of industries located 
across the country.45 Much of the focus from new environmental legislations was on 
mitigating rising environmental detritus without addressing the source – 
industrialisation. Policy incoherence reigned.  
 
From the early 1980s, the government instituted several industrial and market-
oriented reforms with an emphasis on manufacturing, both organised and unorganised, 
and small-scale enterprises. Generally, the period from 1981-1991 is understood to an 
era of deregulation, fiscal expansion and growth in India; this decade experienced an 
average aggregate growth of nearly 6 percent.46 Industrial licensing requirements were 
relaxed for big businesses to enable firms make quick decisions on output.47 Businesses 
were permitted to diversify in related areas without a separate license and exceed 
production capacities without sanction.48 All these policies were adopted to enable firms 
expand output with additional flexibility. Public sector banks were pushed to provide 
convertible debt financing to firms while facilitating the conditions for private capital 
investments in manufacturing.49  
 
New Delhi also renewed the focus on small-scale textile and garment producers. 
Capital and labour constraints were eased to revive production. As a result, the share of 
garments and textiles in India’s total trade increased from 0.15 percent in 1960 to 11.5 
percent in 1995 and India’s share of world apparel exports reached 2.3% in 1992.50 The 
small-scale manufacturing industry, including food, paper, rubber, leather and chemical 
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companies, grew 19 percent from 1981-1991.51 But this revival was accompanied by 
rising pollution since such small-scale industries experience higher rates of pollution 
intensity; firms in these industries generally emit more given lax pollution prevention 
controls.52 Enforcement was difficult since these enterprises lacked data on their own 
operations in terms of pollution rates which also made managers disinclined to worry of 
the environmental effects of production.53 Fearing loss of output and employment, 
Indian regulators proved reluctant to enforce laws that perpetuated the discharge of 
pollutants in environments where most industries were located.54 By standing aside, the 
Indian government exacerbated the seemingly apparent and growing environmental 
problem. 
 
Comprehending Climate Change 
 
The MoEF confronted a raft of environmental concerns without sufficient resources, 
either financial or institutional, to address them. These legacies impinged on the 
ministry’s capacity to grapple with emergent environment concerns like climate change. 
As climate change landed on the international landscape, Indian environmental officials 
were ill prepared to grasp its intricacies or engage with it deftly. This deficit was, in a 
way, inevitable since scientific research on climate change and global warming was 
largely conducted in industrialised countries until 1990. As R.K. Pachauri, former IPCC 
chair states, ‘at the start of the work of the IPCC, developing countries had hardly done 
any research on either the scientific or policy aspects of the problem.’55 But even once 
the IPCC was established, Indian interactions with the body was barren with little effort 
given to robustly engage the scientific network on global warming issues.  
 
All IPCC matters, in fact, fell under the purview of a single MoEF official who 
also covered other international environmental issues like the Ozone Protocol, 
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desertification, biodiversity and UNCED-related issues from 1989.56 There was no clear 
Indian interface or channel to connect national scientific inputs from Indian climate 
scientists with international scientific assessments on global warming.57 In fact, only 
two Indian scientists were involved in the IPCC’s first assessment Report (AR) as lead 
authors and none as coordinating lead authors that are responsible for producing climate 
change research that could be synthesised with other country contributions.58 In July 
1989, the MoEF constituted an Expert Advisory Committee on Global Environmental 
Issues to ‘advise the government on all aspects related to global warming.’59 When 
convened the following year to review climate change in India, the committee reported 
‘no database exists in the country nor is there any present programme for systematic 
study and collection of data.’60 In other words, there was no scientific base on climate 
change or global warming in India that the Indian government could use to determine 
how the country was affected by the phenomena or even if it was.  
 
The MoEF’s record on environmental diplomacy was also chequered.61 The one 
official covering international environmental issues lacked access to the latest scientific 
research on the greenhouse gas problem being done in the United States and Europe.62 
Moreover, there is no official record of MoEF officials attending meetings and 
workshops on climate change that established the policy status quo on climate change – 
that countries had varied responsibilities on climate change. Instead, MoEF officials 
relied largely on informal personal interactions with scientists to grasp the intricacies of 
climate change.63 One external consultant claimed ‘interviewees outside the central 
bureaucracy expressed clear dissatisfaction with MoEF preparations, which they 
perceived as being rather disorganised and arbitrary. The tendency for the MoEF is to 
call in various experts and environmental activists for information only in the last week 
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before an international meeting.’64 As a result, the MoEF did not really ‘get a true 
picture of the range of uncertainty’ on climate change before FCCC negotiations.65  
 
Financial difficulties also throttled Indian climate science.66 Domestic institutes 
and scientists worked under budgetary constraints that dented their capacity to conduct 
solid research and establish linkages with international climate science networks; worse, 
weak connections between domestic institutes thwarted collaborative research on 
climate change in India.67 Leading institutes like the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) and National Physical Laboratory (NPL) that focused on 
climatology and meteorology scarcely interacted with policy institutes like The Energy 
and Resources Institute (TERI) and the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) that 
concentrated on environmental policy.68 In some cases, the focus was different; just as 
IPCC’s Assessment Report 1 arrived, Indian scientists were investigating the climate as 
it was and not how the climate changed over time.69 
 
Leadership was also lacklustre on climate change. In her brief tenure as 
Environment Minister, Maneka Gandhi pressed ahead on air and water pollution, 
natural resource conservation and shoring up domestic environmental governance to 
check rising environmental degradation.70 Little attention, however, was given to 
climate change. T.P. Sreenivasan, retired MEA diplomat, recounts ‘there was great 
awareness around environmental pollution broadly, but not so much on climate issues, 
specifically. These pressures emerged because India was encountering lots of problems 
associated with pollution and there was a growing recognition of that.’71 Maneka 
Gandhi’s successor, Kamal Nath, also did not fare better; his tenure was marked by a 
pronounced willingness to defer internally to the MEA and externally to non-
governmental organisations like TERI and CSE for assistance on climate change.72 
These two organisations would have a key role shaping India’s climate change approach 
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at FCCC negotiations as I detail below.  
 
India’s Domestic Climate Voices 
 
India’s core position on climate change was shaped by non-governmental organisations 
working on environmental issues. These two organisations – Tata Energy Research 
Institute (hereafter TERI) and the Centre on Science and Environment (hereafter CSE) 
had an important role and influence on India’s climate change policy before and during 
climate change negotiations.73 To better understand their role and impact, let us first 
contextualise their emergence.  
 
 As mentioned earlier, the Indian government was struggling to cope with 
various environmental problems from the mid-1970s. Environmental agencies were 
unable to keep pace with the challenges thrust on them. The government’s efforts to 
address environmental issues were undercut by its reform-focused economic agenda in 
the 1980s that worsened environmental conditions. With the government flailing on the 
environment, an incipient environmentalist movement took root.74 The failures of state-
led industrialisation and environmental governance were exposed. Chasms emerged 
between affluent groups and millions of citizens confronting economic deprivation and 
environmental degradation. Environmentalism grew as a homegrown response with a 
dizzying array of groups defending a range of socio-ecological concerns.75 The most 
prominent example was the Chipko movement, a series of ‘tree-hugging’ protests by 
peasants from the Himalayan foothills to halt tree felling by private contractors.76 77  
 
Young environmentalist Vandana Shiva argued that environmental groups were 
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reacting against ‘a new wave of arrogant destruction. Natural resources were only 
valued when they could be used as raw materials in the economy. Conserved nature 
becomes valueless. Only those who were active in industry were valued, while humans 
preserving nature became devalued, such as indigenous and poor women. The real 
ecological battles are fought by the poor.’78 By the mid-1980s, an estimated 100,000 
environmental groups were working on issues related to the ‘diminishing availability of 
such basic materials as food, water, fodder and firewood.’79 Anil Agarwal, CSE 
director, added that activism grew ‘as environmental awareness grew, many people 
began to ask: who is to blame? why are we the ones suffering?’80 
 
Burgeoning environmental activism spurred research on the state of the 
environment in India. Scholars formed networks and organisations to report on the 
deteriorating human environment including the depletion of resources like air and 
water, soil erosion, destruction of ecosystems and the extinction of wildlife. In 1985, a 
group of sixty including scholars, journalists and social workers released a Statement of 
Shared Concern on the State of India’s Environment. The report mapped environmental 
degradations marked by an assault on the ‘country’s grazing lands, forests, rivers, 
ponds, lakes, coastal zones, and increasingly in the atmosphere.’81 Rather forcefully, 
these environmentalists placed the Indian state at the heart of these problems. They 
deplored the Indian government’s practice of ‘converting common property resources 
into government resources’ that has in turn placed them ‘at the service of the more 
powerful.’82 Gradually, these voices converged on climate change through two 
organisations working on environmental policy.  
 
The most prominent non-governmental organisation working on the 
environment was the Centre on Science and Environment (CSE). The CSE was founded 
in 1981 to ‘undertake research and increase public awareness of vital issues in science, 
technology, environment and development.’83 Led by Anil Agarwal, a fiery 
environmentalist, the organisation strove to place the poor at the centre of 
environmental debates, urging the public and policymakers to appreciate the complex 
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social and political conditions affecting environmental change and how those changes 
affected the lives of the poor. In the first few years, CSE focused on producing concise 
reports on how science and technology, energy use and human behaviour were 
impacting India’s environment.84 CSE’s reports, however, set it apart from other groups 
for it combined analysis with evocative descriptions and visual depictions of the 
environment that suggested the dawn of a new “environmental colonialism.”85  
 
The Tata Energy Resource Institute (TERI) was the other notable non-
governmental organisation working on the environment.86 Established in 1974, TERI’s 
initial focus was to ‘make a difference in the way people think about energy and help 
create an energy structure that would minimise pollution and other harmful 
environmental impacts.’87 TERI’s mandate was less political when compared to the 
CSE. By 1985, TERI found recognition among environmental officials ‘filling gaps in 
governmental services and knowledge related to energy matters.’88 But unlike the CSE, 
TERI’s agenda and activities differed in tack and approach; less strident, TERI 
functioned like an internal think tank, working out the government’s energy projections 
and estimates.89 In different ways, both organisations distilled the importance of climate 
change to MoEF officials and Indian diplomats.  
 
TERI organised and facilitated discussions on climate change so Indian officials 
from MoEF and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) could learn more about the 
issue. By 1988, prevailing views on climate change were split over how and, 
importantly, which countries should address climate change. Several climate workshops 
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and conferences – Villach (1987) Bellagio (1988) paid heed to the plight of developing 
countries in tackling climate change given financial and technological constraints.90 In 
1991, the IPCC’s first Assessment Report warned countries of the rising implications 
and costs accompanying accumulation of greenhouse gases. The report was moderate 
but activist in that it urged all countries to shed ‘business as usual’ practices and 
collectively mobilise against climate change.91 Importantly, Assessment Report 1 
argued that ‘industrialized countries and developing countries have a common 
responsibility in dealing with problems arising from climate change, and effective 
responses require a global effort.’92 Besides providing evidence, these workshops 
clarified the need for a political response to climate change.	  	  
	  
This political view, absorbed through climate workshops and U.N. committee 
meetings in New York, informed early views of Indian diplomats present at those 
meetings vis-à-vis addressing climate change – that developing countries had different 
responsibilities vis-à-vis climate change contingent on adequate provision of financial 
resources from developed countries.93 MEA and MoEF officials collaborated with TERI 
to hone this view and clarify how to best position India on climate change. In October 
1989, TERI gathered Indian diplomats working on multilateral issues and MoEF 
officials for a conference ‘Global Warming and Climate Change: Perspectives from 
Developing Countries’ alongside diplomats and representatives from other developing 
countries.94 At the conference, several papers were presented on the emission patterns 
of developing countries highlighting their levels relative to developed countries. The 
resultant conference report singled out developed countries for ‘having caused the major 
share of the problem’ and ‘possessing the resources to do something about it, industrial 
countries have a special responsibility to assist the developing countries in finding and 
financing appropriate responses.’95 Attention was given by conference delegates to 
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sketch out what those responses would be in terms of emissions mitigation. In the end, 
the conference urged the Indian government to involve all levels of government in 
understanding the nature of climate change and its effects and calibrate its energy 
matrix and policies given shifting climactic conditions.96 
 
Having absorbed the political importance of climate change, the Indian 
government’s official climate change position was outlined in April 1990. The V.P. 
Singh government hosted the Conference of Select Developing Countries on Global 
Environmental Issues ‘to strengthen links and coordinate developing country positions 
on global environmental matters.’97 Indian diplomats realised the importance of 
stitching together a coalition of developing countries that perceived climate change 
similarly. The Indian government expected developed countries to bear ‘primary 
responsibility to reverse the situation by setting limits on greenhouse gas emissions.’98 
Echoing sentiments expressed at Toronto, Noordwijk and U.N. Resolution 44/228, the 
Indian government emphasised notions of ‘equity and responsibility’ to address the 
problem.99 The conference eventually agreed that the ‘responsibility for reduction of 
greenhouse gases to prevent a climate change would, therefore, rest with the developed 
countries.’100 Politically, the statement was critical given the impact it would have at 
climate change negotiations.  
 
The conference also marked the beginning of TERI’s relationship with the 
Indian government on climate change and other environmental matters. “TERI and 
CSE,” Environment Minister Kamal Nath remarked, “came to be my major arms of 
input in UNCED preparations.”101 Over the next few years, TERI provided estimates on 
national greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation options and forecasting impacts of global 
warming that informed government policies.102 Susanne Jakobsen argues that during 
this period TERI ‘shared impressive access to and impact on the central government’s 
policymaking on climate change in the pre-UNCED years where they came to ‘sit at the 
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drawing-desk’ with the MoEF as it began to form a national position on climate 
change.103 TERI’s policy assistance in these few years did not veer from the 
government’s thinking and position on climate change.104 Even as the organisation 
provided global warming estimates to the government during and after climate 
negotiations, TERI researchers were aware of the boundaries of their influence that 
proved contingent on the government’s willingness to accept burdens vis-à-vis carbon 
emissions.105 
 
With this understanding, Indian diplomats participated at the Second World 
Climate Conference (SWCC) in October 1990. Reproaching the IPCC’s assertion of 
common responsibilities, developing countries pushed for the conference’s declaration 
to mark that developed countries had the ‘main responsibility’ to reduce greenhouse 
gases given past contributions.106 When this move was contested by developed 
countries, both sides agreed to a declaration that stated that both ‘industrialised and 
developing countries have a common but differentiated responsibility for dealing with 
problems of climate change.’107 The statement was vital for developing countries, 
including India, represented by MEA officials, for it gave them a political solution to an 
issue – climate change - that they now regarded as purely political and not 
environmental. The SWCC also marked the nadir of IPCC’s influence on climate 
change with the balance of power shifting from scientists to member states that found 
prevailing science amenable to conflicting political positions.108 India approached 
climate negotiations with an intent to mainstream this political understanding of climate 
change and push back against prevailing scientific views that stressed international 
collective action regardless of development status or technical capabilities. But once 
they arrived at negotiations, it was the other environmental organisation – the CSE that 
fortified India’s approach and gave negotiators the intellectual basis to execute their 
intentions.  
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Reservations that developing countries held against the IPCC doomed the 
network’s chances of conducting international climate negotiations.109 In December 
1990, the U.N. passed a resolution to place negotiations under the auspices of the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (INC/FCC) with negotiations set to commence in February 1991.110 Before 
negotiations commenced, the World Resources Institute (WRI) published its Second 
Annual World Resources report in 1991. Prior scientific research on global warming 
from IPCC and other networks focused on the combustion of fossil fuels and release of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. But the WRI report investigated the burning of 
biomass and release of gases like methane largely from agricultural activities to map 
climate change.111 The index, used in the report, was important because it was one of 
the first documented attempts to measure and compare national carbon emissions, the 
primary marker to determine a nation’s climate change responsibilities.112 From the 
data, the report declared that ‘developing countries were just as responsible’ for climate 
change as developed countries, identifying India, Brazil and China as three of the top 
six emitters.113 
 
Not only did the WRI report stake out a clear and controversial position on 
national greenhouse gas emissions, it forced developing countries, particularly those 
identified as major emitters, to clarify their respective positions on climate change.114 
Like other developing countries, India was caught off-guard when the WRI report was 
unveiled. Neither was New Delhi well equipped to grapple with the report given the 
MoEF’s weak understanding of the science of climate change.115 Dealing with 
pollution-related issues precluded environmental officials from acquiring a workable 
grasp on global warming or climate change. Moreover, the MoEF had no substantive 
links to IPCC, the principal arbiter on greenhouse gas emissions estimates.  
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The MoEF’s knowledge deficits on climate change were embarrassingly laid 
bare in its official response to the WRI report. Responding publicly, Environment 
Minister Maneka Gandhi reflexively proclaimed ‘India should stop producing rice’ to 
curb purported emissions without considering the merits of the report and its 
conclusions.116 Gandhi’s imprudent response was widely pilloried. When attendant 
clarifications were issued in the media, the MoEF backpedalled. Gandhi retracted her 
statement that India was equally responsible for greenhouse gas emissions; instead, she 
clarified that a ‘methane conspiracy’ was afoot around the greenhouse gas emissions of 
the poor.117 Ineptly, MoEF officials reinforced that a clear difference existed between 
the ’survival emissions of the poor’ and ‘luxury emissions of the rich.’118 
 
The MoEF’s public retraction drew directly from the direction given by CSE to 
the WRI report and observations. The CSE stepped in to articulate a grounded 
developing country perspective on global warming backed by evidence and experience. 
In a scorching riposte to the WRI report, CSE’s head Agarwal and fellow colleague 
Sunita Narain published Global Warming in an Unequal World, where they argued that 
the WRI report was ‘based less on science and more on politically motivated 
jugglery.’119 They claimed the report focused disproportionately on national emissions 
instead of per capita emissions that were considerably smaller for developing countries 
when compared to the developed world.120 Agarwal and Narain also refuted the notion 
that greenhouse gases should be accounted for without establishing their origins. What 
they called for was an approach that split emissions in two kinds: ‘subsistence 
emissions’ generated by the poor to take care of themselves and ‘luxury emissions’ 
generated by the consumption patterns of the rich.121 Put simply, equity matters. 
Agarwal publicly reinforced equity at a symposium on climate change in early 1992,  
 
‘I tried to draw the difference really between the rich and the poor and not so 
much against the North and South. I have repeatedly made the point that had the 
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W.R.I report pointed out that people like me are using too many cars and 
destroying the earth’s atmosphere, believe me, I would have never responded 
against them however bad the mathematics and science or anything might have 
been. It is only because I got very mad at people saying that a poor farmer in 
Bangladesh or in West Bengal or Thailand who has half an acre of land and is 
producing just about enough food to survive is producing methane that is 
destroying the earth’s atmosphere.’122  
 
Agarwal and CSE reframed climate change around social justice, the central leitmotif 
driving their work on the environment. Agarwal also linked the fates of the poor to 
international rules and systems that work against the poor and less privileged, ‘if we 
have to move towards global environmental management, we have to develop a system 
of environmental rights for all human beings. Use of instruments like conventions, aid, 
trade and debt are all levers of power in the hands of the North. They are nothing but 
levers of power in the hands of the north.’123 
 
Agarwal’s post-WRI report clarifications and advocacy resonated in India just as 
FCCC negotiations commenced in Washington. Harnessing the moment, Agarwal urged 
MoEF officials to adopt a proactive stance at international climate meetings that 
protected the interests of poorest citizens in India.124 Agarwal also wrote a letter to 
Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar warning of an effort ‘by western nations seeking to 
ram a new ecological order down the throats of the hapless third world’ through 
international environmental conventions.125 Remain wary of external intentions shaping 
the global warming discourse, Agarwal argued, given their potential effects on domestic 
policy should the Indian government concede to the scientific framing of the problem 
by networks like the IPCC.126 His positions were a function of the CSE’s larger policy 
advocacy that strove to place the poor at the heart of environmental policy debates; 
incidentally, CSE’s riposte and attendant advocacy on climate change dovetailed with 
the Indian government’s desire to evade commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Agarwal laboured to ensure the Indian government and the MoEF, in 
particular, did not concede to contrarian notions advanced by groups like IPCC and 
WRI that global warming imposed symmetric expectations on all countries. Conceding, 
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in Agarwal’s view, would likely result in policy commitments incommensurate to 
national emission contributions, however measured, to the emergent problem. 
 
The CSE’s retort and focus on equity and history vis-à-vis emissions politicised 
the issue in India. A former Indian climate change negotiator asserted ‘when we were 
looking at equity and other institutional factors, the monograph by Agarwal and Narain 
influenced our thinking as it placed equity at the forefront.’127 Indian environmental 
journalist Darryl D’Monte refers to the CSE report as a ‘game-changer that transformed 
the domain of discourse’ on climate change in India and abroad.128 Though already 
aware countries held different obligations on greenhouse gas emissions from various 
climate workshops and meetings, the Indian government and climate negotiators, in 
particular, grew acutely sensitive of the distinctions between countries when it came to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions or responsibilities to curb climate change. While 
TERI focused on mapping the greenhouse gas emissions of developing countries, the 
CSE historicised the emissions debate giving developing countries added ammunition 
when claiming developing countries held distinct responsibilities on climate change. 
The CSE had a discernible impact on the atmosphere around which climate change was 
effectively being negotiated providing a historical and geographic context to the 
emissions debate. 
 
Moving Ahead Diplomatically 
 
India approached climate negotiations with caution. Scientific knowledge on climate 
change was suboptimal. The international politics around global warming had become 
fractious pitting developed against developing countries. Scientific networks like the 
IPCC advised on climate change favoured joint collective action by all countries, a 
position that the U.S. and several European countries endorsed. These developments set 
the stage for FCCC negotiations. Before negotiations, internal discussions occurred in 
New Delhi over which ministry should lead climate negotiations for India - Ministry of 
External Affairs (MEA) or Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). Though the 
substance matter fell under the purview of MoEF, the MEA was given the lead given 
                                                




political tensions surrounding the ascription of climate responsibilities.129 
 
Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, India’s chief climate negotiator asserted ‘had they 
been UNEP negotiations, of course it would have fallen within the purview of the 
MoEF. While the MoEF did rightly lead in policy coordination, when it came to 
negotiations, it became appropriate for MEA to take the lead.’130 But convenience was 
not the only reason. Various international conferences on global warming and climate 
issues clarified the political importance of climate change and the need to mobilise a 
strong political approach at negotiations. This urgency necessitated a strong diplomatic 
team to defend Indian interests. The government decided that the MEA would lead with 
MoEF assisting on specific policy matters.131132 That said, the MEA’s record and 
expertise on environmental diplomacy was also limited; unlike the MoEF, MEA did not 
have a separate unit to cover global environmental issues. On the Montreal Protocol, the 
MEA’s U.N. division managed negotiations alongside other multilateral issues like 
disarmament, human rights, peacekeeping and Security Council matters.133 
 
Despite constraints, MEA officials acquired a sound political understanding of 
global warming through the UN’s Second Committee that debated climate change in 
December 1989.134 Several plenary discussions at the Second Committee that year 
focused on the ‘deterioration of the environment.’135 In fact, representing India at the 
Second Committee was Chandrashekhar Dasgupta who took over as India’s chief 
climate change negotiator in Washington.136 Dasgupta familiarised himself with climate 
change and how it was considered at various intergovernmental conferences including 
the Noordwijk Conference, 9th Non-aligned Summit and the Second World Climate 
Conference; all these conferences recognised that developed countries had greater 
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responsibilities on climate change. This notion was formally endorsed by the U.N.’s 
Second Committee that noted since ‘the largest part of the current emission of 
pollutants into the environment originates in developed countries,’ they had the ‘main 
responsibility for combating such pollution.’137 These experiences led to the conference 
organised by TERI where discussions mapped emission patterns of developing 
countries. This conference also precipitated India’s first climate change position in 
1990. With this foundation, the Indian delegation commenced FCCC negotiations.  
 
Underway in Washington  
  
FCCC negotiations commenced in Washington, D.C. in February 1991.138 Negotiations 
were divided between Annex I or industrialised countries and Non-Annex I consisting 
of developing countries; this division instantly gave developing countries leverage 
given their majority.139 The first meeting sorted out the logistical framework of 
negotiations and how they would be conducted. Negotiations were split into two 
working groups.140 The first group focused on commitments to limit and reduce carbon 
emissions.141 The second group was tasked to craft the legal and institutional 
mechanisms to enact commitments.142 Many countries, including India, stressed the 
importance of addressing climate change in an ‘integrated and comprehensive manner,’ 
bristling at the mention of hard targets or timetables on emission reduction.143 Given the 
bifurcation of negotiations, the Indian delegation split responsibilities, with the MEA 
assigned the first working group and MoEF the second.144  
 
Negotiations, unsurprisingly, were marked by a North-South split with 
developed countries keen on tackling climate change as an environmental problem and 
developing countries an issue tied to their development.145 India’s chief negotiator 
Dasgupta recalls that at the beginning ‘there was indeed, a clear North-South divide. 
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Within the group of developing countries, on the one hand, you had countries whose 
economies were mainly dependent on oil exports and who were, therefore, 
unenthusiastic about climate change mitigation; while on the other hand, the group also 
included low lying island states which are threatened by physical extinction as a result 
of climate change and wanted maximum action on mitigation. Then there was a central 
group, including India, China and other countries, which sort of provided a sort of 
balance to the group. From the outset, India was asked to speak on behalf of the G-77 
which directly placed Indian negotiators across from their European and American 
interlocutors who formed the other two poles during the negotiations.’146 The first 
meeting’s texture validated India’s political tack that hinged on framing climate change 
as a developmental and political issue not an environmental one given the resources, 
both financial and technical, required to mitigate climate change.  
 
Marking Boundaries in Geneva 
 
Formal negotiations resumed at the second session in Geneva in June 1991. To generate 
ideas on a draft framework convention, member states submitted national proposals 
detailing their preferences.147 India did so at the outset. India’s contribution stated that 
developed and developing countries had a responsibility to reduce emissions but this 
necessity, for developing countries, was contingent on respective development 
objectives since they had to focus on ‘the eradication of poverty and the achievement of 
economic and social development.’148 Equity starred in India’s proposal. Dasgupta was 
clear as to how he perceived climate change when presenting India’s position, ‘the 
problem of global warming is caused not by emissions of greenhouse gases as such but 
by excessive levels of per capita emissions of these gases. If per capita emissions of all 
countries had been on the same levels as those of the developing countries, the world 
would not today have faced the threat of global warming. It follows therefore that 
developed countries with high per capita emission levels of greenhouse gases are 
responsible for incremental global warming.’149 
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India’s position emphasised the historical nature of industrialisation and 
development in assessing climate change that placed greater burdens on those that had 
industrialised over those that had not. The proposal did not go into the specifics of how 
climate change affected India nor did it wade into scientific estimates on global 
warming provided by the IPCC.150 Given India’s weak engagement with the scientific 
network and the controversial politics surrounding the IPCC’s dictums, the Indian 
delegation steered clear of the science of climate change. Instead, India’s paper 
historicised emission trends precipitating the onset of climate change; this focus ring-
fenced from consideration current estimates of global warming trends that the IPCC laid 
out.151 This approach also narrowed the understanding of climate change at 
negotiations, especially for many developing countries unclear on the implications of 
accepting commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
The Indian proposal urged developed countries to address climate change by 
establishing national plans to stabilise greenhouse emissions, providing financial 
resources to assist developing countries, transferring environmentally sound 
technologies and building their capacities in scientific and technological research.152 
Dasgupta attributed India’s differentiated focus to the importance of economic 
development to negotiations and the framework convention, ‘because we realised what 
was at stake and that was the issue of responsibilities and how it had to be divided. 
Climate change was not caused by carbon emissions as such but excessive carbon 
emissions that was historically conditioned. And this had to be taken account of.’153 On 
financial assistance, the Indian proposal called for an independent fund that would ‘be 
democratically administered by the parties to the convention, rather than through 
institutions where donors have disproportionate influence.’154 From developing 
countries, however, India expected little; New Delhi’s stance hinged on external actions 
from developed countries to manage and mitigate the problem.   
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Importantly, the paper defined climate change and how it was understood from a 
developing country perspective.155 Dasgupta recalls that through the proposal, ‘India 
made a vital contribution since developing countries often cede invaluable political 
space to developed countries in international negotiations that allows the latter to 
control the course and pace of negotiations. I was determined that this should not 
happen in climate change negotiations. It was essential to define the issues appropriately 
and present our own proposals right at the beginning.’156 Prime Minister Narasimha 
Rao, briefed by Dasgupta on negotiations before hand, advised his chief negotiator to 
reject any proposal that would hamper India’s development.157 Rao gave broad 
directions to negotiators without getting involved in the details.158  
 
The Indian proposal also received support from China. Before the second 
negotiating session, the Chinese government hosted a conference entitled ‘The 
Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development of Developing Countries’ 
that gathered representatives from the developing world. Emerging from discussions 
was the ‘Beijing Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development’ that 
insisted on the right for developing countries to grow in light of growing international 
concerns vis-à-vis environmental protection from the 1970s.159 In fact, through the 
Beijing conference and FCCC negotiations, an incipient partnership between China and 
India ‘became a mainstay of Chinese negotiating strategy’ given convergence on 
protecting their development trajectories from potential climate change commitments.160 
China’s support emboldened India’s stance but there was pushback from other 
countries.  
 
Opposition came from Gulf and Small Island states that had different concerns 
of the Indian position. Saudi objections revolved around India’s focus on per capita 
emissions that would place it a disadvantage given high emissions from fossil fuel 
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production.161 Island states, on the other hand, were keen to sharpen commitments for 
countries located in highly vulnerable areas prone to climactic shifts.162 Brazil and other 
Latin American countries were receptive to accept obligations if anchored at 
‘differentiated’ levels which implicitly accepted some climate responsibilities without 
spelling them out.163 The British proposal emphasised international cooperation between 
all countries as important to ‘take a full part in the international response to climate 
change.’164 The U.S. did not tread far from this stance. Recognising ‘different nations 
have different social, economic and other circumstances,’ Washington pushed for 
flexibility in crafting national responses while stressing all nations participate.165  
 
Financial assistance was a vital issue at negotiations. Quite clearly, the Indian 
proposal advocated for the establishment of an independent climate fund to meet the 
‘costs for developing countries to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change.’166 
India placed the onus on developed countries to establish and finance the fund with a 
caveat that all resources be exclusively available to developing countries.167 Financing 
was a crucial plank in India’s paper and approach given how Indian negotiators 
conceptualised climate change. Politically, tackling climate change at the global level 
would rest on financial assistance provided to developing countries and Indian 
negotiators pushed hard for sufficient resources to realise that cause.  
 
Most developed countries, however, were not as specific or forthcoming on 
financial assistance.168 Germany agreed that developed countries should provide 
‘adequate and additional financial resources’ without giving details.169 France focused 
on domestic policy changes that can be made like instituting taxes, bolstering 
regulations and providing incentives to curb greenhouse gas emissions.170 The British 
paper offered more detail here; to assist developing countries, London called for 
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developed countries to mobilise necessary financial resources through the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) of the World Bank with assistance from the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP).171 Conspicuous by their silence on financial assistance was the U.S. American 
delegates focused more on technology transfer to developing countries more than 
financial assistance; Washington argued that before finances can be transferred, more 
required research and analysis was required given ‘existing ambiguities’ on the costs 
and benefits of global warming.172  
 
The second meeting ended without consensus. The first working group that 
considered commitments was split. Most developing countries, except Gulf and Island 
states, pushed to differentiate responsibilities between developed and developing 
countries and of the attendant need to meet potential costs from that commitment.173 
There was a divergence on the nature of specific commitments required; several 
delegations, especially the U.S., felt that the framework convention should be flexible 
enough for states to work with while the Europeans preferred clear pledges.174 The 
Indian view that many developing countries shared expected developed countries to 
commit to specific targets and developing countries to follow a path consistent with 
their ‘respective capabilities’ without specifying further. 175  
 
The second working group that considered legal and institutional mechanisms to 
enact commitments was also divided. Some developing countries, including India, 
declared their preference for a separate climate fund with contributions from 
industrialised countries.176 The U.K.’s position stood in contrast, suggesting a new 
institution would be expensive to create and operate, instead pushing for financial 
assistance through existing U.N. agencies.177 In the end, the second session was 
remembered for the sheer range of issues discussed. But the concerns of developing 
countries laid bare in this session would shape the contours of negotiations. Importantly, 
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the Indian paper constricted the space around discussions by declaring a defensive 
developing country perspective on climate change that ruled out commitments and 
expected financial assistance. 
 
Battling in Nairobi 
 
India retained pressure on developed countries for financial assistance in Nairobi from 
September 1991. New Delhi firmly objected to Japan’s pledge and review proposal, 
where all states would commit to limit greenhouse gas emissions and subsequently 
report measures taken for formal review; Indian delegates insisted the framework 
convention be anchored on per capita emissions with remedial actions taken based on 
contributions from developed countries.178 Despite a clear stance on financial 
assistance, Indian negotiators extended an olive branch, proposing that developing 
countries might implement specific projects to reduce emissions, provided costs are 
fully met for such projects.179 The Indian proposal was endorsed by other developing 
countries that felt some compromises had to be made to move the dialogue on 
commitments and financial assistance. The Chinese delegation also submitted a 
proposal pronouncing their preferences on the framework convention. Beijing 
recognised the need for international cooperation based on equity where responsibilities 
are common but differentiated among member states.180 Backing India, Beijing 
endorsed a separate international fund ‘composed of adequate, additional and timely’ 
financial resources.181 
 
Nonetheless, clear distance remained between countries on commitments to 
reduce emissions.182 The Indian position on commitments, that many developing 
countries endorsed, argued that specific mitigation commitments should only apply to 
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developed countries but this view was rejected by the U.S. that maintained 
commitments should be applicable to all countries.183 On the financial mechanism, two 
specific options were discussed – an independent international fund or the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) backed by the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP.184 The GEF 
option was supported by developed countries given the operational costs associated with 
creating new institutions while India and other developing countries backed an 
independent fund to provide funding based on recipient needs.185 Developing countries 
had little faith funding would be provided without conditions given how development 
finance was disbursed through existing donors like the World Bank.186  
 
When it became clear that the G-77 group could not agree on commitments due 
to resistance from Island states, a new coalition consisting of India, China and fifty-two 
developing countries formed to gather consensus.187 Steering a middle course, this 
group resubmitted a proposal on commitments that called on developed countries, on 
the basis of assessed contributions, to meet the costs accompanying climate mitigation 
and adaptation.188 Gaps, however, widened between developed countries who sought to 
unite on the basis of the EC’s stabilisation proposal that called for all industrialised 
countries to set and achieve clear stabilisation targets.189 But this proposal was rejected 
by the U.S. that opposed precise stabilisation targets in favour of flexibility.190 As 
negotiations concluded in Nairobi, developed countries found themselves divided on 
emissions commitments while developing countries appeared united on commitments 
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Consolidating in Geneva  
 
India returned to Geneva for the fourth negotiating committee session in December 
1991 with a desire to finalise provisions on financing and commitments.192 As 
negotiations progressed, a group of forty-three developing countries, including India, 
submitted a separate proposal on commitments to push for consensus on the matter.193 
On responsibilities, the document stated ‘feasible measures to address climate change’ 
should be taken only in accordance with national development plans and priorities, 
again provided costs are met on a regular basis.194 The proposal did not take a specific 
stance on developed country commitments to curb emissions but impelled them to 
‘provide on a grant basis new, adequate, and additional financial resources to meet the 
incremental costs’ that developing countries would incur.195 The text also called for 
transferring technologies on ‘concessional, preferential and favourable terms.’196 What 
negotiators from developing countries gathered was that the thrust of negotiations and 
path to an acceptable framework convention hinged on the amount of financial 
assistance received from developed countries to deflect the focus from what developing 
countries ought to do. Indian negotiators increased calls for financial assistance as 
negotiations progressed; reservations, however, remained from developed countries.  
 
Negotiations evolved to assume a ‘trilateral character’ between European 
countries, United States and the G-77 with its offshoots.197 Washington continued to 
rebuff conditions on emission reductions, stabilisation of greenhouse gases and transfer 
of technology and financial resources ‘on anything other than commercial terms.’198 On 
financing, developed countries continued to support the GEF option; to allay concerns 
of developing countries, OECD countries agreed to restructure the GEF’s governance 
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arrangements to give them a greater say in the way funds are disbursed.199 The E.C. 
insisted on time-sensitive stabilisation targets for all developed countries which most 
developing countries endorsed with financial resources and technology added on.200 But 
it was still unclear whether the U.S. would agree to the proposal.  
 
To clarify their position on commitments, the G-77 advanced a joint statement 
extolling the right to economic development hoping it would be added to the final 
framework convention.201 The position advanced that ‘measures to guard against 
climate change should be integrated into national development programmes taking into 
account that environmental standards valid for developed countries may have 
inappropriate and unwarranted social and economic costs in developing countries.’202 
Reflecting the initial Indian proposal, the G-77 statement reiterated that the historical 
differences of emission patterns must be respected when negotiating climate change 
commitments.203  
 
To move negotiations forward, Working Group I began streamlining portions, 
culling discordant elements to arrive at a more agreeable text.204 But differences 
remained among developed countries on commitments; both the U.S. and E.C opted to 
shelve negotiations with developing countries until they found common ground 
amongst themselves.205 India, like other developing countries, had to wait until the E.C. 
and U.S. reconciled their differences for a breakthrough. Indian negotiator Dasgupta 
recalls ‘we drew a blank in our efforts to sound the E.C. and U.S. separately on a deal. I 
came to the conclusion that neither of these parties were prepared to enter into 
substantive negotiations with developing countries. The result was a deadlock in the 
INC.’206 Differences remained on all issues - commitments developed countries were 
willing to assume, amount of financial assistance they would provide to developing 
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countries, mechanism channelling financial assistance and obligations developing 
countries were willing to accept should financing and technology arrive. As a result, 
negotiations went directly into drafting mode at the end of the fourth session without 
resolving existing differences.207 
 
Finalising the Framework Convention  
 
The fifth negotiating committee session took place in February 1992 in New York.208 
Prevailing differences were complicated by the transatlantic divide on both parts of the 
convention – emissions commitments and financial resources. Washington’s reluctance 
to accept a stabilisation target and agree conclusively on financial assistance threatened 
to attenuate the framework convention to an agreement that required weak 
commitments from all member states to tackle climate change.209 Developing countries 
grew apprehensive that reservations from developed countries would ricochet back 
forcing them to modify their positions to produce an agreement.210 This fear incensed 
Indian negotiators having clearly established their position of no emission reduction 
commitments under any condition. Dismayed by the deadlock, the G-77 issued a joint 
statement asserting ‘developed countries must clearly indicate the commitments on 
emissions for stabilisation and reduction that they are willing to enter into along with a 
specific time-table.’211  
 
Progress, however, was made on financial assistance. The E.C. agreed to 
provide ’new and additional’ financial resources to developing countries for mitigation 
that the U.S. accepted, in principle, without specifying details.212 Both the U.S and E.C. 
also detailed their plan for restructuring the GEF to invest more power in the hands of 
developing countries on how financing would be provided.213 Though this concession 
did not assuage all developing countries, it made the GEF palatable. Near the end of the 
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final plenary session, the revised text from work done by both working groups was 
submitted.214 With no time left to bridge existing gaps, the forum decided to suspend 
negotiations and adjourn matters until another meeting, created as the second part of the 
fifth session to make necessary compromises and produce a framework convention in 
time for the Rio Convention in June 1992.215 
 
The second part of the fifth session continued in May 1992 in New York.216 
News arrived that the U.S. and E.C. had settled their differences on emissions. With the 
breakthrough, the chairman submitted a working paper covering commitments and 
mechanisms for transferring funds and technologies.217 Based on the revised text from 
the previous session, the working paper presented a more balanced framework 
convention reflecting trade-offs on a range of contentious provisions including financial 
assistance.218 A key procedural change was adopted to accelerate negotiations. At the 
chairman’s suggestion, discussions on the revised text were moved to an ‘enlarged 
bureau’ that included about two dozen countries that had played a key role at 
negotiations.219 
 
The chairman’s resultant text sought to balance interests of developing and 
developed countries. For the former, their demand of no oversight of national plans to 
curb emissions was inserted.220 Requests for adequate financial resources were 
acknowledged and compliance to treaty provisions were contingent on the arrival of 
financial resources and transfer of technology.221 Lead Indian negotiator Dasgupta adds 
that the latter inclusion was significant, ‘the critical point in terms of financing, from 
our standpoint, was that the entitlement of financing be enshrined in the framework 
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convention. And also the acknowledgement that we were developing countries that had 
overriding social and economic commitments, which had to be respected in the 
framework and it was.’222 On the financial mechanism, the text stated that it would not 
create an independent fund but make every effort to ensure that the existing entity or the 
GEF would be ‘transparent, balanced and operate under the authority of the Conference 
of Parties.’223 The Indian delegation agreed to the language.   
 
For developed countries, the text contained weak commitments on emission 
reduction. At the plenary, Dasgupta prodded developed countries to settle on a concrete 
position, ‘OECD countries were not keen to commit to clear targets, especially the U.S 
that did not even want to commit to any stabilisation requirements, let alone reduction 
targets. Near the end, with much difficulty, we brought it back to the plenary forum 
where this issue was debated. I submitted an amendment calling for clarifications to 
OECD commitments that were riddled with ambiguities but eventually that made it into 
the treaty.’224 When questioned by Dasgupta on the statement’s ambiguity, the chairman 
clarified it was as such due to the inability of developed countries to agree on a precise 
pledge.225 Nonetheless, developed countries were urged to ‘take all practicable steps to 
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, access to and transfer of 
environmentally-sound technologies and knowhow.226 Though developing countries 
pushed to insert ‘full agreed incremental costs’ from developed countries for reducing 
emissions, the ensuing text only allowed for ‘agreed costs.’227 
 
Objections aside, the chairman insisted to not debate the merits of the position of 
developed countries given the difficulties surrounding their settlement. Indian 
negotiators pushed again to consider several provisions in the text, particularly 
developed country commitments.228 Given the text and unsure whether they could 
consent to a largely toothless convention, the Indian delegation sought political counsel 
from New Delhi on the course to take.229 The Prime Minister’s office directed Indian 
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negotiators to work with other leading developing countries like China to protect their 
flank but leave the door open to a deal.230 There was no clear executive directive from 
New Delhi through the course of negotiations. To secure changes to the text on 
unfulfilled provisions, India lobbied influential developing countries, especially China. 
With some support, the clause on financial resources was amended to reflect ‘agreed 
full incremental costs.’231 On the suggested body that would monitor treaty 
implementation, another Indian amendment was passed, confining the body’s authority 
only over developed countries and their commitments.232 After agreements were 
secured on other issues, texts were distributed to the larger plenary session for 
approval.233 
 
On May 9 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was formally adopted.234 The framework convention endorsed the view that 
climate protection is contingent on ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities,’ recognising that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are overriding priorities of developing countries.235 Though the text did not 
clarify responsibilities of developed countries, it called on them to ‘take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects itself.’236 The framework convention 
also recognised that actions of developing countries would be measured only by the 
‘effective implementation by developed country parties of their commitments under the 
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology.’237 The document 
also enshrined that ‘agreed full incremental costs’ be given by developed to developing 
countries for climate mitigation.238 On the financial mechanism, a compromise was 
reached by entrusting the responsibility to the World Bank’s Global Environment 
Facility (GEF).239  
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Despite weak commitments imposed by the framework convention on both 
developed and developing countries, there was a pervading sense that the result was the 
most palatable outcome as negotiations ended.240 While Indian negotiators were 
disappointed by the inability to extract specific commitments from developed countries 
on emissions, they managed to protect their interests on both commitments and 
financial assistance. As per their original intent, Indian negotiators managed to stave off 
emission reduction commitments and secured promises of financial assistance, though 
unspecified, for developing countries before undertaking mitigation actions.241 At the 
end, Indian negotiator Dasgupta declared ‘my government will sign the climate change 
treaty - we will sign it in Rio.’242 India signed the United Nations Framework 




India worked to negotiate and ratify a weak Framework Convention on Climate Change 
to foreground an alternative political understanding of climate change that would 
protect its development trajectory from climate change commitments. Institutions, 
particularly the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), did not have a sound 
understanding of climate change having missed international debates on the issue and 
having been preoccupied by other environmental problems. This knowledge gap left the 
Indian government wanting in terms of preparing a strong environmental approach to 
climate change even as Indian diplomats grasped the international politics of the 
subject. But existing institutional gaps were filled by advocacy and assistance from 
domestic interest groups like The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) and the Centre 
for Science and Environment (CSE) who furnished the government with perspectives 
on how developing countries were affected by the issue. Their understanding placed the 
onus on industrialised countries to lead in addressing the problem. Both CSE and TERI 
remained abreast over the international discourse on climate change that emphasised 
shared responsibilities between all countries. They sensed that accepting this tack would 
harm India’s development given the commitments accompanying climate mitigation. 
Working with the Ministry of External Affairs and MoEF in different capacities, TERI 
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and CSE instilled the importance of having a development-centric climate change 
position that emphasised history and equity. Indian negotiators adopted this tack and 
sought to anchor the framework convention on principles of equity and differentiation 
that exempted developing countries from unconditional commitments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions with financial assistance provided for remedial measures. At 
negotiations, Indian delegates worked with their developing country counterparts to 
ensure discussions did not stray from this agenda that led to a framework convention 
weak on emissions reduction commitments but strong in terms of protecting economic 









This chapter covers India’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
the first post-cold war multilateral nuclear disarmament treaty. Signatories to the CTBT 
agree to ban nuclear weapon explosions in all environments. The chapter first provides 
a brief background recounting developments leading to CTBT negotiations and India’s 
behaviour at negotiations. Then it moves to consider why India’s CTBT behaviour was 
puzzling. After that, the chapter provides an analytical narrative that describes how 
interests, institutions and interest groups interacted to determine India’s approach at 
negotiations leading and the subsequent rejection. Briefly, before negotiations, Indian 
diplomats and disarmament officials in the Ministry of External Affairs understood how 
a nuclear test ban agreement would affect India and sought to negotiate a treaty that 
protected their security interests. Besides the MEA, there existed several domestic 
voices, namely strategic experts, who wanted to shape the government’s position at 
negotiations. Through commentary, writings and consultations with MEA officials, 
these experts conveyed their views on the treaty. However, the range of views presented 
precluded the consolidation of any clear position. This situation gave the Indian 
government more leeway in terms of determining whether to accept or reject the treaty, 




In the mid-1980s, international civil society organisations were actively pressing both 
the United States and Soviet Union to commit to a nuclear test ban agreement.1 
Organisations like the Five Continent Peace Initiative and the International Physicians 
for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) were highlighting the deleterious effects of 
continued nuclear testing and even the possibility of a nuclear conflict.2 In the past, joint 
disarmament efforts between both super powers were foiled by recurring internal 
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qualms over verification. Even as both countries signed a panoply of arms control 
treaties since 1960, they did not seriously consider banning nuclear tests.3   
 
Then in 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union. Stuck 
in an economic crisis at home and a fruitless conflict in Afghanistan, Gorbachev 
decided to undertake an ambitious program of reforms.4 One part of the program 
covered nuclear disarmament. Gorbachev declared a moratorium on nuclear testing on 
August 5, 1985 after the Third Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review 
Conference that brought the prospect of a nuclear test ban agreement to the fore.5 Even 
though many non-aligned states supported this move, little support came from nuclear 
weapon states for the initiative. Gorbachev and Reagan then convened at the Reykjavik 
Summit in October 1986.6 From their meeting came the Intermediate Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty (INF) that required both countries destroy categories of intermediate 
range tactical nuclear weapons.7 Importantly, Moscow appeared willing to accept 
intrusive verification standards that had hitherto been the bugbear of arms control 
deliberations.8 There was hope that this outcome could lead to test ban negotiations. 
Soon enough, a window opened with talks scheduled on the NPT’s renewal.  
 
NPT signatories convened for the Fourth NPT Review Conference in August 
1990. Near the end, a group of non-nuclear weapon states pushed to secure a 
commitment for more ‘bilateral and multilateral action’ on a possible test ban.9 Of 
nuclear weapon states, only the Soviet Union supported the move.10 Still resisting, the 
United States backpedalled, offering ‘step-by-step negotiations’ between the 
                                                
3In fact, United States supported by the UK foiled all attempts to bring up the issue of a test ban at the CD 
in the mid 1980s. See J. Edmonds, “A Complete Nuclear Test Ban—Why has it taken so long?,” Security 
Dialogue, vol. 25, 4 (1994): 380. 
4Reforms or Glasnost that referred to openness or greater political and economic freedoms for Soviet 
citizens and Perestroika or the reconstruction of the Soviet political and economic system. See “Glasnost 
and Perestroika” Cold War Museum 2009, 
http://www.coldwar.org/articles/80s/glasnostandperestroika.asp.  
5Johnson, Unfinished Business, 26-29. 
6Ibid, 28.  
7Ibid.  
8Ibid.  
9President de Rivero of Peru called for negotiations between 16 states to reach an agreement on CTBT 
language. States included the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela 
and Yugoslavia. Mexico led the non-aligned opposition. See Johnson, Unfinished Business, 34. 
10China and France did not accede to the NPT until after the 1990 Review Conference. Of the three 
nuclear-weapon states at the 1990 NPT Review Conference, only the Soviet Union supported the CTBT.  
 
133 
superpowers on testing limitations hoping it would lead to a complete ban on testing.11 
Despite last minute negotiations, the impasse could not be broken with the U.S rejecting 
the proposed language; as a result, the entire review conference collapsed having failed 
to secure a final agreement on issues discussed.12  
 
The breakdown made it clear that the NPT’s extension hinged on Article VI that 
called for progress on a nuclear test ban agreement. But the problem was how to bring 
nuclear weapon states to the negotiating table to achieve this goal. One option was the 
creation of a ‘bridge’ or temporary reprieve from the problem - nuclear testing; in other 
words, a temporary suspension of nuclear testing that would create a conducive climate 
for test ban negotiations.13 With much difficulty, all nuclear weapon states agreed to 
moratorium by April 1992. This development eventually gave way to the U.N. General 
Assembly’s resolution on the Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement (hereafter CTBT) 
adopted on December 9, 1992.14 Soon thereafter, the Conference on Disarmament 
(hereafter CD) adopted a negotiating mandate for the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Nuclear 
Test Ban to ‘negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively 
verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to 
the prevention of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear 
disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.’15 
 
India hailed the CD’s decision. At the CD, India’s representative M.M. Jacob 
proclaimed, ‘we believe that the CTBT would go a long way in arresting a nuclear arms 
race and bring to an end the development of more lethal warheads.’16 For decades, India 
pressed the U.N. and CD to negotiate a nuclear test ban to enhance its own security in a 
region where nuclear proliferation was taking place and where the potential for conflict 
endured. Through the 1970s and 80s, the Indian government invested heavily in 
multilateral disarmament to ameliorate its nuclear security gap, particularly vis-à-vis 
China and Pakistan, pushing initiative after initiative, largely in vain. As momentum 
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gathered in 1992 toward a test ban mandate at the U.N., Indian leaders supported the 
cause. In an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 28, 1990 Foreign 
Minister I.K. Gujral remarked on India’s hope for more robust disarmament measures, 
‘with the end of the cold war, we feel that now is the time and a most opportune one for 
the international community to question the theories that justify the continuation of 
nuclear weapons.’17 Gujral’s declaration was followed by appeals to nuclear weapon 
states to declare a moratorium on nuclear testing and engender a conducive environment 
for negotiations.18 
 
At negotiations, Indian interlocutors were determined to negotiate a treaty that 
was rigid on scope or what kind of nuclear tests to ban and equitable on test verification, 
the two key components of the treaty. India’s positions on both provisions were 
steadfast and precise. Indian negotiators held out for nuclear weapon states to work with 
other countries to negotiate a tough treaty but this desire was not forthcoming. Midway 
through, NPT signatories reconvened to indefinitely extend the NPT which perpetuated 
the division between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. Soon after, China 
and France abruptly conducted several nuclear tests to shore up arsenals before a test 
ban agreement was finalised. These developments irked the Indian delegation and 
imperilled its agenda of a strong treaty that imposed symmetric constraints on all states 
vis-à-vis nuclear tests. But this hope was dashed. After NPT extension, nuclear weapon 
states returned to design a treaty that would leave some space to conduct ancillary tests 
while depriving other states of that right. Indian negotiators resisted this move just as 
the tough treaty they pushed for withered away. With no choice, India withdrew from 
negotiations and eventually rejected the treaty at the U.N. General Assembly.  
 
Puzzle – India’s CTBT Behaviour 
 
India’s behaviour at CTBT negotiations and eventual rejection raises a puzzle. Why did 
India adopt an enthusiastic stance toward the CTBT before and during negotiations only 
to reject the treaty? Security-wise, regional conditions had been deteriorating since 
India’s peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. India was aware China and Pakistan were 
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collaborating on nuclear issues. Pakistan’s nuclear disclosures, credible or not, 
exasperated Indian policymakers. Before negotiations, both countries were embroiled in 
a security crisis that threatened to go nuclear; the crisis precipitated nuclear discussions 
with the United States. Relations with Pakistan had not perceptibly changed to warrant a 
reversal with respect to the CTBT. Moreover, from 1993 China and India worked to 
remedy their perception gap that resulted in the signing of confidence-building 
accords.19 India’s security did not demonstrably deteriorate during negotiations to merit 
a change of heart midway. Though Prime Minister Narasimha Rao desisted from testing 
a nuclear weapon before CTBT negotiations, there was no clear signal that another 
nuclear test was in sight; in fact, financial compulsions intervened repeatedly to thwart a 
nuclear test. India’s rejection of CTBT also cannot be explained when viewed from a 
liberal institutionalist perspective. With marginal gains accrued from the treaty on 
nuclear test restrictions, India should have complied but what followed was rejection. 
Domestic politics, some scholars claim, caused India’s rejection. Dinshaw Mistry 
argues that India’s changing stand on the CTBT is attributable to ‘broader domestic 
criticism from the press and other political parties’ on disarmament and, in particular, 
the Entry into Force (EIF) clause which attempted to forcibly pull India into the treaty.20 
No doubt, CTBT negotiations, particularly after NPT extension, unleashed a torrent of 
domestic criticism notably from certain security commentators urging the government 
to be more circumspect before determining the course to take. But Mistry fails to 
explain why or how these domestic voices proved decisive. To explain why India 
rejected the CTBT, I focus on why the Ministry of External Affairs initially found 
CTBT negotiations in India’s interest, at first, and how that position changed from mid-
1995 leading to rejection.  
 
Narrative - India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
MEA’s Disarmament Diplomacy 
 
India’s multilateral nuclear diplomacy at the U.N., CD and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) has been a consistent feature of its foreign policy since the 
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1950s. India has supported several multilateral arms control and disarmament 
agreements to enhance its own security. This trajectory began with Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s call for a ‘Standstill Agreement’ in 1954 between atomic powers to 
cover nuclear testing and publicise effects of these weapons so the international 
community becomes better aware of accompanying risks.21 Nehru’s call won 
international attention when the U.N. Disarmament Commission submitted it for formal 
consideration in July 1954.22 But the move did little to stanch nuclear testing; in fact, 
from 1955 to 1989, the average number of tests conducted every year was 55.23 
Nonetheless, Nehru’s faith in multilateralism and India’s position as a materially weak 
state in the international system privileged diplomacy over other options.24 
 
In 1959, Indian diplomats co-sponsored a U.N. resolution that implored nuclear 
weapon states to refrain from underground nuclear testing.25 Nehru continued to needle 
Washington to prioritise disarmament; with the support of non-aligned leaders, he 
proposed a joint U.S.-Soviet summit on disarmament despite contingent tussles between 
the superpowers.26 When the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in 1963, Nehru 
hailed the treaty as a ‘watershed’ that would ‘take us toward disarmament and peace.’27 
Though India held PTBT was a positive development, New Delhi clarified that the 
treaty ‘is not the solution.’28 It was, in the words of Arthur Lall, the Indian delegate to 
the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), a step toward ‘general and 
complete’ disarmament.29 The solution was universal nuclear disarmament.  
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This objective acquired greater urgency after China tested its first nuclear device 
in October 1964.30 Thence Indian diplomats looked for opportunities to constrain the 
Chinese nuclear program which eventually led to negotiations for a Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (hereafter NPT).31 At negotiations, Indian delegate Vishnu Trivedi 
proposed a two-stage disarmament treaty requiring existing nuclear weapon states to 
cease production of nuclear weapons and progressively reduce remaining capabilities.32 
But Washington and Moscow demurred; instead, the superpowers toiled to widen the 
gap between nuclear and non-nuclear states by proposing different obligations.33 Trivedi 
fiercely opposed a U.S. plan that prohibited non-nuclear states from conducting 
peaceful nuclear explosions on the grounds that all countries should have the right to 
‘retain the same peaceful explosion rights as the nuclear weapon states would have.’34 
All through negotiations, Trivedi struggled to bridge the nuclear gap between India and 
the nuclear weapon states.  
 
All of India’s interests - halting production of nuclear weapon systems, 
obtaining security commitments from superpowers, securing disarmament commitments 
for nuclear weapon states and possessing the right to conduct peaceful nuclear 
explosions were given short shrift at NPT negotiations.35 Unsurprisingly, New Delhi 
refused to sign the NPT.36 NPT, signed in April 1968, was a pronounced setback for 
India; instead of constraining nuclear weapon states, the treaty hamstrung non-nuclear 
weapon states and instead of disarming China, the treaty legitimised its nuclear status.37 
The only concession won by non-nuclear weapon states was the right to conduct 
peaceful nuclear explosions. Short of producing nuclear weapons, disarmament proved 
                                                
30“1964 First Chinese Nuclear Test.” CTBTO, 2010, Accessed November 1, 2015. 
https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test.  
31Kennedy, India's Nuclear Odyssey, 131.   
32Disarmament Commission, Statement of V.C Trivedi, Indian Representative to the Disarmament 
Commission, UN Document PV/75 (New York: UN Disarmament Commission, 1965) 
33Ibid.  
34Both the Soviet Union and United States amended Article IV on ‘peaceful uses of energy,’ added a new 
Article V on ‘peaceful nuclear explosions.’ See Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 127. 
35Ibid. 
36On June 12 1968, the UN General Assembly Resolution endorsed NPT with UNGA Resolution. The 
vote was 95 to 4 with 21 abstentions. The four no votes were Albania, Cuba, Tanzania, and Zambia. See 
United Nations General Assembly, UN Resolution 2373 (XXII) (New York: United Nations, 1968) 
37Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 78.  
 
138 
the most amenable policy option, given the lack of external security guarantees, to 
enhance India’s security.38 
 
 Nonetheless, work on the Indian nuclear program continued leading to a 
peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. Though salutary for India’s nuclear program, the 
explosion hastened industrialised countries to tighten controls around nuclear supplies 
through the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) established in 
1975.39 Through the 1960s and 70s, however, the Indian government chose not to 
develop a nuclear weapon for largely financial reasons.40 Once this decision was taken, 
the government had only one policy option to improve its nuclear security – multilateral 
disarmament.41 In 1978, Indian delegates pushed for a comprehensive test ban 
agreement at the U.N. General Assembly’s Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD). 
Thereafter at the Conference on Disarmament (hereafter CD) advocated for total 
disarmament as a way of constraining nuclear program development in nuclear weapon 
states.42 At CD discussions in 1979, India’s delegate Chinmaya Gharekhan outlined a 
possible way toward test ban negotiations by calling nuclear weapon states to ‘observe a 
moratorium on nuclear testing’ until a comprehensive test ban agreement was 
concluded.43 New Delhi hoped nuclear weapon states would negotiate a comprehensive 
test ban agreement but there was no interest from the other side.44  
 
 In the 1980s, the Ministry of External Affairs (hereafter MEA) persisted with 
the disarmament focus even as regional security conditions deteriorated against two 
distinct threats, Pakistan and China. At the CD, Indian delegates advocated for total 
disarmament, inclusive of a ban on all nuclear weapon tests. In a speech to the U.N.’s 
Second Session on Disarmament on June 11, 1982 Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha 
Rao asserted, “how can this session follow up the declaration of the first session? I 
venture to propose the following concrete programme of action: immediate suspension 
                                                
38A.G. Noorani claims that India received implicit assurances from the United States to protect “India’s 
territorial integrity” against a Chinese nuclear attack. See A.G. Noorani, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear 
Guarantee,” Asian Survey, Vol. 7, 7 (1967): 498.  
39Tadeusz Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” The Non-proliferation Review 1, 1 (1993): 2. 
40Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 93. 
41R. Rajagopalan, “Multilateralism in India’s Nuclear Policy: A Questionable Default Option,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy ed. David Malone et al, (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 651. 
42Conference on Disarmament, Document CD/PV/.47 (Geneva: Conference on Disarmament, 1979) 
43Ibid.  
44Pande, CTBT: India and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 181. 
 
139 
of all nuclear weapon tests.”45 Concurrently, the Indian government made overtures to 
both Pakistan and China, communicating a desire to better relations.46 
 
At the U.N., the MEA intensified their efforts for disarmament inclusive of a 
ban of all nuclear tests.47 In 1986, India’s CD representative Eric Gonsalves engaged 
opponents on the demerits of a possible test ban treaty that centred on two concerns – 
security and compliance. On security, nuclear weapon states felt testing was necessary 
to deter adversaries and ensure nuclear arsenals are battle tested and ready. In terms of 
compliance, nuclear weapon states were less than confident of existing verification 
arrangements particularly in the event of a potential evasion. The Indian response to 
these fears was for member states to make a ‘political commitment to a comprehensive 
nuclear weapon ban’ that they hoped will serve as an ‘effective deterrent’ against 
potential violators.48 India suggested that on-site inspections supplement ‘the national 
technical means to verify compliance to a test ban’ that was also offered under Indira 
Gandhi’s 1984 Six-Nation Disarmament Initiative.49 Indian diplomats worked to find 
different ways to address qualms of other states on a test ban agreement but, despite 
these efforts, nuclear weapon states did not move on disarmament.  
 
Their disdain also felled the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Disarmament Action Plan. After 
becoming Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi championed disarmament to mitigate regional 
nuclear competition and, if possible, as a way out of building nuclear weapons.50 
Gandhi proposed a three-stage plan to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide by 2010 
that urged non-nuclear weapon states, including India, to shun nuclear weapons.51 The 
plan included a suggestion for countries to work toward a comprehensive nuclear test 
ban. Former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit later argued that the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan 
was sincere and forthright in intent, ‘the calculation was that if we get the endorsement 
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of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan from the nuclear powers, then India will not have to 
purposively move on its nuclear weapon programme.’52 However, Dixit adds, ‘we also 
wanted to be in forefront of the movement towards the elimination of nuclear 
weapons.’53 But the initiative was snubbed by nuclear weapon states. 
 
The need for a disarmament agreement heightened in 1990 as tensions flared 
between India and Pakistan over militant violence in Kashmir. Soon the bellicose 
rhetoric tangled with Pakistan’s alleged nuclear capabilities, particularly the production 
of highly enriched uranium.54 Prominent security critics pressured the V.P. Singh-led 
Indian government to clarify its position on nuclear weapons and their applicability in a 
precarious regional situation.55 The Indian government, however, sustained its nuclear 
ambiguity, calling for disarmament while laterally developing nuclear weapons.56 As 
serious as these events were for India, the government did not test nuclear weapons 
again largely due to financial constraints and threats of sanctions.57 Pakistan’s nuclear 
progress and potential, however, had to be domestically accounted for with the crisis. 
Clamour from the press and other security experts on India’s nuclear policy emerged. 
These voices also questioned the utility of India’s disarmament diplomacy at the U.N. 
and other multilateral fora.58 Nonetheless, Indian diplomats held firm on disarmament 
given limited policy alternatives to protect India’s security and improve its nuclear 
position. MEA was clearly aware that, stopping short of developing a clear nuclear 
weapons deterrent, India’s best hope to reduce the existing nuclear gap between nuclear 
weapon states and other states was disarmament.59  
 
In 1991, Narasimha Rao became the Indian Prime Minister. Rao proved 
stubborn on nuclear testing which meant that India’s disarmament focus would sustain. 
To lessen palpable sub-continental tensions, U.S. and India held a bilateral dialogue on 
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non-proliferation in lieu of Washington’s five-nation conference to create a regional 
nuclear weapons free zone.60 To advance non-proliferation, several ideas were mooted 
including proposals that proscribed countries from testing nuclear weapons which 
Indian diplomats were receptive to.61 Realising India would not sign the NPT, 
Washington urged New Delhi to improve the regional nuclear balance by combating 
proliferation, eschewing nuclear tests and diplomatically engaging on regional nuclear 
issues.62 Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit expressed a willingness to convene 
relevant regional nuclear states, China, Pakistan, Russia and Pakistan to explore these 
ideas further.63 But talks were strained by increased signs of activity at Pokhran where 
the nuclear establishment was in the midst of testing Prithvi, a nuclear weapon. Rao, 
however, remained half-hearted on tests and dithered despite pressure from scientists.64 
 
While Washington and New Delhi discussed nuclear issues, developments at the 
U.N. moved toward negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement which 
incoming U.S. President Bill Clinton supported. By early 1992, nuclear weapon states 
agreed to refrain from testing, including the United States.65 With the reprieve, the U.N. 
moved a resolution for a Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement that was then adopted on 
December 9 1992. The resolution was endorsed by the outgoing V.P. Singh 
government. India did not rule out participating in negotiations for a CTBT and neither 
did the Narasimha Rao government withhold consent should the treaty meet its 
interests.66 Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit believed India should be open to a test ban 
agreement even if it precluded India from testing a nuclear weapon arguing ‘that option 
we were willing to foreclose as we had the basic technology.’67 Dixit’s view was the 
result of an informal expert committee that he organised to review and analyse India’s 
nuclear position. The committee concluded that testing was not entirely necessary to 
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develop a nuclear weapon.68 The report, in effect, admitted India had nuclear 
capabilities that provided some deterrence against China and Pakistan.69 Indian 
diplomats understood that negotiations on a test ban agreement could not reverse 
existing nuclear capabilities and India could still develop a weapon without nuclear 
testing which made the MEA more amenable to negotiations. Nonetheless, Dixit 
remained wary of a treaty that compromised India’s security interests or one that did not 
meaningfully reduce the nuclear gap between India and nuclear weapon states.70 
Concluding a meeting with U.S Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright before 
negotiations, Dixit remarked that if a CTBT was drafted ‘within a framework of non-
discriminatory provisions, you might be able to prevent India from overtly becoming a 
nuclear weapon power.”71 Put differently, India expected uniform restrictions on all 
member states in return for accession. On this basis, the MEA also expressed an interest 
in a ban on fissile material production for explosive purposes to safeguard India’s 
nuclear option while permitting the reprocessing of plutonium for civilian purposes 
under international safeguards.72 India approached negotiations confident of making 




Indian negotiators arrived in Geneva hoping to negotiate a firm treaty that banned all 
nuclear tests. For India, banning all nuclear tests would constrain nuclear weapon states 
from augmenting their nuclear arsenals through various means including laboratory and 
sub-critical tests. Indian diplomats were also cognisant of the fact that India had latent 
nuclear capabilities which gave them the ability to develop nuclear weapons without 
testing. 
 
CTBT Negotiations commenced in January 1994.73 Representatives from thirty-
eight countries, part of the CD, formed the core negotiating group.74 At first, the 
governing mandate ‘to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and 
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effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty’ was adopted.75 This directive 
meant that the treaty had to be clear in scope. In terms of activities, options split 
between banning all activities related to nuclear tests that most non-aligned states 
wanted or leave space for certain activities which the nuclear weapon states preferred.76 
And second, the mandate called for a robust verification regime that would go beyond 
the national technical means (NTM) verification system which the PTBT and the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) had.77 These issues were to be negotiated in 
two working groups - Working Group 1 that would cover verification and monitoring 
and Working Group 2 that would focus on legal and institutional issues, including scope 
of the treaty, basic obligations, implementation and entry into force. 78  
 
India’s opening position, presented by lead negotiator Satish Chandra, differed 
from the positions of nuclear weapon states that varied from a comprehensive 
agreement covering all nuclear explosions (U.S.) to leaving exemptions for tests in 
certain environments (Russia, U.K., France and China). On scope, India wanted a clear 
comprehensive treaty without ‘exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any 
circumstances.’79 Unsurprisingly, the clarity was the legacy of sustained lobbying for 
such an agreement. The intent was clear – begin to close the nuclear gap between the 
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states by eschewing testing and upgrading of nuclear 
facilities validated by similar conditions and rules. A former Indian disarmament 
negotiator noted of India’s approach, ‘our view going in was that the treaty needed to be 
comprehensive, covering horizontal and vertical proliferation and non-discriminatory in 
that it would not extend, in perpetuity, the position of nuclear weapon states. We had a 
clear priority of preventing nuclear war and prospects of a nuclear winter. But the focus 
was on disarmament.’80 Chandra underlined that India’s position grew from a long-
standing commitment to disarmament within which ‘CTBT has a very important 
place.’81 As negotiations began, the Indian delegation’s intent and rhetoric was 
forthright.  
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India negotiators pushed the CTBT as the first step to universal disarmament but 
pushback came from nuclear weapon states that wanted some room to manage nuclear 
arsenals.82 Nuclear weapon states sought space to undertake ‘activities not prohibited’ 
that included safety tests, inertial confinement fusion, low-yield hydrodynamic and 
hydro-nuclear tests, simulations and peaceful nuclear explosions.83 But among nuclear 
weapon states, divisions existed on what tests to exempt and include.84 France, Russia, 
U.K. and the U.S. appeared to converge around an open understanding of nuclear 
explosions, hoping to leave it ambiguous enough to allow for these ‘other activities.’85 
But this shaky consensus withered as other issues got discussed.  
 
The Indian delegation submitted a detailed position on verification, the second 
key component of the treaty. India’s position reiterated its earlier principle expecting 
symmetry on all states or a verification system that applied to all states regardless of 
nuclear capabilities. Discussions on verification were initially hampered by conflicting 
positions on the treaty’s scope to determine what kind of tests required verification.86 
Soon an agreement was reached among nuclear weapon states for an international 
monitoring system (IMS) that would monitor tests conducted across the world. Four of 
the five nuclear weapon states, U.S., U.K., France and Russia settled on an IMS 
operated through four technologies - seismic, hydro-acoustic, infrasound and 
radionuclide.87 India’s lead negotiator Chandra communicated India’s intent to adhere 
to the four technologies being considered for the IMS.88 Chandra also came out in 
favour of special monitoring arrangements for ‘established nuclear weapon test sites’ 
that could not be verified using conventional methods while being open to on-site 
inspections that it felt was ‘necessary for deterrence purposes.’89 
 
                                                
82Arundhati Ghose, “The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Intricate Moments during the 
Negotiations,”	  Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,	  8, 2 (2013): 213. 
83Johnson, Unfinished Business, 58. 
84In the P-5, states had asymmetrical technological capabilities that resulted in competition over what to 
include and exclude from the treaty. Ibid, 58. 
85China held firm that CTBT should only cover nuclear weapon test explosions and not cover other 
explosions. See Z. Yunhua, China and the CTBT Negotiations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998) 
86Johnson, Unfinished Business, 64. 
87The core of IMS would be the seismic network stations. Ibid. 
88Conference on Disarmament, Document CD/PV/680. 2 (Geneva: Conference on Disarmament,1994) 
89Conference on Disarmament, Document CD/PV/690. 1 (Geneva: Conference on Disarmament,1994) 
 
145 
Negotiations resumed for the second year in January 1995. There was a general 
sense among G-21 countries that an opportunity was lost by not completing a draft 
treaty before the 1995 NPT Review Conference. CD chairman Marin Bosch attempted 
to table a draft treaty after the first session for approval but opposition from China, 
France and the U.K buried his initiative.90 Nonetheless, most delegates were pleased 
with the progress made on scope, having narrowed down a threshold on nuclear tests, 
and verification. Australia’s proposal on scope emerged as most amenable given 
resistance on what tests member states wanted banned.91 The Australian proposal barred 
‘any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and any such nuclear 
explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.’92 However, the proposal was 
not clear on other kinds of nuclear tests conducted internally, an issue that would return 
for further discussions. On verification, negotiators agreed on the details of the 
International Monitoring System (IMS).93 On-site inspections proved more contentious; 
predictably, much debate centred on the decision-making around the triggering of an 
inspection.94  
 
 Indian negotiators interjected to flag G-21 concerns on scope and verification. 
Chandra expressed concerns on exceptions suggested by nuclear weapon states vis-à-vis 
nuclear tests even as the Australian scope formulation found support in the CD.95 
Chandra reiterated the G-21’s hope that the ban ‘be comprehensive and no tests should 
be conducted under any pretext.’96 Indian reservations also extended to on-site 
inspections, perceiving proposed rules as intrusive and a ploy to ensnare non-NPT 
signatories through the CTBT.97 Chandra tried to refocus the verification debate to be 
relevant for all countries, not just countries that had nuclear capabilities. India’s position 
on inspections gradually tightened to one where inspections would ‘would have to be 
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approved after due consideration and in an appropriate time framework.’98 With these 
developments, the CD adjourned negotiations to give way to NPT Review Conference 
in May 1995. Besides the NPT Review Conference, general elections in key countries, 
including France and India, loomed large over negotiations.99 NPT Conference in mind, 
negotiations strove to produce a revised draft treaty text by April 30.100 But the deadline 
weighed on discussions with countries chary of accepting precise commitments before 
NPT renewal.101 For years, the NPT’s relevance and credibility rested on progress made 
on a test ban agreement but now the former’s relevance burdened the prospects of the 
latter.  
 
NPT Extension 1995 
 
175 countries convened for the Fifth NPT Review and Extension Conference in April 
1995 in New York. The Fourth NPT Conference in 1990 failed as parties could not 
agree on a test ban pledge; CTBT was a key priority again for NPT signatories.102 On 
NPT extension, a range of opinions gathered. Four nuclear weapon states, U.S., U.K., 
France and Russia wanted the treaty extended indefinitely to entrench their nuclear 
position.103 Other states wanted a single fixed period of either 10 or 25 years as leverage 
to pursue disarmament.104 But states chose against a specific time period given how 
CTBT negotiations had come along in Geneva.105 Paragraph 4 (a) of the NPT was then 
updated with reference to the CTBT, expecting it to come into force ‘no later than 
1996.’106 In return for a positive vote from other member states, nuclear weapon states 
led by the U.S. agreed in a formal statement to pursue ‘systematic and progressive 
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efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those 
weapons.’107 
 
On May 11 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely.108 More than ever, there 
was a palpable sense after the conference that a CTBT was imminent.109 But a CTBT in 
near sight drove China and France to shore up their nuclear arsenals. On May 15, China 
exploded a nuclear device and on June 13 France declared it would conduct eight 
nuclear tests between September 1995 and May 1996.110 Both actions were widely 
condemned.111 Both actions also proved inconsistent with NPT obligations, particularly 
the need to show ‘utmost restraint’ on nuclear testing while the CTBT was being 
negotiated.112 The indefinite extension, the Chinese test and the resumption of French 
tests also soured G-21 attitudes, particularly India, over nuclear weapon states, blighting 
their desire to negotiate an unyielding test ban agreement.113 
 
NPT extension unsettled India.114 CTBT negotiations had not produced binding 
commitments on scope although discussions narrowed down an acceptable threshold 
above which nuclear tests were barred. The stiff resistance of nuclear weapon states 
against tabling a rough treaty draft in April 1995 intensified suspicions among G-21 
countries that the CTBT would not be comprehensive.115 Disregarding Article VI of 
NPT, CTBT negotiations had, thus far, largely ignored disarmament.116 These fears 
were validated by Chinese and French nuclear tests soon after NPT extension. All these 
developments rankled the Indian delegation. The official MEA response underlined the 
hypocrisy of the nuclear tests soon after NPT extension, ‘we are dismayed by the recent 
nuclear tests carried out by some nuclear weapon states. That these steps are being taken 
by states which are parties to the NPT, soon after its indefinite extension, highlights the 
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inherent deficits of the Treaty. These developments represent a serious setback to the 
on-going negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and undermine its 
successful conclusion.’117 Security-wise, NPT extension was a setback for non-nuclear 
weapon states, like India, threatened by nuclear strike or nuclear proliferation. India was 
alarmed by the latter fear with nuclear ties burgeoning between China and Pakistan and 
assistance Pakistan received from countries in the Middle East.118 Without a robust 
security guarantee for non-NPT signatories like India, the only option left vis-à-vis 
deterrence was ‘the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.’119 But there was no 
clear signal that the government was preparing to test which left one option - return to 





Indian negotiators returned to Geneva in June 1995 with an intent to obtain clear 
commitments from nuclear weapon states on CTBT’s scope and disarmament writ 
large. Arundhati Ghose replaced Satish Chandra as India’s chief negotiator. Ghose took 
charge by getting a sense of the negotiating environment from her G-21 counterparts. 
She was forewarned of the ‘triumphalism in the P-5’ after they secured the extension of 
the NPT without making any clear commitments, especially on disarmament.120 Ghose 
came to appreciate the pressures accompanying NPT extension and its residual 
influence on the CTBT that ‘was being pushed’ in a similar vein without robust debate 
on the larger issue - disarmament.121 Her perception was confirmed as negotiations 
resumed; Ghose intuited that continuing this tack would leave India in a ‘situation of 
having to accept a draft treaty which was against our basic interests.’122 In other words, 
accepting a treaty that did not impose symmetric commitments on all CD member states 
and did not pledge to advance disarmament.  
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Ghose quickly sent a diplomatic missive to New Delhi to get political clarity on 
India’s CTBT position and instructions on how to proceed should nuclear weapon states 
devise a treaty that advanced their interests alone.123 Sustaining the same tack, Ghose 
reckoned ‘would close our nuclear option’ and not redress the nuclear gap between 
India and nuclear weapon states since negotiations were moving toward cementing 
NPT’s division between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. Ghose’s 
instinct was backed by India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) that noted ‘if India 
were to accept this treaty, as it was emerging, it would indeed close our options.’124 This 
position was articulated to Ghose by A.N. Prasad, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 
(BARC) Director, as negotiations continued in 1995. Prasad was incensed by Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) Director Chidambaram’s view that India could rely on high 
level computational and simulation capabilities that purportedly made nuclear testing 
redundant.125 Prasad was determined to ensure India and BARC had space to test a 
nuclear weapon openly even as political leaders resisted the call.126 Diplomatically, 
however, the focal issue was disarmament and securing a promise to work toward it. 
Indian Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar met Ghose the following month in Vienna and 
mentioned “unless we get some kind of equaliser through on nuclear disarmament, in 
the body of the draft, it was not going to be possible for us to accept the text”.127 The 
point was clear – secure a firm commitment from nuclear weapon states to advance 
disarmament and deter testing or repudiate negotiations. 
 
To move India’s agenda forward, Ghose submitted a proposal to expand the 
scope of the treaty to cover bans on hydro-nuclear and laboratory tests.128 Her key 
concern was that the ‘treaty draft only banned explosive testing. It did not ban any other 
form of testing using methods like computer simulation, sub-critical, hydrodynamic 
testing, etc.’129 Given how negotiations had transpired, nuclear weapon states would 
have secured space to conduct such tests under a threshold. To address this gap, the 
Indian proposal consisted of two provisions:  
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1) Each State Party undertakes to prohibit and to prevent, and not to carry out, any 
nuclear weapon explosion, or any other nuclear test explosion, or any release of 
nuclear energy caused by the assembly or compression of fissile or fusion 
material by chemical explosive or other means, at any place under or beyond its 
jurisdiction or control.  
 
2) Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, 
assisting or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon 
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.  
 
Before presenting the proposal, India received broad consent from G-21 states though 
some states like Iran did express concern over defining nuclear explosions that would 
complicate verification.130 But Ghose’s proposal was largely ignored by nuclear weapon 
states and some European countries that preferred to finalise the ‘zero-yield’ threshold 
advanced by the Australian scope proposal.131 
 
G-21 states, however, concentrated opposition on threshold by demanding a 
clear statement from the conference against nuclear testing. Delivering their statement 
was Ghose who asserted that ‘conducting or intending to conduct nuclear-weapon tests 
over and above the substantial number of tests already conducted raises serious 
questions about the nuclear-weapon states real intentions with regard to continued 
development of nuclear weapons. Recent reports about discussions among the nuclear-
weapon states on a threshold for a test ban have also given rise to deep concern.’132 
CTBT, Ghose added, ‘should be an instrument against both horizontal and vertical 
nuclear proliferation and should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament.’133 In 
terms of scope, the statement urged CD member states to ‘ensure that negotiations are 
held for a clear understanding’ to produce a CTBT.134 But nuclear weapon states again 
did not take Ghose’s intervention seriously.135 
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In August 1995, nuclear weapon states finalised an agreement amongst 
themselves on scope. The impetus came from U.S. and France that discussed possibility 
of a scope that banned all tests.136 Washington pushed Paris to relent on their demand to 
have some thresholds by giving the French access to their simulation facilities that 
would obviate the need to conduct tests of any sort.137 The pressure worked. On August 
11, U.S. and France committed to ‘a true zero yield ban’ on all nuclear explosions that 
was backed by the U.K despite reservations.138 Angered by American and French 
concessions, Moscow evaded pressure on a decision until April 1996 when Boris 
Yeltsin agreed to the Australian scope.139  
 
India’s position on the treaty tightened further. R. Chidambaram, Chairman of 
India’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), called for specific amendments to the treaty 
in the wake of nuclear tests carried out by China and France that he feared ‘would have 
repercussions on the treaty.’140 For Chidambaram, CTBT’s relevance would be assured 
‘only if it was linked firmly to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a well-
defined time framework, within the next ten years.’141 External Affairs Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee reinforced this plea at the U.N., ‘CTBT must contain a binding commitment 
on the international community, especially nuclear weapon states, to take further 
measures within an agreed time frame towards the creation of a nuclear weapon free 
world. In our view, the CTBT must be an integral step in the process of nuclear 
disarmament.’142 Stopping short of opposing the treaty, Mukherjee warned that ‘it must 
reflect the overwhelming world view favouring elimination of nuclear weapons within a 
time frame.’143  
 
Prime Minister Rao also affirmed India’s desire for ‘real disarmament in a world 
that appeared to be drifting into complacency on the question of disarmament’ in his 
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address to the same forum a few days later.144 Before arriving in New York, Rao met 
fellow non-aligned leaders at the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Summit where he 
urged countries to ‘strive for a nuclear weapon-free world.’145 Observers claimed Rao 
grew ambivalent of a treaty that he feared ‘would hamper India’s autonomy in global 
affairs’ relative to other major powers that were consolidating their power position 
through nuclear policy.146 Through disarmament, India was hoping to constrict nuclear 
weapon states from nuclear program development but given negotiations, this objective 
appeared seemed bleak, at best.147  
 
Negotiations Resume 1996 
 
On January 23 1996, CTBT negotiations resumed for the third year. Jaap Ramaker, the 
incoming chair, set out his primary goal - to have negotiations concluded by June 1996 
‘to allow the fiftieth session of the General Assembly consider the text.’148 Given the 
breakthrough on scope among nuclear weapon states, three issues acquired prominence 
- finalising the verification regime; adopting language on nuclear disarmament; and 
deciding how the treaty would enter into force. But tensions lingered between nuclear 
weapon states and between them and other groups from the agreement on scope.149 The 
decision to settle scope on a zero yield shifted the calculus for non-nuclear weapon 
states that had active nuclear programmes as it would prevent them from conducting 
nuclear tests, should they accede. Despite conceding, the U.K. remained ambivalent, 
finding it hard to reconcile with the zero yield prospect. France conducted its sixth 
nuclear test, noting it would be the last.150 Russia held firm on zero yield but nudged 
closer to China on verification.151 A series of private negotiations followed between 
nuclear weapon states on these issues that disrupted CD negotiations.152  
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The Indian delegation was perturbed by the behaviour of nuclear weapon states. 
They hoped the treaty would bar all tests without exceptions to simulations or 
laboratory procedures but this prospect appeared remote given P-5 consensus on the 
Australian scope. Zero-yield conditions would effectively establish a ‘low threshold that 
was designed to preserve the right to conduct hydro-nuclear tests.’153 The Australian 
scope also meant that even with a zero-yield threshold ‘India was faced with the 
possibility that the treaty would freeze its nuclear program’ while nuclear weapon states 
could use existing space to upgrade their nuclear weapons.154 The scope compromised 
Indian interests that reinforced their staunch desire for a treaty centred on disarmament. 
 
To refocus negotiations on disarmament, the Indian delegation reiterated its plea 
for a treaty that banned all types and kinds of nuclear tests, peaceful or otherwise.155 On 
January 25, Ghose implored the CD 
 
‘to ensure that the CTBT leaves no loophole for activity, either explosive based or non-
explosive based, aimed at continued development and refinement of weapons. This 
situation would be untenable where, even with a CTBT in place, development, 
refinement and production of new nuclear weapons continues. Consequently, the 
political intent needs to be reflected in the CTBT, clearly defining our objective – a 
treaty which will bring an end to all nuclear weapons development, not constrained by 
artificial limits of verification within a clear and specific time-bound framework.’156  
 
Along the same lines, Indian Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar issued a public statement 
in New Delhi denouncing the ‘qualitative development, upgradation and improvement 
of nuclear weapons’ which he claimed impeded ‘genuine nuclear disarmament within a 
time-bound framework.’157 To achieve these objectives, India called for fair and 
transparent negotiations.  
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That India would forward a strong disarmament proposal did not surprise other 
member states but the fact that they would attach a timeframe as a condition did.158 
Ghose defended the time-bound framework referring to examples of START I and 
START II that also had clear time frames, ‘the open-ended commitment to eliminate 
nuclear weapons is an unsigned promissory note, useless against the threat of nuclear 
weapons,’ she added.159 The explicit link between the treaty and a target date for total 
disarmament appeared as folly to other delegates since nuclear weapon states would not 
countenance that condition.160 The move created an impression that the Indian 
delegation deliberately set this condition foreseeing its defeat giving it the necessary 
justification to reject the treaty.161 Nonetheless, Ghose appeared sincere, ‘the political 
intent needs to be reflected in the CTBT, clearly defining the objective to bring to an 
end all nuclear weapons development.’162  
 
India’s latest proposal did little to move nuclear weapon states; this development 
meant negotiations were moving toward a close with nuclear weapon state consensus on 
scope and verification. On May 28 1996, Ramaker tabled an updated clean draft treaty. 
The text, in his words, were to drive the “last and final stage of negotiations.”163 The 
draft met with a raft of concerns from G-21 states. Ghose was disappointed as the text 
did not include language on disarmament or address Indian reservations on scope, ‘it 
had become clear that the US and the rest of the P-5 supported by the Western Group 
were not willing to take on board any of our concerns. The Chairman came out with a 
clean text which did not refer to any of our concerns or our amendments.’164 By now, 
India had seemingly reached a point of no return with its proposals and entreaties 
consistently rebuffed. Time had come to take stock on where India stood with respect to 
the treaty.    
 
 
                                                
158For India’s submissions to the CD in the 3rd session, See Conference on Disarmament, Indian draft 
language on preamble: working paper, CD document CD/NTB/WP.295 (Geneva: Conference on 
Disarmament, 1996); Conference on Disarmament, Indian draft language on entry into force: working 
paper, CD document CD/NTB/WP.297 (Geneva: Conference on Disarmament, 1996) 
159Conference on Disarmament, Statement by Arundhati Ghose, Plenary Meeting of Conference on 
Disarmament (Geneva: Conference on Disarmament, 1996) 
160Johnson, Unfinished business, 96-98. 
161Ibid.  
162“India urges linking of CTBT with elimination of N-arms,” Times of India, January 25, 1996, 4. 
163Johnson, Unfinished Business, 105. 
164Ghose, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Intricate Moments during the Negotiations, 213. 
 
155 
Domestic Nuclear Consternations 
 
India’s CTBT approach from mid-1995 was also affected by a churning public domain 
filled with views of various domestic constituencies and individuals, particularly 
strategic experts working on national security issues. Several views emerged from the 
wider national security community muddling public debate around the treaty.  
 
By August 1995, Indian CTBT negotiators were flummoxed. Till then, they had 
focused on negotiating a treaty that imposed symmetric expectations on all member 
states vis-à-vis nuclear testing and verification. This approach was dented by NPT 
extension followed by Chinese and French nuclear tests that shattered hopes nuclear 
weapon states would accept meaningful curbs on their nuclear programs. Subsequent 
discussions and agreement on scope widened the gap between India’s interests and the 
CTBT. This situation prompted a rethink in the MEA on India’s CTBT position. 
Outside the MEA, public discussions on the treaty heated up from mid-1995. CTBT 
developments brought the nuclear question very much into the public domain beyond 
the ‘contained circle of strategic analysts into the media.’165 
 
By late 1995, CTBT negotiations hardened the positions of several strategic 
experts already sceptical of the treaty. NPT extension in May 1995 laid to rest hopes 
that disarmament, India’s key CTBT objective, would come to bear. Divisions between 
nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear states would remain. This situation was made 
worse by the Clinton administration’s decision to lift restrictions on arms sales to 
Pakistan that reinforced calls made by nuclear proponents to strengthen India’s nuclear 
capabilities.166 Clinton’s decision irked Indian policymakers and some security experts. 
To Brahma Chellaney, this ‘duplicity’ demonstrated Washington’s hypocrisy on nuclear 
proliferation that was gallingly accompanied by calls for India to sign the NPT and 
discontinue its nuclear weapons program.167 American reactions to Prime Minister’s 
Rao’s failed nuclear test in December 1995 further stoked the angsts of hard-line 
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nuclear votaries like Chellaney and C. Raja Mohan resulting in a clear denunciation of 
the CTBT.  
 
In January 1996, Chellaney repeatedly invoked American reactions to Rao’s 
attempted nuclear test in the seminar circuit in New Delhi to lobby the government to 
reconsider its stance on the CTBT that would ‘prevent India and other nuclear states 
from testing nuclear devices since it was at the core just another non-proliferation 
measure.’168 Chellaney sensed that American pressure ‘brought home very tellingly that 
CTBT was not an abstract subject - it had very real implications for India’s strategic 
future.’169 Chellaney urged the government exercise its right and test a nuclear weapon 
before the ‘CTBT permanently closed the door.’170 For Chellaney, the government’s 
ambivalence was disconcerting since it used NPT extension to question the treaty’s 
utility even as New Delhi had been cognisant of the ‘hypocrisy of other nuclear powers 
for a long time.’171 It was alleged that Chellaney channelled the reservations of India’s 
nuclear scientists who were keen to test which also dovetailed with his view. Publicly, 
Chellaney advised that the “technical demands of a missile-based deterrent could not be 
met” without testing of nuclear weapons.172 This option was open since work on the 
nuclear program continued apace with adjustments made due to India’s fiscal troubles; 
given constraints, Abdul Kalam, Defence Research and Development Organisation 
chief, focused on larger projects including missile development.173 However, clear 
thinking on this option was precluded by CTBT negotiations and the MEA’s 
disarmament-centric approach.  
 
The government’s approach in balancing disarmament abroad and testing at 
home troubled Chellaney and Mohan given the strategy’s utility having, now, seen the 
behaviour of nuclear weapon states. Both Mohan and Chellaney consistently lamented 
the lack of clarity from the MEA toward the CTBT, emphasising the need to not just 
test nuclear weapons but to also have the right to refine nuclear capabilities toward a 
robust nuclear posture. For them, what they saw as dithering on the CTBT or India’s 
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cautious approach not only deferred a nuclear test but clouded strategic thinking on 
India’s national security and how to best address existing threats. From their perch, 
clarity vis-à-vis India’s nuclear posture and capabilities and how to best achieve that 
through policy was only possible with the CTBT out of the way.  
 
Mohan attributed India’s CTBT intentions to a desire to signal to major powers 
that India was willing to engage on key issues, notwithstanding security interests, ‘for 
far too long in the recent past, the very murmur of disapproval from the great powers on 
a particular issue often stopped Indian policy in its tracks. In the last few years, India 
was ready to catch a cold even before India sneezed.’174 In a television interview, he 
echoed Chellaney’s criticisms of the treaty, ‘the U.S. conditions for supporting the 
treaty are such that I don’t think you can ever get a truly comprehensive test ban treaty. 
Second, I don’t think the U.S. and the nuclear powers are going to accept disarmament 
conditionality’s for signing this treaty. I just don’t think it’s going to work out.175 Put 
simply, the possibility of U.S. and Indian interests aligning on CTBT was quite far 
which made rejection of the CTBT followed by a nuclear test preferable.  
 
Mohan and Chellaney’s preferences anchored the treaty and India’s position 
thereof on one issue – nuclear testing. Their views generally reflected the outlook of 
India’s nuclear scientists and technical community that insisted India’s deterrent would 
not be credible without conducting a few nuclear tests. Tests, they argued, were integral 
to develop missile-ready warheads and create a database for continued nuclear weapons 
research. Given the need to test, the CTBT, in current form, was untenable to both 
Mohan and Chellaney and scientists who subscribed to this view. However, Mohan also 
clarified that should India conduct an adequate number of tests and develop credible 
weapons capabilities, CTBT could be signed at a later date.176 But in the MEA, this 
view did not have much salience since Indian diplomats had, for decades, sustained 
India’s nuclear gaps and quandaries through disarmament diplomacy. This tack required 
working with the United Nations, Conference on Disarmament and, occasionally, the 
United States to improve India’s nuclear security balance while developing the 
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necessary capabilities to test a nuclear device. Given the delays and political reticence 
around a nuclear test, diplomacy was the only available option.  
 
 Mohan and Chellaney’s views broadly aligned with the views of K. 
Subrahmanyam, the doyen of India’s strategic studies community, but with one major 
difference – Subrahmanyam supported CTBT withdrawal but did not explicitly call for 
nuclear tests to demonstrate India’s nuclear capabilities.177 As negotiations commenced, 
Subrahmanyam underscored the futility of nuclear weapons and his hope for a ‘nuclear 
weapon-free world which will bar and eliminate all nuclear weapons.’178 In an article 
written with General K. Sundarji, who held similar deterrence beliefs, and two 
American analysts, Subrahmanyam argued that India could possibly sign a CTBT for it 
hypothetically did not disturb India’s existing de facto deterrence.179 Subrahmanyam 
believed India could be a veritable spokesman for disarmament and deterrence, 
downplaying claims that a choice existed between both. In his view, both disarmament 
and deterrence were in the national interest and could be advanced as such.180 
 
But NPT extension deeply embittered Subrahmanyam. With the extension, 
India’s disarmament focus ceased to be of use, in his view, given the perpetuation of 
differentiated nuclear statuses.181 Also with the extension, it became clear that CTBT 
would not be comprehensive, universally applicable or credibly advance disarmament. 
Subrahmanyam’s immediate reaction was terse but trenchant, ‘the extension legitimises 
a weapon of mass destruction in perpetuity and by implication its use for which there is 
no historical precedent.’182 As Priyanjali Malik points out, ‘discrimination was an 
anathema’ to Subrahmanyam and he unleashed a barrage of writings publicising the 
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inequity.183 The inequity largely emanated from what he perceived as inane nuclear 
rationalities that nuclear powers, U.S. in particular, subjected onto other states while 
exempting themselves from those very principles.184 After NPT extension, the CTBT in 
his view was ‘perpetuating a nuclear apartheid’ that ‘reminds Indians that the age of 
imperialism is not over’ at least on nuclear matters.185 Subrahmanyam seethed at what 
he perceived was unwarranted pressure from Washington to force India on the NPT and 
CTBT while remaining blind to burgeoning nuclear ties between China and Pakistan 
and of the latter’s alleged nuclear capabilities.186  
 
French and Chinese tests in late 1995 sensitised Subrahmanyam to the 
geopolitics of the treaty between major powers. Subrahmanyam was already alarmed of 
nuclear ties between China and Pakistan and attendant implications on India. The Indian 
government was aware of Sino-Pakistani nuclear ties and of Pakistan’s uranium 
capabilities since 1986 but introducing the United States allowed Subrahmanyam to 
claim Washington was more intent on constricting India’s nuclear aspirations than 
meaningfully constraining nuclear ties between India’s chief adversaries. Importantly, 
he clarified, these problems could not be rectified through the CTBT since, even at 
zero-yield scope, nuclear weapon states had sufficient latitude to conduct certain 
tests.187 Pakistan’s nuclear maturation under an Asian security context marked by 
China’s economic rise unnerved Subrahmanyam. Expecting Beijing’s rise to sustain, 
Subrahmanyam warned of consequent implications to other Asian powers, like India, 
that he argued should ‘build its image as a nuclear weapon capable power.’188 Again, 
the point was not to immediately test a nuclear weapon but to demonstrate nuclear 
capabilities somehow. Like Chellaney and Mohan, Subrahmanyam was befuddled by 
Washington’s unyielding non-proliferation focus toward India instead of working with 
New Delhi ‘to keep an appropriate balance vis-à-vis China.’189 Later, he deduced that 
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the CTBT was a ‘major strategic confrontation between the United States and China 
with the game being played in the CD a charade.’190 
 
As 1996 rolled in, Subrahmanyam’s views sharpened, scepticism mounting 
toward CTBT negotiations. Near the end of January, lead negotiator Ghose submitted a 
new proposal that anchored the treaty on disarmament to be achieved within a specific 
time-frame. Ghose’s time-bound proposal was directed to gauge whether nuclear 
weapon states were serious on disarmament or if negotiations were a ruse to entrench 
their nuclear privileges.191 As expected, the Indian proposal was not given serious 
consideration which made it clear to Subrahmanyam that negotiations were only serious 
about disarmament for non-nuclear weapon states. This development also made him 
realise that fighting for a CTBT at the CD was a futile effort as long as the NPT remains 
breached. In a thunderous column published on January 25 1996, Subrahmanyam 
likened the existing nuclear hierarchy to ‘nuclear imperialism,’ exhorting India to adopt 
Gandhian methods of non-cooperation to resist the CTBT. 192 ‘Non-accession to 
CTBT,’ in his words was ‘a logical extension of India staying out of the NPT, 
especially when nuclear weapons have been sought to be legitimised through their 
indefinite and unconditional extension.’193 
 
Subrahmanyam then shifted focus to disarmament to illuminate how 
negotiations did nothing to advance the cause, ‘the treaty, as it is being canvassed, will 
not reduce one single warhead to deserve the name of being a step toward disarmament. 
It is aimed at freezing the present technological status quo and prevent the three 
undeclared nuclear weapon states – India, Israel and Pakistan, from testing first 
generation weapons.’194 Subrahmanyam decried the obvious disparity, pointedly raising 
concerns over the NPT and its effects on the CTBT, ‘what is the purpose of prohibiting 
nuclear weapon tests if a nuclear weapon state can pass on nuclear weapons technology 
or for that matter weapons themselves to a non-nuclear weapons country?’195 The 
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scenario, he argued, posed particular concerns for India since it would have to ‘take into 
account the possibility of a China-Pakistan nuclear weapon relationship in spite of 
China’s membership of NPT and its obligation not to transfer nuclear weapon 
technology.’196 Given the futility of the NPT in preventing illicit transfer of nuclear 
materials between countries, Subrahmanyam pushed the government to question how a 
CTBT would improve this situation after legitimising nuclear weapon states.197 
 
Even as Subrahmanyam’s views touched a range of issues, it did not lend easily 
to a policy solution or approach that MEA officials could apply at negotiations. In the 
words of one of his contemporaries on his public campaign against the CTBT, 
‘Subrahmanyam was the ultimate salesman with respect to the CTBT. He had the ability 
to marshal all kinds of arguments - good, bad and sophisticated and he used a litany of 
different opinions to get his points across.’198 Subrahmanyam’s views, however, did not 
go uncontested; two more voices entered the fray pushing the government to stay the 
course and accept the CTBT despite its flaws.  
 
The most prominent voice against Subrahmanyam was Muchkund Dubey, 
former Foreign Secretary, who agreed deterrence was necessary but did not believe 
‘India had to test to demonstrate its nuclear capability.’199 Dubey endorsed accession on 
certain conditions. Some Indian scientists held this view, including R. Chidambaram, 
director of India’s Atomic Energy Commission.200 Dubey reinforced the sufficient 
deterrence argument against Subrahmanyam, ‘I felt India could sign CTBT and still 
continue building our nuclear capacity. I felt we had adequate nuclear capabilities to 
deter, otherwise known as latent or recessed deterrence. Our scientists were telling us 
subcritical tests in laboratories could continue with the miniaturization of warheads. I 
did not think we needed unlimited deterrence, which is not a necessity or sufficient even 
now.’201 On the CTBT, Dubey argued India adhere as long as it proved to be 
‘comprehensive, non-discriminatory’ and had some language referring to disarmament 
within a time-frame.202 However, Dubey did state that if these conditions were not met, 
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India should reject the treaty without ‘yielding to pressure’ from nuclear weapon 
states.203 
 
Subrahmanyam challenged Dubey’s position, ‘some have argued that India 
should continue its efforts to get a meaningful disarmament linkage for the CTBT 
during the Geneva negotiations, and after all avenues of securing such a linkage are 
exhausted should we reach the decision-making point of whether we should sign the 
treaty or not. This is not the right course for India.’204 Subrahmanyam pushed the Indian 
government to dispense with the disarmament rhetoric once and for all for none of the 
nuclear weapon states deemed the matter as universally important. Instead, he urged the 
government to be mindful of the larger geopolitics around the CTBT with the rise of 
China, nuclear status of Pakistan and the patent inability of the United States to 
appreciate those risks.205  
 
But Dubey’s views could not be summarily dismissed; a longstanding advocate 
of disarmament and the architect of Rajiv Gandhi’s fated disarmament action plan, 
Dubey had a stellar grasp of the diplomatic trade-offs around the CTBT and how to 
balance international pressures and domestic exigencies vis-à-vis nuclear diplomacy. 
The importance of regional security conditions was not lost on Dubey, particularly 
should China’s nuclear assistance to Pakistan result in the latter becoming a full-fledged 
nuclear weapons state. Dubey sought to articulate a policy that could seemingly protect 
India’s existing nuclear capabilities and prevent Pakistan and other threshold states from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Even though the MEA and Dubey view’s aligned in terms 
of latent deterrence, the position became untenable as the politics around CTBT debates 
brought the issue of nuclear testing to the fore. It became progressively difficult for 
MEA officials to continually sustain the nuclear ambiguity having been bombarded 
with opinions from experts like Subrahmanyam, Chellaney and Mohan on the toxic 
regional security situation with two adversaries – China and Pakistan collaborating on 
nuclear issues with one of those adversaries - Pakistan - fuelling an insurgency on the 
Indian border. Put simply, the issue of nuclear testing could no longer be ignored. 
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Also gathering to contribute to the public debate was a nascent anti-nuclear 
weapons movement around India’s ‘two-man anti-nuclear brigade’ - Achin Vanaik and 
Praful Bidwai.206 Both Vanaik and Bidwai pushed the Indian government to accept the 
treaty, flaws notwithstanding, for they saw disarmament as an iterative project built on 
measures like the CTBT.207 Bidwai and Vanaik questioned the efficacy of India’s 
insistence to link the CTBT with ‘time-bound disarmament’ that in their eyes ‘could 
have never been accepted without destroying the purpose and possibility of a CTBT.’208 
They argued that the CTBT’s real significance ‘is that it will end the nuclear arms race, 
one of the worst menaces the world has ever known.’209 In a television interview in 
April 1996, Bidwai clarified his view, ‘rejecting the treaty would have very bad 
implications for India’s security because this means that, most likely, Pakistan will not 
sign the CTBT. The two countries will keep their nuclear weapons option open and this 
will lead to a deterioration of security balance in the region and will make for an 
extremely messy nuclear policy in the Indian case.’210 Though Vanaik and Bidwai’s 
preferences were clear, their message lacked force. Organisational constraints hampered 
the anti-nuclear movement from acquiring an organised national presence that blunted 
their potency.211 Other obstacles also existed; Vanaik argues as CTBT debates picked 
up,  
‘the position of anti-nuclear activists was rather small and inconsequential to the 
big picture. Negative press did not help us as we were portrayed as stooges to 
the United States that was trying to squeeze India. It is also important to 
remember that there was not much popular support for us. India had a middle 
class that was not radicalised. Looking back, India was independent of an 
antinuclear movement for decades. Other elements of the anti-nuclear movement 
were tied to political parties and thus divorced from the core message. At times, 
elements that would have supported us from the Left also rejected the CTBT, 
influenced by currents of nuclear nationalism. Amongst the larger group, only 
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Praful, Kanti Bajpai and I were able to get our views across to the public on the 
merits of the CTBT. Visibility was largely individual, not collective.’212 
 
 Different domestic perspectives on the treaty, in effect, dominated the public 
discourse on the treaty but gave the government more leeway in terms of making a clear 
policy choice on the matter. As these views were being projected into the public 
domain, the MEA was reassessing its own position on the treaty that suggested some 
pushback from its initial CTBT position. At a seminar on India’s nuclear options in 
December 1995, MEA officials, retired diplomats and strategic experts debated on the 
utility of India’s nuclear stance that led to their conclusion that a ‘hardening of India’s 
nuclear posture’ was warranted in light of ‘the permanent extension of the NPT.’213 But 
it was not clear from the discussion what ‘hardening’ was tantamount to in terms of 
policy – whether it meant a rejection of the CTBT with no commitment to test a nuclear 
weapon, rejection of the CTBT followed by a nuclear test or signing the CTBT 
provisionally and leaving ratification to be dealt with later. Indeed, the MEA appeared 
to be assessing these options as domestic debates picked up; in fact, at the December 
1995 seminar, several participants identified that the current policy of “keeping the 
nuclear option” ceased to be of use and there existed a “need to examine how best to 
translate this into effective deterrence.”214 There was also an acknowledgement from 
MEA officials present that India’s co-sponsoring of the CTBT was a ‘mistake’ akin to a 
‘self-made goal.’215 At another conference organised by the Centre for Policy Research 
(CPR) in January 1996, Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar laid out his concerns of 
CTBT negotiations. One of the participants at the conference, P. R. Chari, claimed after 
there was ‘official sponsorship of opposition to the CTBT’ led by the Foreign Secretary 
himself.216 But despite this realisation, there was no clear signal on what the resultant 
policy should be; the MEA, in effect, left the door open for some progress before a 
decision had to be made.  
 
It was clear from the seminar that the MEA, misgivings aside, did not bind itself 
with the views of a particular individual or position – Mohan and Chellaney, 
Subrahmanyam, Dubey or Vanaik and Bidwai.  Despite critical statements from 
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External Affairs Minister and head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission over CTBT 
negotiations in late 1995, uncertainty lingered over whether India’s shifting mind-set 
would precipitate rejection of the CTBT and, perhaps, a nuclear test. The uncertainty 
was driven by the fact that the diplomatic trade-offs for India over CTBT negotiations 
were not clearly laid out even as perceptions of the CTBT evolved. In February 1996, 
Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar declared that while disappointed with negotiations 
India ‘did not believe the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for its security.’217 
The statement indicates that the MEA still had nominal faith in disarmament despite 
how CTBT negotiations had transpired in Geneva. But the Indian delegation had to 
return to see whether they can move nuclear weapon states to agree to certain 
constraints before deciding on whether to sign the treaty.  
 
Rejecting CTBT – Gowda and Ghose 
 
By 1996, India’s public domain was filled with a variety of opinions on the CTBT. 
Individuals like K. Subrahmanyam, C. Raja Mohan, Brahma Chellaney, Achin Vanaik, 
Praful Bidwai and Muchkund Dubey opined on the merits of the CTBT and how the 
Indian delegation should respond once they return for negotiations. Mohan and 
Chellaney urged rejection followed by a nuclear test, Vanaik and Bidwai supported 
accession, Subrahmanyam pushed the government to withdraw from the treaty to 
protect India’s autonomy on nuclear issues while Dubey endorsed conditional accession 
having achieved some deterrence. The eventual decision, though, had to be taken by the 
Indian Prime Minister.  
 
Within a month in mid-1996, two governments came to power in New Delhi, 
one led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that lasted thirteen days and the other a 
coalition government led by Janata Dal (JD) leader Deve Gowda.218 I.K Gujral became 
External Affairs Minister under Gowda. In office, Gujral pledged to maintain the 
Congress government’s CTBT policy that linked the treaty to universal nuclear 
disarmament; critics questioned whether the position was provisional before India 
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formally rejected but this question was left unanswered.219 Initially, it was unclear what 
the incoming government’s position was on nuclear tests and how that would come to 
bear on India’s CTBT position. Early on, Gowda questioned Gujral on the possibility of 
a nuclear test but Gujral advised caution advising Gowda that resultant costs would be 
‘unbearable for our economy and social infrastructure.’220 This position, in effect, meant 
that the government would see negotiations through for a CTBT despite misgivings 
over negotiations in Geneva.  
 
Divisions also reared within government. The incoming government’s nuclear 
ambiguity flustered the nuclear establishment, particularly nuclear scientists who urged 
the government to clarify India’s nuclear position. A senior Department of Atomic 
Energy official argued ‘by not signing the CTBT, you will invite international 
opprobrium, including sanctions. As it is, since 1975, developed countries have stopped 
giving us vital technology, thus affecting our nuclear power generation, which at the 
moment is pitiably low. But despite this, we are not going to gain anything when we say 
we are not for nuclear explosion and yet refuse to sign the CTBT. The situation of pain 
without no gain does not make any sense.’221 Calls from scientists could not be 
disregarded since work on India’s nuclear programme continued with missile 
development.222 Internal reservations combined with energetic public debate on the 
CTBT compelled the government to make a decision on the treaty just as Indian 
negotiators returned to Geneva for negotiations. 
 
To categorically rule on the matter, Ghose was summoned back from Geneva to 
discuss the chairman’s May 28 draft treaty. Key principals - Prime Minister, Foreign 
Minister and Foreign Secretary debated on whether to accept or reject the treaty with 
consensus edging toward rejection.223 The final decision belonged to Gowda. After 
hearing different positions in the room, generally unenthusiastic, Gowda turned to 
Ghose and asked if she was ‘satisfied with the brief’ and confident of heading back to 
Geneva to declare India’s rejection.224 Ghose replied she ‘needed clear instructions in 
                                                
219For a good overview of Gujral’s views on arms control and nuclear weapons, see I.K. Gujral, 
Viewpoint: Civilization, Democracy and Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2009), 89-102. 
220I.K. Gujral, Matters of Discretion: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Hay House, 2011), 628. 
221Ibid.  
222K. Subrahmanyam, “India enter Missile Age,” The Times of India, July 13, 1990.  




writing approved by him’ to go ahead.225 Gowda gave his consent. The paperwork was 
completed for Ghose to return and convey India’s decision.226  
 
 To justify rejection, India focused on security reasons and how CTBT 
negotiations and conduct of nuclear weapon states compromised India’s security. In 
particular, emphasis was given to the treaty’s inability to extend beyond nuclear testing 
to limit proliferation between states particularly in India’s neighbourhood. Although 
scope-wise, there was limited room to strew this desire into the draft treaty, it was the 
summary disregard of disarmament by nuclear weapon states that nettled Indian 
negotiators.227 A clear multilateral declaration on disarmament, in India’s view, could 
have controlled illicit nuclear transfer but negotiations overlooked the issue. Presenting 
the government’s decision on June 23, Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar made oblique 
references to China and Pakistan, ‘countries around us continue their weapon 
programmes either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment, India 
cannot accept any restraint on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept 
obligations to eliminate their nuclear weapons.’228 Haidar declared that the treaty 
appeared ‘discriminatory and woefully inadequate’ and one that ‘has no effect on the 
South Asian security environment.’229 
 
On the same day in Geneva, Ghose conveyed India’s rejection, ‘the basic 
prohibitions, as drafted so far, which define the scope remain very narrow and do not 
fulfil the mandated requirement of a comprehensive test ban. This approach would give 
us only a nuclear weapon test explosion ban treaty and not a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.’230 Ghose underscored India’s security concerns by calling out ‘countries around 
us that continue their weapon programmes, either openly or in a clandestine way.’231 
Ghose’s peroration then reached its climax, ‘this cannot be the CTBT that India can be 
expected to accept. Countries around us continue their nuclear weapons programme, 
either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment, India cannot accept 
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any restraints on its capability, if other countries remain unwilling to accept the 
obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. Such a treaty is not in India’s national security 
interest. India, therefore, cannot subscribe to it in its present form.’232 Ghose’s 
declaration was followed by a formal statement in parliament on July 15. External 
Affairs Minister Gujral expressed regret that negotiations had not done ‘justice to its 
mandate,’ instead legitimising nuclear possession by a few powers.233 Most CD member 
states had by then accepted the Chair’s May 28 draft treaty. On June 28, Chairman 
Ramaker tabled a revised draft, widely expected to be the final version.234 But countries 
were yet to agree on entry into force, a provision that would come to be marked by 
India’s intransigence.   
 
Entry into Force  
 
To be legally binding, a treaty has to enter into force (hereafter EIF). Provisions on 
entry into force stipulate how a treaty becomes legal after ratification. Typically, a 
treaty enters into force through a specific time frame once a treaty is finalised and open 
for signature.235 In the first two years, CD discussions did not produce a clear EIF 
provision. This impasse prolonged debate on EIF, particular on the number of member 
state ratifications required for the CTBT to come into effect. From May 1996, 
developments became more contentious and problematic, particularly for India. Under 
pressure from Russia and the U.K. to finalise a draft treaty, Chairman Ramaker inserted 
an amendment linking EIF to the treaty’s proposed international monitoring system that 
India had agreed to earlier.236 Under Ramaker’s formula, the treaty would enter into 
force after ratification by 37 states that offered their seismic facilities or radionuclide 
laboratories to the treaty’s International Monitoring System (IMS).237 But the proposal 
was met tepidly. Rebecca Johnson argues Ramaker hoped for this move to be a 
‘placeholder’ that would make negotiators resolve the problem.238 Instead it became a 
flashpoint.  
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India opposed Ramaker’s EIF provision deeming it to be a violation of its 
sovereignty and an effort to inveigle it into the CTBT. The Indian delegation quickly 
mounted a rear-guard action to ensure India would be exempt from the entry into force 
clause. Wasting no time, Ghose threatened to withdraw Indian seismic stations from the 
IMS.239 Whether or not the provision was intended to be a ‘placeholder’, the issue 
became moot when Russia and China endorsed the provision.240 Seeing no way around, 
India withdrew its stations from the IMS.241 Offering another way, India proposed to 
anchor the treaty around a timetable for nuclear disarmament; Ghose moved a proposal 
stating ‘this treaty shall enter into force only after all state parties have committed 
themselves to the attainment of the goal of total elimination of all nuclear weapons 
within a well-defined framework.’242 By now, India’s calls for disarmament had become 
incongruent with the interests of nuclear weapon states. From an Indian point of view, it 
appeared as though nuclear weapon states were looking to surreptitiously lock-in gains, 
particularly on scope and verification, through an amenable EIF provision.243 
 
Indian delegates grew strident. Repeatedly, Ghose tied EIF to universal 
disarmament, warning India was willing to block consensus unless the provision was 
amended, ‘India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain 
unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons. India would not 
accept any language in the treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide 
in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to 
such a treaty.’244 Setbacks aside, Ramaker persisted to re-engage India; he abandoned 
the IMS-based proposal, given India’s resistance, and devised a new plan that made EIF 
conditional on a list of 44 states that were participating members of the CD and in the 
1995-1996 IAEA list of states with nuclear programmes and reactors.245 EIF now 
formed Article XIV that now applied to 44 states with a three-year cushion given on 
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ratification.246 This provision meant that the CTBT would still apply to India, after 
rejection, as India was one of the 44 states that had nuclear facilities under IAEA 
safeguards. Ghose and her delegation made clear that the move contravened 
international law since ‘no state can be coerced into signing a treaty, nor can a treaty’s 
entity into force be made conditional on the signature of any country, without that 
country’s consent.’247  
 
To exempt India, Ghose submitted another proposal on August 8, 1996 where 
the treaty would come into effect after 65 states ratify.248 Upon submission, Ghose 
warned that if EIF was not adjusted accordingly India would ‘would be reluctantly 
obliged to oppose’ the treaty in the CD.249 But other member states were unwilling to 
back India’s proposal. On August 19, the treaty returned for final consideration. India 
refused to give consent or allow any CD document to be passed to the U.N. General 
Assembly without consensus.250 Invoking U.N. General Assembly Resolution 50/65 
that agreed to endorse a final CTBT text when the CD resumed, Ghose countered that 
this outcome would not be possible since ‘there was no consensus on the text and there 
was no consensus on forwarding it to the UN General Assembly.’251 Before finishing, 
Ghose added ‘it is unprecedented in the history of international treaties that a sovereign 
nation is required to sign a treaty against its will under implied threats.’252  
 
Left with no option, Ramaker presented the final report to the CD on August 
20.253 Again Ghose restated India’s objections to adopt the report without CD 
consensus.254 Several attempts followed, in vain, to placate India and have the treaty 
sent to U.N. in New York. Back home, the MEA maintained Article XIV left them no 
option but block the treaty, ‘though India would not have endorsed the CTBT itself, it 
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would not have blocked the treaty had the entry into force clause not been categorical 
about getting India’s concurrence within three years, failing which the CD would have 
thought of measures against us. This was nothing but an affront on our sovereignty.’255 
 
To clear the impasse, the Belgian Ambassador called for the draft to be sent to 
the U.N. General Assembly as an official CD document without consensus.256 Belgian 
initiative was assisted by the Australian Ambassador to the U.N. who requested for the 
U.N. General Assembly to consider the CTBT.257 On September 9, the U.N. resolution 
on CTBT (50/245) was considered.258 A vote was taken on September 10 where the 
CTBT was endorsed by 158 states.259 Five states - Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and 
Tanzania abstained and three states - Bhutan, India and Libya voted against.260  
 
Ghose then delivered a statement tinged with a mix of anger and 
disappointment, ‘this treaty would only succeed in perpetuating a discriminatory status 





India rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty after recognising that the treaty 
would not impose symmetric nuclear test ban commitments on member states in the 
Conference on Disarmament instead reproducing the nuclear disparity between nuclear 
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. Before negotiations, the Ministry of External 
Affairs (MEA) pushed universal disarmament to address India’s nuclear security deficit. 
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CTBT negotiations gave MEA officials another opportunity to reduce existing nuclear 
gap between them and nuclear weapon states and neutralise regional nuclear tensions. 
Indian diplomats had a deep understanding of nuclear disarmament. At negotiations, the 
Indian delegation strove to negotiate a tough, equally applicable treaty that placed 
uniform expectations on all member states in terms of nuclear tests and verification. But 
this desire was assiduously thwarted by nuclear weapon states that were keen to reserve 
certain privileges in terms of nuclear testing. To contest this move, Indian negotiators 
pushed hard for the treaty to be anchored on a clear time-bound disarmament 
framework but this ploy also ended in vain.  
 
This development made Indian negotiators question the treaty’s merits and 
reassess their position alongside a tide of domestic voices back home. NPT extension 
and Chinese and French nuclear tests shook India’s domestic nuclear debate, bringing 
forward a diverse set of domestic views from various non-governmental voices on how 
India should respond at negotiations - ranging from acceding to the CTBT without 
conditions and rejecting it comprehensively. Domestic security experts appeared 
divided with respect to how Indian diplomats should respond to negotiations having 
achieved none of their interests and standing on the cusp of accepting a treaty that 
dented India’s security and ability to test a nuclear weapon. A range of views emerged 
that covered different sides of the debate but with no clear policy position or alternative. 
No strong coalition formed with respect to the CTBT that could settle on a position and 
work with the MEA to secure its interests. Informally, MEA officials gathered various 
views on the treaty but the diverse range of domestic preferences gave them more 
leeway in terms of responding to developments at negotiations. MEA officials choose to 
keep their options open once negotiations resumed and gauge whether nuclear weapon 
states would be willing to accept language on disarmament or limited curbs on their 
nuclear arsenals. But before this could happen, Indian negotiators obtained the 











This chapter covers India’s ratification of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement at the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT member states took part in 
multilateral trade negotiations from 1986 to 1994 at the Uruguay Round. Negotiations 
led to the creation of the World Trade Organization and extended GATT principles to 
areas previously exempted (Agriculture, Textiles) and new areas (Intellectual Property 
Rights, Trade in Services, etc.). The chapter first provides a background covering 
developments that led to multilateral trade negotiations at the Uruguay Round and 
India’s behaviour at the Round. India’s behaviour was marked by a willingness to 
negotiate and accept rules in areas like agriculture and textiles where it historically 
resisted liberalisation and in new areas like trade in services and intellectual property 
rights. I also ask why the Indian government adopted this approach. Next, the chapter 
provides an analytical narrative focusing on how interests, institutions and interest 
groups interacted to determine India’s approach at the Uruguay Round negotiations 
leading to ratification of the larger trade agreement. Briefly, the Ministry of Commerce 
was keen to protect and advance India’s interests at trade negotiations. The ministry, in 
particular, focused on reducing international trade barriers that prevented Indian goods 
and services from reaching foreign markets. Various business lobbies and associations 
played a notable role influencing India’s agenda at GATT negotiations that led to India 
signing on major trade agreements in textiles, agriculture, services and intellectual 




In the 1980s, protectionism was rampant within the international trade system.1 
Developed countries were incensed by GATT’s concessions to developing countries 
that made them full members without expecting commensurate reduction in trade 
barriers; instead, GATT allowed them to maintain trade restrictions to ease thorny 
balance of payment quandaries. For developed countries, this practice amounted to free-
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riding by developing countries while they faced constant protectionist pressures.2 To 
overcome macroeconomic difficulties – inflation, unemployment and stiff export 
competition from Asian economies, the U.S and several European countries relied on 
subsidies and various non-trade barriers to protect certain industries like apparel and 
clothing from developing country goods.3 Specifically, developed countries used 
safeguards and other policy measures, like Voluntary Export Restraints (VERS), to 
limit exports from developing countries that persisted for years, unchecked.4 To be sure, 
GATT permitted countries to impose trade restrictions when facing problems like 
balance of payment difficulties, infant industry promotion or unfair competition when 
goods are dumped causing internal economic disruptions.5 These measures, however, 
were designed to be temporary until products ceased to be injurious to the importing 
country.6 But in practice, rules were seldom followed; developed countries acquired 
immense power imposing such restrictions while few mechanisms existed to verify their 
claims. Ultimately, these unilateral measures undermined GATT’s credibility to uphold 
institutional norms that prized openness, transparency and economic growth. 
 
In October 1980, Arthur Dunkel, Swiss trade negotiator, became GATT Director 
General. To understand how such measures were affecting GATT’s credibility, Dunkel 
established a group of independent experts to ‘identify the fundamental causes afflicting 
the international trading system and consider how these may be overcome during the 
remainder of the 1980s.’7 One of the remedies, the group suggested, was to begin a new 
round of GATT negotiations to ‘strengthen the multilateral trading system and further 
open world markets.’8 The report was released in Geneva at a time when countries were 
largely split on a new round of negotiations. The United States gave its blessing for a 
new round which affected the logic of other member states who prized greater access to 
the American market. India opposed the prospect of new obligations when prior 
commitments on protectionism and non-tariff barriers remained unfulfilled.9 Other 
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developing countries found developments inexorably moving toward another trade 
round despite reservations from countries like Brazil, Malaysia and Egypt over the need 
for a new round of trade negotiations.10 
 
In April 1985, meetings began to determine whether GATT should launch a new 
trade round and, if yes, what the round should focus on. By now, the G-7 decided to 
push for negotiations and that it ‘should be in 1986.’11 The U.S. was particularly 
adamant, stating it would ‘go ahead with a conference outside the GATT’ if necessary.12 
Another meeting convened by the Swedish Trade Minister in Stockholm sought to 
engineer a consensus between developing and developed countries on negotiations that 
would focus on goods and services, side-by-side. Still unconvinced, India pushed to 
postpone negotiations until prior ‘confidence-building measures to restore credibility to 
the trading system’ were undertaken.13 New Delhi wanted a ‘firm and credible 
commitment, supported by appropriate legislative action’ that no new GATT-
inconsistent restrictive trade measures would be introduced.14 
 
But support for a round came from several ASEAN countries who called for 
negotiations to ‘begin expeditiously.’15 Since decisions were taken on the basis of 
consensus at GATT, prevailing differences prolonged the debate. To resolve the 
impasse, the U.S. invoked Article XXV that facilitated joint action by GATT members 
on important matters provided two-third majority support existed.16 Convinced that a 
majority of GATT member states wanted a new trade round, Washington requested a 
meeting of GATT’s highest body – the Session of Contracting Parties.17 The special 
session, convened in late September 1985, reached agreement on a ‘preparatory process 
on the proposed new round of multilateral trade negotiations.’18 Uruguay was picked as 
the host country to demonstrate the importance of developing countries to the 
exercise.19 
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The winnowing down of issues to negotiate at the round proved difficult. 
Washington hoped to widen the trade ambit from a singular focus on just goods.20 Three 
new issues were flagged for consideration – trade in services, intellectual property rights 
and trade related investment measures. For most developing countries, this course was 
unprecedented since GATT principles, particularly trade liberalisation, stood to be 
applied to service industries for the first time. This prospect meant that issues like 
finance, insurance, culture, tourism and communications governed by domestic laws 
would enter the trade fold and be subject to GATT principles.21 Firmly against this 
prospect, India wanted negotiations to focus only on goods without wading into issues 
like services that were ‘alien to the jurisdictional competence of the General 
Agreement.’22 Shiv Shankar, Indian Minister of Commerce, pushed for trade in services 
to be removed from the agenda. For Shankar, there was a fear that “once services were 
brought into the GATT, the leverage of trade in goods would be used to secure 
concessions in the area of services by the developed countries.”23 
 
Nonetheless, Indian trade officials negotiated all these issues, including 
agriculture, textiles, services, and intellectual property rights. Surprisingly, Indian trade 
officials arrived at negotiations to secure market access and reduce tariff levels and 
other subsidies for Indian firms keen to boost their export output. That India had been 
liberalising since the early 1980s conditioned the positions and concessions made by 
Indian trade officials on key issues at the Uruguay Round. Despite fervent opposition to 
matters like intellectual property rights and services, Indian trade negotiators managed 
to obtain sufficient adjustment periods before the new rules would become applicable to 
India. The final Uruguay Round Agreement consisted of more than sixty agreements 
including significant agreements on politically sensitive issues like agriculture, services, 
textiles and intellectual property rights. The final agreement also established the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) that entered into force on January 1, 1995 to replace GATT. 
India signed the Uruguay Round Agreement after negotiations and became a signatory 
to the WTO soon thereafter.  
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Puzzle – India’s Uruguay Round Behaviour 
 
India’s behaviour at the Uruguay Round is puzzling for one reason. When GATT 
officials debated the possibility of a new trade round, Indian trade officials were 
vehemently opposed. Indian officials questioned the need for a new round since GATT, 
in their view, was yet to deliver previous market access concessions. Since the end of 
the Tokyo Round in 1979, developed countries used protectionist measures to shield 
their economies from foreign goods despite promising to uphold market access 
commitments. Once the Uruguay Round negotiations were confirmed, Indian trade 
officials worked through the G-24 to limit negotiations to only cover trade in goods, 
away from emergent issues like intellectual property rights, investment rights and trade 
in services. On these three issues, India’s unwillingness to consider them grew out of a 
desire to protect strategic domestic industries from liberalisation. But India’s reticence 
on trade goes back to the GATT’s establishment. Over the years, Indian interactions had 
largely been defensive and cautious, given reservations over how GATT functioned and 
domestic preoccupations over international trade as a lever to develop the economy.24 
Despite reservations before the round, Indian trade officials entered negotiations with a 
desire to secure additional market access on a range of goods including textiles and 
agriculture and proved willing to consider intellectual property rights and trade in 
services. Why did Indian officials consider these issues at the Uruguay Round and ratify 
a range of agreements soon thereafter? To explain why India ratified the Uruguay 
Round trade agreement, I focus on why the Ministry of Commerce found negotiations 
in India’s interest, at first, and how relevant business lobbies and associations 
representing Indian firms in particular industries influenced the positions taken by 
Indian trade negotiators on each of the key agreements signed at the trade round. 
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Narrative - India and the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement  
 
Rebooting India’s Trade Policy  
 
Until the late 1970s, India largely kept itself away from international trade. India’s share 
of world trade fell from 2.2 percent in 1948 to 0.4 percent in 1980 and the ratio of 
exports to GDP declined from 7.3 percent in 1951 to 4 percent in 1972.25 To revive 
exports, the Indian government enacted several reforms in 1976. Regulations on 
international financial transactions were relaxed.26 Improved agricultural returns and the 
discovery of oil in the Arabian Sea reduced the import share of oil, allowing imports of 
machinery and related industrial items to rise.27 The government also provided tax 
incentives to small and medium sized exporters.28 Though New Delhi struggled to 
signal that India was open for trade, it was becoming evident that the ground was 
clearing for greater engagement with the international economy. Gary Pursell, a long-
time follower of India’s trade policy, affirmed that stating “the available data on imports 
and import licensing are incomplete, out of date, and often inconsistent. Nevertheless, 
whichever way they are manipulated, they confirm very substantial and steady import 
liberalization that occurred after 1977–78 and during 1980s.”29 
 
Pro-trade measures were a function of a larger thrust to reform India’s 
economy.30 Trade, as mentioned, was a key component but the Indian government also 
targeted clearing other constraints that hamstrung economic growth. Production became 
a key priority for the Indian government.31 Capital controls were eased to allow 
companies to raise finances directly from the public.32 Despite changes, there was no 
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clear effort to pare the size of government.33 This objective was thwarted by the clear 
inability to extract revenue from a wide tax base and competing policy demands that 
required sustained state action.34 As expenditures rose for priorities ranging from 
defence to infrastructure, the government focused on restructuring to ably service 
private-sector led growth path driven by production to raise revenue and drive growth.35  
 
These initiatives bore fruit directly and indirectly through signalling. With the 
private sector on board, the new growth strategy generated high rates of investment and 
marked improvements in investment efficiency.36 In particular, the share of corporate 
sector investments in GDP rose to nearly 5 percent, accompanied by a marginal dip in 
public investment.37 Manufacturing experienced a productivity surge with total factor 
productivity rising nearly 3 percent from 1981-1989, surpassing ‘that of East Asia even 
in the first twenty years of the East Asian miracle.’38 What made this trajectory more 
impressive was that it took place when the global economy was facing headwinds. 
Growth proved tepid worldwide, given the lag from oil shocks and stagflation in the 
1970s; oil prices, problematically, remained high, intermittently denting India’s fiscal 
balance.39 Bottlenecks aside, sufficient positive reinforcement on growth from 
government and industry paved the way for tangible economic gains.  
 
The growth-first strategy continued in the early 1980s. The Ministry of 
Commerce (hereafter MOC) became better aware of its own shortcomings vis-à-vis 
trade and how to further eliminate existing constraints on producers. The MOC formed 
several committees to recommend policy options vis-à-vis international trade. The first 
was the Alexander Committee that examined India’s import and export regime. In its 
report, published in 1978, the committee recommended an overhaul of India’s import 
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control procedures through a ‘comprehensive de-licensing of import measures.’40 The 
report recommended granting liberal access to imports for exporters and strengthening 
the ‘institutional infrastructure for export promotion,’ which also required an extensive 
overview of how industrial, fiscal and monetary policies affected trade.41 These 
conclusions were endorsed by the Abid Hussain Committee on Trade Policies in 1985 
that advised the government to strike a balance between protection and competition, 
indicating that an over reliance on the former was counterproductive to the economy 
writ large.42 The committee pushed for tariffs to be lowered for goods that serve as 
inputs to exportable goods. The report emphasised a clear need for India to adopt a 
‘rational export promotion’ policy.43 Presciently, the Hussain committee recognised and 
stressed the role of technology in trade and development which led them to recommend 
relaxing existing controls to foster technology transfer.44  
 
Heeding some recommendations, New Delhi adopted several policies to ease 
constraints on trade from 1984. Under a new Import-Export policy, the MOC pledged to 
‘provide a further incentive to exports, allow local industry to expand its access to 
foreign capital goods and technology and to simplify import procedures.’45 Import 
licensing requirements were removed, except for certain consumer goods; measures 
were also taken to further simplify the import tariff architecture.46 The general thrust 
was to liberalise imports of capital goods and raw materials that were inputs for exports 
and reduce tariffs on these imports. The MOC also committed ‘to provide industries, 
especially in the small scale sector, easier and more regular access to their requirements 
of inputs in order to maximise their output and improve their productivity, to provide a 
stimulus to those engaged in exports and, in particular to manufacturing units 
contributing substantially to the export effort.’47 Resultant export promotion measures 
included a new passbook-scheme of duty free imports for certain exporters, reduction of 
corporate taxes, reduction in interest rate on export credits, allowance to retain foreign 
exchange receipts for export promotion, remission of excise duties and additional 
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interest rate incentives on government-sponsored loans for large exporters.48 These 
measures expanded the Indian trade basket; on the menu for export in the mid-1980s 
were commodities like tea, jute and cotton but also textiles, machineries and 
consultancy services. Yet, despite reforms, the Indian economy underperformed; export 
volumes produced by exporters grew at a modest pace of 6.5 percent through the 
1980s.49 The drift effectively meant that external limitations constrained Indian exports.  
 
 The external problem stifling Indian exports, as highlighted earlier, was 
protectionism. Protectionism was largely the legacy of the 1973 Tokyo Round.50 In 
Tokyo, tariffs were reduced on thousands of products. Discussions deepened on non-
tariff barriers that led to the adoption of codes on reducing subsidies and duties, revising 
anti-dumping practices, product standards, government procurement and customs 
valuations.51 However, the Tokyo round of negotiations occurred at a time of crisis with 
rising global unemployment and inflation. To soften its impact, developed countries 
used special arrangements and exceptions like subsidies, safeguards and voluntary 
export restrictions to regulate trade between developing countries on key goods 
including textiles and agriculture.52 Developing countries were dismayed by these ad-
hoc arrangements that reduced foreign market access for their exports.53 The situation 
had become difficult since their exports, especially products like garments, agricultural 
commodities and electronic products, were crucial in terms of trade for developing 
countries. India’s trade output was scuppered by subsidies and non-trade barriers in two 
particular areas - textiles and agriculture. The MOC became more sensitised to these 
barriers just as they were adopting several moves to increase the trade outputs of these 
two sectors.54  
 
India’s Textile Trade 
 
Textiles formed a key part of India’s trade basket. The industry’s structure consisted of 
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large-scale cotton mills, small-scale decentralised operations and public sector mills that 
focused on spinning, weaving, fabric-processing and garment making.55 From 1975, the 
industry was riding a wave increasing collective output of fabric and apparel by 30-40 
percent.56 To propel growth, the Indian government unveiled a new textile policy in 
1985 that removed restrictions on the textile industry, particularly constraints on raw 
materials and technologies to increase output.57 A new financing scheme was 
introduced to assist ailing textile mills boost production.58 Slowly, textile output 
increased and so did demand from home and abroad.59 Yet, the industry had problems – 
both domestic and international. Despite steady returns, competition with other 
developing countries laid bare lingering operational difficulties. Productivity was low as 
was the absorption rate of new technologies and practices.60 These deficits 
compromised product quality which, in turn, reduced potential business opportunities. 
But existing slack was also caused by another factor - reduced international market 
access due to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (hereafter MFA).  
 
Through the MFA, developed countries imposed quotas on textile and apparel 
exports from developing countries.61 Introduced in 1974 as a temporary measure to 
allow developed countries adjust to textile imports from developing countries, it 
evolved to become a range of country-specific and product-specific quotas on various 
textile products.62 Exporting countries retained control over administration through 
quotas allocated to firms on the basis of past export performance.63 Quotas, however, 
were negotiated bilaterally with importers having more sway over quota specifications 
based ‘on the sensitivity of the products for its domestic industry.’64 These 
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specifications constrained trade since they were determined ‘when surges in imports of 
particular products caused, or threatened to cause, serious damage to the industry of the 
importing country.’65 By 1981, the U.S. brought ‘more than 80 percent of its total 
imports of textile and apparel products’ under the MFA, negotiating separate bilateral 
quota agreements with exporting countries.66 This situation was unprecedented since 
textiles made up roughly 29 percent of total manufacturing goods exported from non-oil 
developing countries and the entire trading arrangement was not governed by GATT 
rules.67 
 
Indian textile exports were affected by these quotas. Most of India’s textile 
exports were shipped to three markets – the U.S, E.C. and Japan; quotas, in fact, 
covered nearly 97 percent of Indian textile and garment exports to these countries in 
1987.68 With the U.S., non-tariff barriers against India were ‘the highest in the textile 
group’ covering nearly 75 percent of garment and apparel shipments.69 51 percent of 
India’s exports to Japan were subject to various non-tariff barriers including the MFA.70 
The arrangement served as a clear hindrance for Indian textile exporters. In fact, the 
growth rate of India’s textile exports from 1985-1988 was higher than quotas allowed 
under bilateral MFA agreements.71 Exports to these specific markets faced binding 
constraints even as trade volumes rose and this situation existed alongside underused or 
unused quotas for certain textile goods where India was uncompetitive.72  
The MFA also had internal implications on India’s textile sector. From 1986, 
small-scale garment exporters, having exhausted quotas, stalled plans to expand 
capacity and output that, in turn, restrained innovation as firms eschewed investment on 
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in-house machinery and equipment.73 India had the lowest levels of investment per 
worker ($389) in the global garment industry in the mid-1980s; though low investment 
kept wages low, productivity gains were hard to find.74 Expensive overheads, coupled 
with high managerial costs decreased productivity which, in turn, slowed mechanised 
production.75 Instead of regulating production, the MFA hampered innovation, creating 
disincentives for firms to expand output. A World Bank study on the subject claimed 
that the MFA gave ‘misleading signals to different segments of the global garment 
industry and created long-term distortions in the exploitation of countries comparative 
and competitive advantage in textiles and garments.’76 By 1987, 77 percent of Indian 
firms engaged in garment and apparel trade called for a quota-free trading environment; 
Indian exporters felt that with a level playing field, they would be better equipped to 
compete with firms in China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka given competitive 
advantages in labour and wages.77 The displeasure was conveyed to trade officials at the 
MOC who were working with the textile industry to address constraints.78 
 
India’s Trade in Agriculture  
 
Likewise, India’s trade in agriculture proved sluggish in 1985. For decades, agriculture 
had dominated India’s trade basket, constituting a share of 44 percent in 1965 but this 
share dropped to 25 percent in 1974 as the focus turned to food self-sufficiency.79 To 
achieve self-sufficiency, the government adopted a range of controls on agriculture to 
ensure domestic availability and maintain price stability.80 Inputs to increase yields like 
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seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, electricity and water, increased with costs subsidised. 
Access to institutional financing improved supplementing informal credit.81 These 
policies, aided by a rise in private investment on mechanised technologies, boosted total 
agricultural output.82 In 1981, India produced 10 percent of the world’s agricultural 
output despite accounting for just 1 percent of world trade in agriculture. The success of 
this strategy resulted in a ‘dwindling share of India in world agricultural trade.’83 
Nevertheless, India had become a key producer of commodities like rice, jute and 
groundnuts but also wheat, sugar, coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco.84 Yields consistently 
grew for these commodities. But had these commodities been more accessible to 
international markets, a former Indian trade negotiator added, ‘India would have had an 
outsized impact on the global agricultural market.’85 For this prospect to be realised, 
Indian commodities would have had to become competitive or have prices lower than 
world prices.  
 
And the conditions for that prospect had become propitious. Nayyar and Sen 
identify that by the mid-1980s ‘India’s domestic agricultural prices were diverging from 
world prices’ and in a position to capitalise through freer trade.86 In fact, the terms of 
trade between agriculture and manufacturing in India tilted in favour of agriculture 
when the opposite was happening in the world economy with developing countries 
forced to institute structural adjustment policies that throttled their agricultural sectors.87 
For rice, cotton, tobacco and various fruit products, Indian prices were lower than world 
prices; tea and jute, major components of the Indian trade basket, matched world 
prices.88 With competitive prices, agricultural commodities were poised to reap 
windfalls for farmers and the Indian government - should international trade in 
agriculture liberalise. Freer trade was expected to increase domestic prices of key crops, 
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generating profits for farmers that could possibly lead to a reduction in the input 
subsidies provided by the government, mainly fertiliser and irrigation.89 And an increase 
in agricultural prices would further incentivise farmers to boost production and 
investment.  
 
The MOC gradually realised that clear opportunities existed in agricultural 
exports. Moving gingerly from the self-sufficiency focus, the ministry allowed farmers 
to export commodities like groundnut, cloves and cooking oil.90 Export targets were 
next set for a range of agricultural commodities.91 Commerce Secretary Abid Hussain 
emphasised that agricultural exports were a priority for the government and so were 
linkages between industry and agriculture to meet export targets.92 In 1986, the Cabinet 
Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) cleared constraints that allowed Indian 
producers to set up joint ventures abroad to encourage ‘foreign companies market our 
agro products.’93 The ground was gradually clearing for open agricultural trade.  
 
But for Indian farmers to capitalise from these measures, greater international 
market access was needed, especially in developed countries that had become 
unabashedly protectionist vis-à-vis agriculture.94 Worldwide, agriculture was in crisis; 
prices were in free fall from commodity booms in the 1970s.95 This scenario refocused 
attention on self-sufficiency and food security, not trade. Protectionism ensued across 
the industrialised world alongside export promotion that produced a net surplus in staple 
commodities.96 Food prices in the developed world were nearly twice as high as 
international prices; trade policy was used to sustain price-support policies and transfer 
income to agriculture.97 The U.S and E.C. were at the forefront of this practice.98 For 
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developing countries, however, this protectionism rankled given sizeable export 
earnings from trade in agriculture.99  
 
Another concern was the GATT’s actions on agriculture. Since GATT’s 
founding, agriculture was removed from its remit. The U.S., E.C and Japan ring-fenced 
domestic agricultural policies from international trade considerations. Exemptions from 
GATT on agriculture led to waivers being granted for developed countries to openly 
subsidise domestic farm sectors. In fact, support for farmers in the United States 
increased from $2.7 billion in 1980 to $25.8 billion in 1986. In Europe, governments 
spent $22 billion on farm support in 1986, up from $6.2 billion in 1976.100 Levels of 
protection had increased from the Tokyo Round in 1973. Moreover, key trading states 
like the U.S, France and Japan evinced no desire in demonstrating their commitment to 
free market principles when it came to agriculture.101 For developing countries like 
India, adherence to multilateral trade rules by major economies in agricultural trade 
proved critical given the effect these states had on agricultural trade flows and world 
prices.102 It became critical to lever GATT to reverse the protectionist impulses of 
critical trading countries and secure additional market access for agricultural products. 
 
India’s Trade in Services 
 
Like agriculture and textiles, services emerged as an issue of interest for Indian trade 
officials. In 1981, India’s service industry covered an entire spectrum of activities in 
fields like engineering, industries, electronics, drugs and pharmaceuticals, computer 
software and urban management, etc.103 Given the diversity, Indian trade officials 
signalled a desire to become better aware of how trade affected their multifaceted 
services industry. Research was conducted on trade in services over the next three years 
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by the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), commissioned by the MOC.104 The 
ensuing report cautioned the government against negotiating trade in services at GATT, 
indicating that, for now, the best strategy was ‘a holding operation.’105 Nonetheless, the 
report urged the government to interact with developing countries on the matter, share 
information on trade in services and emphasise labour services at GATT discussions.106 
 
Externally, Indian trade officials approached services with caution but, 
internally, there was debate over whether India could materially benefit from trade in 
services given the policy emphasis on developing domestic service industries.107 Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to the U.S. in 1985 triggered discussions on bilateral 
commercial and trade exchanges. American firms and companies travelled across India 
in 1986 and 1987 to explore opportunities while Indian business representatives did the 
same across the U.S.108 Henry Cahill, U.S. Consul General in Bombay, led several 
American delegations to explore trade opportunities in fields like ‘heavy construction, 
computer consultancy and software, medical services, hotel and tourism management, 
graphics, engineering design and repair maintenance’ and determine how both countries 
‘could pool their talents to export their services on a global basis.’109 
 
Yet, the official government position on trade in services at GATT did not 
change. Indian trade officials were wary of bringing in service-related activities into the 
GATT, fearing a possible diminution of national control in those areas.110 Even as 
GATT member states gathered at Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986 to 
hammer out a negotiating mandate for the Uruguay round, India’s opposition to trade in 
services remained. Then, pressure from the U.S ramped up against countries resisting 
consideration of trade in services at GATT. US Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter 
threatened the use of Section 301 of the newly passed U.S. Trade Act (1974) to get 
recalcitrant countries to negotiate a multilateral framework on trade in services or risk 
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being sanctioned by the U.S.111 In addition, Washington threatened to remove 
concessions granted through the General System of Preferences (GSP) to GATT states 
objecting to negotiate trade in services.112  
 
Yeutter’s threat created a flutter in New Delhi given the government’s focus on 
information technology and electronic services but equally for Indian goods exported to 
the U.S. In 1986, the U.S accounted for 19 percent of Indian exports and 10 percent of 
its imports.113 Also, the U.S. was the leading source, by far, of foreign collaboration in 
services with Indian firms; U.S foreign investment in 1985-86 was greater than inflows 
over the previous decade, amounting to a third of India’s total FDI that year.114 That 
year, the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO) envisaged a ‘growth rate of 
50 percent per annum in consultancy exports by 1989-90 generating valuable export 
earnings for industry and government.115 The implications of U.S. sanctions through 
Section 301 were thus profound.  
 
Trade scholar Jagdish Bhagwati called for a shift in India’s services approach, 
prodding Indian officials to yield on the matter.116 There was no guarantee, Bhagwati 
added, that other developing countries would continue to resist given self-interest; 
dithering, he claimed, on India’s part would only intensify American resolve to deepen 
retaliatory action.117 The MOC grew to accept that the matter was becoming a fait 
accompli; trade officials realised that by agreeing to consider the issue, India could, at 
least, influence rules in service areas where it had a clear advantage like labour 
services.118 Ultimately, India relented and as did other developing countries that saw 
negotiations at GATT as an antidote to American protectionism. But developing 
countries were still mixed on whether negotiations should take place at GATT, given 
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qualms over the application of GATT principles, especially Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) on trade in services.119 MFN meant all foreign services-related companies would 
be treated as domestic companies when they entered a country to set up shop. As a 
compromise, member states agreed to consider services at negotiations but ‘on a parallel 




Indian negotiators were faced with three key problems at Uruguay Round negotiations – 
textiles, agriculture and services. Shaping the MOC’s understanding of these problems 
were domestic groups affected by distortions and restrictions in the international trade 
system. These groups either suffered financially from opportunities lost through 
distortions or had considerable benefits in store, should constraints be removed. 
 
With respect to textiles, India had a natural comparative advantage in cotton and 
cotton-based fibres. Despite problems, there was a concerted effort by textile exporters 
to boost output from 1981. The Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO) and 
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FICC) pushed various export 
promotion councils to boost garment and apparel exports given measures taken by the 
government to liberalise import of inputs.121 These councils hailed the government’s 
focus on trade liberalisation and export promotion and pushed trade officials to secure 
additional market access.122 Moreover, the estimated financial gains from greater textile 
trade, without the MFA, were sizeable. In 1986, average textile imports to developed 
countries amounted to $66 billion with a third of that - $21 billion from the United 
States, India’s top exporting market for textiles. Canonero and Srinivasan (1995) 
estimated India’s bilateral textile trade with the U.S and E.C could increase by 2.6 and 
4.3 percent once the MFA was phased out generating $800 million in 1986 alone.123 
Leading trade scholar Fred Bergsten estimated that increased trade would result in a 
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0.5-4.5 percent rise in South Asia’s GDP with much of that accruing to India given 
competitive advantages in labour and wages compared to other developing countries.124 
For India, the MFA had outgrown its utility despite benefits accrued to textile-importing 
countries; however, the arrangement had become difficult to dislodge given the leverage 
developed countries had at GATT that sustained the arrangement. Satish Modi, 
Chairman of the Indian Cotton Mills Federation (ICMF), affirmed that should the 
government assist in ridding the MFA, it would ‘stimulate higher utilisation of capacity 
in domestic industry’ and enable ‘textile exports to reach greater heights in the coming 
years.’125 Clear opportunities in textile trade made MFA abolition vital for Indian trade 
negotiators at GATT.  
 
Agriculture was another key priority. Ramu Deora, Federation of Indian Export 
Organisations (FIEO) President, lauded the policy reforms made to liberalise 
agricultural production and urged the government to further improve trade access for 
domestic commodities given India’s “infinitesimal” share in world agricultural trade.126 
Potential for greater agro-trade, Deora added, was immense given agricultural growth 
rates; in fact, the growth rate in agriculture was 3 percent from 1981-1991, which was 
nearly double the rate of the previous decade from 1971-1981 despite facing chronic 
bottlenecks in terms of infrastructure and logistics.127 However, the MOC did not 
consult with local farmers’ organisations or agro-processing industries in the lead up to 
negotiations at the Uruguay Round. These groups were represented by larger industry 
and export organisations like FIEO and FICC in discussions with trade officials.128 
Nonetheless, FIEO did make a case to trade officials that Indian agriculture had become 
highly export competitive given their prices and freeing trade would unleash its growing 
export potential.129 
 
 The third priority was trade in services. Early on, the MOC was reticent toward 
considering services at GATT, given reservations over how rules would be framed and 
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if they would cover a whole range of domestic service sectors. The MOC commissioned 
research by the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) to better understand the position 
of Indian services companies and how international trade policies affected their 
prospects just as it unveiled a new technology policy to incentivise firms in the services 
industry. Groups like the Indian-American Chamber of Commerce (AICC), 
Confederation of Engineering Industry (CEI) and Association of Indian Engineering 
Industry (AIEI) paved the way for Indian services companies to discuss partnerships 
with American firms.130 Their initiative was supported by the government’s 1986 
software policy that emphasised the integration of domestic firms with international 
firms focusing on computers and software. This policy was in response to the growing 
global demand for data processing and software services ‘which presented itself as a 
real opportunity for Indian companies to sell their services abroad.’131 Opportunities 
appeared to be widening for Indian services firms abroad, which rendered market access 
crucial for their growth. 
 
The MOC’s commissioned report on trade in services advised Indian trade 
officials to reassess India’s position on services, given on-going domestic economic 
policy changes to assist consultancy services firms whose output was on the rise. The 
report also urged the government to seize a ‘golden chance to possibly rearrange the 
internal priorities of India both of substance and tactics.’132 This call was endorsed by a 
number of trade and commercial associations including the Associated Chamber of 
Commerce (ACC), Confederation of Engineering Industry (CEI) and the emergent 
National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), some of whom 
represented firms in the rising services industry.133 In fact, the combined Indian services 
industry had acquired a market size constituting roughly 28 percent of Indian exports in 
1985, involving a sizeable contingent of educated professionals in several fields.134 The 
sector grew from 24 percent of Indian domestic income in 1951 to 39 percent in 1986-7 
and exports of professional technical services grew at an annual rate of 12 percent from 
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1974-1988.135 In particular, the volume of software exports, a key growth industry, 
increased from $26 million in 1985 to $110 million in 1989, largely in the form of 
‘deputations, on-site consultancy, professional services, or body shopping.’136 Prospects 
to augment this share existed through additional market access in developed countries. 
In fact, total world trade of US $375 billion in services was identified by The 
Technocrat in September 1989 as ‘a big cake in which the developing countries may 
also have a sumptuous bite if they play their cards dexterously.’137 
 
Indian trade officials approached Uruguay Round negotiations to secure market 
access in these areas – textiles, agriculture and services and, concurrently, protect 
domestic firms from external competition in these areas, given promising growth 
records over the past decade. 
 
Underway in Geneva 
 
Uruguay Round negotiations commenced in October 1986 in Geneva. Negotiations 
were split into two groups - Group of Negotiations on Goods (GNG) to cover trade in 
goods and Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) to cover trade in services. Under 
GNG, sub-groups focused on fifteen subjects like textiles, agriculture, etc. Despite the 
addition of issues like services and intellectual property rights, member states still had 
to reduce tariffs and discuss non-tariff barriers to trade.138  
 
The Indian delegation arrived optimistic, looking to reverse trade restrictions in 
areas like agriculture and textiles, and cautious, not wanting to concede commensurate 
market access, in return. In fact, there was a pervading fear amongst the Indian 
negotiators that developing countries would have to reciprocate, in-kind, for market 
access concessions provided by developed countries.139 Nonetheless, the Indian 
delegation was keen to secure greater access on textiles and agriculture as well as 
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ascertain the growing interest around trade in services. India entered the round with an 
improving international trade position. Both India’s trade deficit and total exports were 
moving in the right direction. To service exports, imports increased, particularly 
manufacturing inputs, chemicals and other machineries.140 Indian exports to the U.S. 
doubled from 1980-1986 and total Indo-US trade increased from $2 billion in 1979 to 
$4 billion in 1986; these two trends secured India a positive trade balance with the U.S 
in 1983.141 Pushing onward, the Rajiv Gandhi government dispensed with quantitative 
restrictions to establish a clear structure of tariffs. 1986-1987 also saw a restructuring of 
the fiscal side alongside policies to simplify the tax regime, presenting investors a more 
stable and predictable policy environment.142  
 
Indian negotiators looked to advance this trajectory.143 Given India’s trade 
balance and priorities around textiles and agriculture, negotiators identified three 
restrictions for GATT to address - the Multi-Fibre Agreement, tariffs on Indian coffee 
and tea and the competitive subsidisation of food grain exports.144 This agenda formed 
the initial focus for the Indian delegation led by officials from the MOC who were 
supported, when needed, by Indian diplomats.  
 
Phasing out the MFA 
 
India’s most pressing concern was getting rid of the Multifibre Arrangement. Early on, 
India’s chief negotiator S.P. Shukla flagged the need to ‘see substantive progress in the 
area of trade in textiles and clothing, which has been subject to the long-standing 
derogation from GATT rules’ through the MFA.145 This scenario, Shukla stated 
‘embodied the very antithesis of differential and favourable treatment for developing 
countries’ that had been at the heart of GATT.146 Shukla called for the ‘return of textile 
trade to the GATT rules’ but this outcome, he argued, should be in accordance with the 
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Punta del Este declaration that did not expect developing countries to reciprocate on 
trade concessions.147 Shukla’s MFA stance was fronted by a strong declaration by 
Indian Finance Minister V.P. Singh at GATT to dispel with the MFA by making its 
‘present extension the last one.’148 Like Shukla, Singh underlined contradictions in 
statements released by developed countries on upholding a liberal trading order while 
undermining that objective through arrangements like the MFA.149  
 
The Indian delegation directed its efforts to eliminate MFA through the 
International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (ITCB), a body of twenty developing 
countries that exported textiles and garments. ITCB was established ‘to achieve the 
elimination of discrimination and protectionism directed against member exports of 
textiles and clothing in world markets.’150 From July 1987, ITCB was given observer 
status in the Negotiating Group on Textiles and Clothing where negotiations on textiles 
took place. The bureau gathered the views of its member states on the MFA and related 
textile issues through the trade round with a desire to eliminate the arrangement. 
Removing the MFA proved tough, early on, since developed countries had grown 
accustomed to it. In 1988, a suggestion by the U.S. and Canadian delegations to replace 
MFA with a transitional system of global quotas was rebuffed by ITCB countries.151 
Most importing countries did not want to disrupt what they saw as a reliable 
arrangement but ITCB countries did not yield easily.152 A breakthrough was achieved 
when developed countries agreed in 1989 to place textiles under the GATT’s orbit away 
from bilateral quota agreements.153 Negotiations proceeded fitfully with differences 
widening between ITCB countries and importing countries on the details of a MFA 
phase-out.  
 
In 1991, the Indian delegation submitted a comprehensive brief through the 
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ITCB, elaborating their expectations of the MFA and textile coverage in GATT.154 The 
brief tied the persistence of the MFA to structural problems faced by developing 
countries in the international economy, namely, the inability to accumulate sufficient 
foreign exchange to finance necessary imports that then generated an acute balance of 
payment difficulties.155 To assist developing countries in avoiding this predicament they 
required, ‘unrestricted access to the markets of industrialised countries for their exports, 
especially their manufactured exports.’156 The removal of restrictions, the brief added, 
was essential ‘to the very success of the Uruguay Round negotiations.’157 Indian 
negotiators urged the negotiating committee to gradually phase out MFA restrictions in 
a clear time-bound schedule to avoid another renewal once the current arrangement 
expired. The preferred formula was for restrictions to be eliminated in four phases over 
a six-year period ending in 1997.158 Resistance grew from some developed countries, 
particularly the U.S., that wanted more time for the transition.159  
 
As negotiations stalled, delegates managed to extend the MFA provisionally for 
17 months until January 1993.160 The U.S. delegation responded with a more cautious 
proposal, suggesting a ten-year transition to incorporate textiles into GATT.161 The 
ITCB opposed the proposal at first; perceiving it as a move to stall progress, Shukla 
exhorted other member states to not place clothing and textiles ‘on the back burner.’162 
But his plea was met by calls from developed countries that they ‘needed more time to 
amend all the necessary national legislation’ for a phase-out.163 Finally, a compromise 
was reached to use the U.S. proposal as the basis for a final agreement.164  
 
Final bargaining on the MFA took place in 1992.165 The holdover issues were 
the duration of the phase-out and the rate and scope through which textiles would be 
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integrated into the GATT. Despite pleas from the ITCB to change the schedule, the 
American suggestion of a ten-year transition period prevailed. The final agreement -
 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) managed to strike a balance between 
competing interests. The result drew from the foundation set by India’s ITCB proposal 
that called for a time-bound approach with several adjustments made to placate 
developed countries. Under the ATC, it was agreed that quotas on textiles would be 
phased-out over a ten-year period from the completion of the trade round.166 All textile 
imports prohibited under MFA would have to be cleared by 31 December 2004.167 By 
2005, the ten-year mark, member states would have to eliminate a wide range of textile 
quotas. For India, the new agreement achieved two interests – secure additional market 
access for Indian textile and garment exports within an acceptable timeframe, and 
importantly, resultant concessions would not be subject to reciprocity. Though tariffs on 
textiles would eventually have to be lowered, certain restrictions would remain on 
textiles and clothing from developed countries.168 
 
Securing Gains in Agricultural Trade  
 
With respect to agriculture, India looked for more market access in developed countries. 
At the first meeting of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture in December 1987, India 
concurred with the main thrust of proposals that called for ‘liberalization of trade in 
agriculture through the removal of distortions and restrictions.’169 However, Indian 
officials did so with a caveat - by imploring countries to consider ‘the development 
dimension’ of the problem.170 This proviso meant recognising developing countries 
were due ‘special and differential treatment’ on agriculture.171 In other words, opening 
up markets for the import of agricultural commodities from the developing world 
without expecting them to reciprocate in-kind and doing away with the range of 
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subsidies given to domestic farmers.172 Reciprocity, Shukla hoped, would be relaxed for 
trade in agriculture.173  
 
The Indian delegation submitted an elaborate proposal on agriculture in 
December 1988.174 The proposal divided responsibilities between developed and 
developing countries and urged GATT to push developed countries to ‘integrate trade in 
agriculture’ through the elimination of trade distortive or restricted measures, subsidies 
that impinged on agricultural trade and prohibition of other non-tariff measures.175 India 
proposed that GATT recognise the distinct status of developing countries vis-à-vis 
agriculture since it constituted a disproportionately large part of their economies, 
necessitating a ‘strong leadership role from the state.’176 Specifically, the proposal urged 
GATT to validate the right of developing countries to adopt measures to aid farmers 
through price support, subsidies, research grants and stocking and distribution 
provisions.177 Despite the audaciousness of the proposal and attendant support gathered, 
the proposal did not tip the scale toward an agreement; developed countries were not 
compelled, yet, to yield on subsidies.178  
 
At the mid-term review of trade negotiations in 1990, GATT member states 
were asked to endorse a broad framework approach to trade in agriculture, characterised 
by a mix of short (immediate freeze on protectionism) and long-term (market oriented 
agricultural trading system) goals.179 The U.S and E.C. resisted offering concessions in 
the short term, preferring liberalisation over the long haul but that offer was spurned by 
several developing countries.180 There was no agreement on agriculture at the mid-term 
review. The impasse and subsequent stalemate made it clear that agriculture was a 
battleground, given the varied interests of key countries; this impasse would give some 
GATT member states, especially in the developed world, the power to veto proposals 
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without ‘corresponding progress on liberalizing agricultural trade.’181  
 
When the negotiating group reconvened in July 1990, Indian officials expressed 
regret over the inflexibility of developed countries in dispensing with ‘trade restrictive 
and distortive’ practices.182 Indian negotiators pushed to exempt India and other 
developing countries from reciprocating on opening markets for developed countries as 
‘it is our view that developing countries assistance to agriculture shall be exempted 
from reduction commitments.’183 India’s exhortations were accompanied by similar 
statements from other developing countries like Egypt and Malaysia.184 Sensing the 
depth of resistance from developing countries, the U.S.’s position began to evolve.185 In 
response, Washington offered to adopt tariffication or convert existing non-tariff 
barriers into a tariff, allowing conditional access to incoming commodities.186  
 
After that offer, the U.S fleshed out its idea in an elaborate proposal reiterating 
its desire to phase out export subsidies over ten-years, coupled with tariffication of all 
non-tariff barriers and adoption of an internal system that disciplined subsidies based on 
their distortive impact.187 Developing countries, the U.S. proposal added, would be 
given leeway when it came to adjusting to these guidelines; openly, the proposal 
assented that their ‘special and differential status’ would be respected within the 
framework, however, ‘without compromising the concerns of net food-importing 
developing countries.’188 Prevailing chasms were being bridged. Importantly, the U.S. 
proposal cohered with the proposal forwarded by the Cairns Group that pushed for a 
phase-out of export subsidies and reduction in the use of domestic subsidies generating 
agricultural surpluses in developed countries.189  
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GATT member states next convened in December 1990 to continue negotiations 
on agriculture. Plenary sessions were consumed by commerce ministers from member 
states who underlined their concerns on the round while exhorting the forum to resolve 
outstanding issues. Indian Commerce Minister Subramanian Swamy hoped that the 
‘process of liberalization once begun becomes irreversible.’190 More concretely, Swamy 
endorsed the Cairns Group’s agenda on agriculture, ‘we fully share the thrust for 
liberalization of agricultural trade and reduction of trade distortive subsidization 
particularly export subsidies.’191 With the U.S, Cairns Group and some developing 
countries converging on gradual market liberalisation on trade in agriculture, the key 
holdout now was the E.C., that refrained from offering a commitment on export 
subsidies. The E.C.’s delay extended negotiations.192  
 
To secure an agreement on agriculture, GATT DG Dunkel called for a brief 
reprieve that lasted until December 1991. Private discussions between the U.S and E.C 
achieved some progress but Brussels held firm on subsidies to farmers under their 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).193 Dunkel intervened to find a solution; he split 
agricultural negotiations into two streams - technical and political, allowing the E.C to 
deal internally with CAP before returning to GATT.194 This decision allowed other 
member states to agree on what a possible agreement on agriculture would look like. 
After more discussions, the committee agreed that new rules prioritise market access, 
reduce export subsidies and phase out domestic agricultural support in an orderly 
manner.195 Three components - market access, domestic support and export competition 
served as the pillars in the final Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).196 Market access 
commitments secured the reduction of tariffs in developed countries.197 Tariffication 
was endorsed as the preferred way to reduce non-tariff barriers. Domestic support for 
agriculture was to be reduced by twenty percent.198 The agreement also stipulated 
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commitments that reduced export competition through subsidies or other types of 
financing which would be based on aggregate budgetary assistance.199 All three 
components, importantly, recognised the special status of developing countries vis-à-vis 
trade in agriculture. This outcome was vital for India. The implementation period for all 
three components differed for developed and developing countries.200 The latter had a 
ten-year cushion before provisions became active.201 Developing countries, with India 
leading, also extolled the rhetoric of special and differential treatment to trade in 
agriculture. Differentiation became clear in the final agreement though developing 
countries were not exempt from new rules once they kicked in.  
 
Clinching Trade in Services  
 
The next priority for Indian negotiators was trade in services. The services industry in 
India was growing and interest warmed to deepen their market access abroad. 
Nonetheless, Indian negotiators proved cautious, unsure how negotiations would play 
out and how penetrative rules would be over domestic services industries.202 
Negotiations took place under the Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS).203 
Broadly, delegates were asked to adhere to the Punta del Este mandate on services that 
called to ‘establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in 
services.’204 The GNS had to clearly define what it meant by services, consider 
principles for rules on services and determine how wide the services terrain would be. 
The task was complex as countries had different kinds of service sectors that were not 
only lucrative (banking, consulting) but also strategically important (telecom, media, 
etc.). Moreover, discussing trade in services involved getting entangled with domestic 
regulatory standards when compared to traditional trade in goods.205  
 
Through 1987 and 1988, divisions emerged on the shape and scope of a trade in 
services agreement. Brazil complained that negotiations were rushed without an 
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adequate understanding of incumbent issues.206 India had some idea given the 
preliminary research done at home that triggered a defensive approach toward trade in 
services, at first. The February 1987 statement by the Indian delegation defended 
autonomous national planning and control over certain industries in light of growing 
service liberalisation. ‘Liberalization,’ the statement argued referred to ‘international 
trade, not internal trade or the production and distribution of services within national 
borders.’207 The Indian delegation wanted to limit multilateral intrusion into a whole 
range of service industries that were under national control.208  
 
The first significant services proposal came from the U.S. in October 1987.209 
Washington called for an agreement to advance progressive liberalisation across a wide 
range of service sectors, applying to ‘the cross-border movement of services and the 
establishment of foreign branches’ to deliver services across the world.210 The proposal 
anchored the agreement on the principle of national treatment to ensure service 
suppliers were not discriminated against abroad.211 The proposal was followed by 
others, less and more specific on core elements. Discussions looked to narrow down the 
concepts to build an agreement on. But as the mid-term review neared, there was scant 
progress on basic issues, exemplified by the fact that the negotiating committee did not 
submit a single text for further consideration. Tellingly, there was no consensus on the 
definition of services.212  
 
Back in India, trade officials took stock again on trade in services. A new 
‘analytic review’ was commissioned and conducted by the Indian Institute of Foreign 
Trade (IIFT) on trade negotiations in services.213 The report argued that ‘developed 
countries were placing more emphasis on transparency and progressive liberalization in 
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trade in services by dismantling various barriers and providing non-discriminatory 
national treatment. Developing countries, on the other hand, emphasized that the 
framework give due weightage to developmental needs which have not to be in any way 
compromised for expansion of trade in services.’214 The report called on Indian 
negotiators to push GNS to be more receptive to the interests of developing countries 
insofar as principles for trade in services were concerned. Progressive liberalisation, the 
report argued, must be undertaken in line with the ‘development objectives’ of 
developing countries.215 The report also highlighted burgeoning chasms among the G-
77, questioning the need to ally with them as negotiations continued given the interests 
involved.216 Instead, the report pushed Indian negotiators to reassess India’s position on 
the issue arguing that ‘a golden chance to possibly rearrange the internal priorities of 
India both of "substance" and well as "negotiating tactics" no exists. A new orbit for 
future negotiations . . . certainly tends to emerge itself.’217 
 
Midway, trade in services discussions were consumed by the concerns of 
developing countries. To allow for all countries to discuss matters without prejudice, it 
was agreed that negotiations would be ‘open to participants to bring forward new areas, 
proposals, concepts and approaches.’218 Gradually, the concerns of developing countries 
on trade in services were laid bare.219 Ministers at the meeting eventually agreed that 
progressive liberalisation in services must be conducted with ‘appropriate flexibility for 
individual developing countries in line with their development objectives,’ while 
allowing developing countries to ‘introduce new regulations’ to protect certain strategic 
sectors.220 India’s desire to find an amenable solution, with protections, was highlighted 
at the meeting by the U.S. and E.C that now recognised the ‘the effective role India can 
play in the course of negotiations, even in the realm of intricate issues.’221 
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After Montreal, Indian negotiators returned to actively negotiate trade in 
services. They also had to contend with an American delegation keen to open up service 
sectors abroad through GATT for their domestic industries.222 This interest aligned with 
India only where it could be competitive in international service markets and that was 
through labour mobility. At negotiations, Indian officials insisted on broadening the 
definition of service industries at GATT to include blue-collar labour.223 The inclusion 
of this group, Shukla added earlier, ‘would make an agreement to liberalize trade in 
services less one-sided’ and more amenable to developing countries like India.224 Indian 
trade officials found an interest within an interest on trade in services.  
 
In September 1989, India’s Commerce Minister Dinesh Singh underlined India’s 
strategy for trade in services. Singh pushed for liberalised trade in human resource 
services, ‘especially the international flow of people, both skilled and unskilled’ 
alongside patience in other areas where services were either nationalised or 
underdeveloped.225 The approach was spelled out in an elaborate proposal on a 
framework agreement on services that India submitted to the negotiating committee in 
December 1989.226 Unlike the American proposal, India’s contribution was pointed, not 
comprehensive. India’s services definition categorically ruled out permanent 
establishment of foreign businesses and unrestricted foreign direct investment.227 This 
understanding meant that foreign firms would not have the right to establish an office to 
produce a service in the host country or facilitate entry from its home base. Instead, the 
Indian proposal limited trade in services to three components - cross border supply of 
specified services, cross border of movement of consumers and most importantly, cross 
border movement of labour involving ‘temporary relocation for production and supply 
of services.’228 These ideas also found their way into the June 1990 services proposal 
developing countries submitted to the GNS.229  
                                                




225GATT, Communication from India: Elements of a Multilateral Framework for Trade in Services. 




229GATT, Communication from Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Mexico, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay: Structure of a Multilateral Framework for Trade in Services. 




Negotiations moved to fill the intricacies of a trade in services agreement that 
delegates now officially referred to as the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).230 Discussions focused on three basic elements – the framework text, annex 
detailing the number of service sectors covered and the schedules of specific national 
commitments that provided opportunities to foreign services companies.231 As member 
states worked through these details, prevailing frictions concerning market access and 
the role of developing countries slackened negotiations. The U.S. revisited the 
possibility of a linkage between access in goods and services, hinting at retaliation if no 
agreement emerged.232 More vexing than this threat was applying national treatment as 
an organising principle for trade in services; this principle required countries to treat 
foreign companies as they would national ones.233 National treatment was problematic 
for the services remit that, as mentioned, had industries that were strategically and 
financially significant to countries. But this idea did not go far; unconditional national 
treatment was categorically ruled out due to clear opposition from developing 
countries.234 Instead, GATT member states had to identify select sectors they wanted 
exempt from GATS. Indian negotiators accepted this decision given reservations on 
opening up several domestic service sectors like finance, tourism, insurance, telecom, 
etc.235  
 
India’s focused participation in trade in services produced results while 
protecting key interests. The level of development of a particular country was 
recognised as a key factor in the GATS agreement. On the list of sectors, the agreement 
moved from a negative list approach listing activities that were restricted to trade, 
leaving open other areas to a positive list approach that listed areas that countries were 
willing to keep open.236 Indian negotiators also managed to keep their ‘banking, 
insurance and basic telecommunications sectors’ outside the agreement while securing 
space ‘for temporary movement of its skilled personnel to the developed countries.’237 
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The question of labour services was of particular importance to India; this interest 
resulted in pushing for rules that allowed more foreign nationals to engage in work 
abroad. Though most developed countries fought to limit this group to the skilled 
category, India insisted developing countries ought to ‘be able to benefit from their 
principal competitive advantage.’238 Eventually, GATS was concluded as a parallel 
agreement on 15 April 1994 after member states provided their national schedule of 
commitments, detailing sectors they allowed and disallowed within the agreement.239 
 
Battling for Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Indian negotiators secured concessions in three key areas - Textiles, Agriculture and 
Services at the Uruguay Round. Concessions, however, did not come empty-handed; 
India had to reciprocate on textiles and agricultural exports after a transition period and 
influenced the pace of liberalisation on trade in services. The Indian government also 
had to concede on another vital issue - intellectual property rights (hereafter IPR).  
 
India initially opposed GATT’s decision to consider intellectual property right 
issues. A.V. Ganesan, India’s principal IPR negotiator, argued that India’s reluctance 
stemmed from a mix of unease over abdicating national policy control on intellectual 
property issues and a sense that such issues were plainly irrelevant for developing 
countries like India that had little to gain but much to lose from negotiations.240 India 
also had reservations considering the matter at GATT given lateral coverage of IPR 
issues at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); this fear was 
compounded by the fact that developing countries were not very familiar with the 
technicalities of the subject which meant their delegations were negotiating from a 
position of weakness, not strength.241 Also shaping Indian reticence was India’s patent 
law - The Indian Patents Act passed in 1970 that had spawned a burgeoning domestic 
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pharmaceutical industry.242 Importantly, the law prohibited product patents, allowing 
only for certain process patents in the food, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors.243 As 
a result, acceding to new international guidelines on patents would have meant rewriting 
domestic rules, a politically difficult proposition, at best. 
 
Nonetheless, IPR negotiations commenced in 1987. Delegates negotiated from a 
broad mandate, ‘to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules to 
reduce distortions to international trade’ and to ‘develop a multilateral framework of 
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods.’244 
Member states agreed negotiations would take place without prejudice to actions taken 
on IPR issues at WIPO.245 Early negotiations were marked by discord, marred by 
different interpretations of the IPR mandate.246 Developed countries, with the U.S. 
leading, sought to negotiate better protections on intellectual property while developing 
countries sought to limit discussions to counterfeit goods.247 The battle lines were stark. 
 
Negotiations mirrored tussles at WIPO over intellectual property protection. 
Developed countries placed intellectual property at the heart of economic growth and 
innovation that merited robust protection.248 To tighten protections, the U.S. submitted 
an ambitious proposal in October 1987, calling for a comprehensive agreement on 
patents that ‘would cover minimum standards for protection and enforcement in 
national law of patents, trademarks, copyright, trade sectors, and the layout design of 
semiconductors.’249 Predictably, the proposal met resistance from developing countries, 
including the Indian delegation that loathed having to pay large sums of money to 
foreign companies for goods through better protections.250 Developing countries looked 
to foil rules that compromised their ability to produce products like drugs and 
pharmaceuticals and sought to shift the focus to developmental issues that warranted 
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low levels of intellectual property protection.251  
 
Through 1987 and 1988, other developed countries moved toward the U.S 
position. As the mid-term review neared in 1990, confusion reigned over the submission 
of a draft IPR text for consideration. As countries convened at the mid-term review in 
Montreal, Dunkel remarked informally that ‘TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) was going to be one of the hardest nuts to 
crack.’252 But Montreal eased some pressures on IPR negotiations. Focus remained on 
designing a workable system of intellectual property protection but with more 
consideration given to ‘underlying public policy objectives of national systems’ for the 
protection of intellectual property.253 This intervention led to a flurry of national 
proposals on intellectual property standards with member states submitting views on 
IPR.254 
 
The Indian delegation was pleased national objectives would be woven into 
negotiations to grapple with ‘the development and public policy dimensions’ of issues 
involved.255 Until now, Indian negotiators insisted IPR issues were foreign to GATT 
and should remain out of the trade round. Then, in a seminal policy shift, the Indian 
government agreed to the inclusion of substantive norms and standards on IPRs as 
called for by the original IPR mandate, essentially changing its previous position. The 
shift’s timing in late 1989 coincided with India’s eagerness to negotiate concessions and 
secure greater market access in other goods and services. Pressures from other areas 
seeped into negotiations on intellectual property rights.256 It was, in the words of A.V. 
Ganesan, India’s IPR negotiator, a ‘signal to the world’ that India was eager to engage 
deeply and more outwardly with the global economy; Ganesan affirmed later when 
asked about the shift, stating that he was instructed by the Prime Minister’s Office to 
make it clear to other countries that India was looking to further ‘integrate its economy 
into the global economy’ and that the Uruguay Round represented an opportunity to 
advance that objective.257  
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India’s decision to negotiate IPR issues was also a result of the pressures exerted 
by the U.S. via Section 301 of the US Trade Act that imposed trade restrictions on 
particular countries.258 US trade officials targeted India, among other developing 
countries, for ‘some of India’s practices fit the Trade Action definition of unfair and the 
key problem as we see it is a lack of product patent protection for pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and food products, etc.’259 India was not the only country threatened but it 
had the distinction of being placed on the Priority Watch list from April 1989. In fact, 
the U.S went as far as threatening to seek India’s expulsion from GATT ‘unless it 
resiles its position on intellectual property and patent rights.’260 Access to the U.S 
market for other Indian goods were also under threat as a result; this threat made 
avoidance of trade frictions paramount, compelling India to engage on IPR issues.261  
 
Negotiating IPR issues meant India and other developing countries had a say in 
the determination of rules. Indian trade officials realised a more pertinent approach 
would be to bargain and restrict the agenda to their interests.262 This approach meant 
mainstreaming concerns of developing countries into the IPR domain. Soon after 
conceding to negotiate IPR issues, the MOC issued a public statement to allay domestic 
concerns stating “this decision is merely a procedural concession. There is no 
fundamental change in the stand that developing countries should receive preferential 
treatment. India has agreed to discuss the matter to see whether at the end of the day a 
package emerges that is “Gattable.”263 After delivering the statement, Indian trade 
negotiators got to work on IPR. 
 
India’s first IPR proposal in 1990 sought to limit GATT’s scope from overly 
influencing rules around intellectual property rights, ‘India would like to reiterate that 
the protection of intellectual property rights has no direct or significant relationship to 
international trade. It would not be appropriate to establish within the framework of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade any new rules and disciplines on intellectual 
property rights. In our view, therefore, there can be no linkage between the basic 
                                                
258“Some Indian policies unfair under U.S. trade act,” The Times of India, April 25, 1989, 15. 
259“India and the U.S. disagree on Patents,” The New York Times, April 17, 1989, D10. 
260“The U.S. plays bully,” The Times of India, November 6, 1989, 12.  
261Former Indian GATT Negotiator.  
262Ibid.  
263GATT, India Presents its views on Intellectual Property and Investment Measures, GATT NUR/031 
(Stanford, CA: GATT, 1989) 
 
210 
principles relating to intellectual property rights and the GATT system.’264 On 
principles, the Indian proposal eschewed focus on underlying liberal principles; 
concepts like most favoured nation and national treatment, the Indian statement argued, 
were inapt for intellectual property issues as these principles were limited to border 
measures affecting trade of goods and ‘not the rights or protection of private parties 
providing services within national boundaries.’265 The Indian proposal hedged by 
stating that GATT principles that mattered for IPR were transparency and differential 
and favourable treatment of developing countries.266  
 
Some developing countries like Argentina, Egypt and Tanzania endorsed India’s 
proposal, identifying it as the ‘first structured treatment of the issues from the point of 
view of developing countries.’267 But this view was not shared by several developed 
countries who questioned the selective application of GATT principles in the area.268 
Nonetheless, India’s proposal scored a major victory when it was accepted as the basis 
for further negotiations after gaining the support of the E.C., Canada and Japan on 
particular provisions, including compulsory licensing.269 That India brought out this 
debate demonstrated its interest in substantively engaging on IPR issues albeit with the 
intention to soften the impact on developing countries.  
 
To move negotiations forward, the U.S, Japan, E.C and Switzerland tabled draft 
TRIPS agreements in 1990. Despite procedural differences, all four submissions 
supported an agreement on patents under GATT. All four submissions claimed better 
protections would be a net benefit for all states, particularly through technological 
diffusion that could fuel innovation and growth. At the same time, thirteen developing 
countries, including India, submitted a proposal that voiced their reservations toward 
stronger protections. Their proposal focused on controlling counterfeit goods through 
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GATT.270 On standards, the document stressed the concerns of citizens imperilled by 
greater protection in sectors like food and health, offering, in turn, little guarantees for 
patent holders.271 Prevailing differences produced an impasse as member states 
reconvened in November 1990; it became clear that for a possible breakthrough, IPR 
rules would have to straddle the need for greater protections with concessions given to 
developing countries against tougher standards. Indian officials needled other states to 
recognise the status and position of developing countries vis-à-vis IPR issues.  
 
Efforts to finalise the TRIPS agreement continued in 1991. Negotiations hinged 
on the scope of protections and patent coverage, special arrangements for developing 
countries including transitional periods and how to incorporate intellectual property 
issues into GATT.272 Informal consultations in December 1990 resulted in a sharp 
narrowing of differences among key countries. This entente produced the famous 
Dunkel Draft, recognising the leadership of GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel who 
shepherded the last mile of IPR negotiations.273 Specifically, the Dunkel draft allowed 
patent protection to last twenty years for products and processes in all fields.274 
Developing countries were allowed a transitional period of ten years of protection 
before domestic patent rules would have to be revised.275 Thus, countries like India 
which had rules in place for process patents would have to adapt them to include patents 
for products once the transitional period expired. Similarly, India’s domestic patent 
rules that protected product patents for 14 years and process patents for 5 years would 
have to be extended to 20 years. In terms of compulsory licensing that allows a patentee 
to exploit the patent for commercial purposes without authorisation from the patent 
holder, the Dunkel draft proved narrow; the draft guaranteed patent rights regardless of 
‘whether products are imported or locally produced.’276 But the document did allow 
countries to issue compulsory licenses without patent holder authorisation when a 
national emergency occurred.277Developing countries insisted on the latter protection.278 
                                                
270GATT, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, 
Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71. (Stanford, CA: GATT, 1990)  
271Ibid.   
272Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System, 318. 
273Biswajit Dhar and C. Niranjan Rao, "Dunkel draft on TRIPs: complete denial of developing countries' 
interests." Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, 6 (1992): 475.  
274Ibid. 
275Ibid.  




Just as IPR negotiations were ending, the Indian economy experienced a 
financial crisis in mid-1991. The crisis forced India’s lead IPR negotiator and incoming 
Commerce Secretary A.V. Ganesan to approach the final Dunkel draft with a strong 
dose of pragmatism tempered nonetheless by self-interest.279 On compulsory licensing, 
Ganesan accepted the final provision that allowed all TRIPS signatories to issue a 
compulsory license in the event of a national emergency or crisis; the exception was 
critical to protecting access to medicines in India.280 The provision also drew on India’s 
initial TRIPS proposal that called for patent exceptions based on national interest that 
had the support of the E.C., Canada and Japan. Ganesan also agreed to the inclusion of 
national public policy objectives in the draft, critical to mount a defence on when a 
patent dispute occurs. But before Ganesan could finalise the TRIPS agreement, the issue 
got embroiled in a political crisis back home.   
 
Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights  
 
India’s policy shift on IPR issues at the Uruguay Round was influenced by two business 
groups - Confederation of Engineering Industry (CEI) and Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce (FICC) that lobbied the government to amend its rigid position 
on IPR.281 In an interview before negotiations, CEI President Chowdhary indicated that 
New Delhi should pursue negotiations as ‘negotiations would lead to solutions’ on 
patents as these rules ‘will have a bearing on the future of the services and consulting 
industry’ in India.282 To augment the MOC’s knowledge on patents, CEI held formal 
industry-government discussions on the matter to clarify issues surrounding its 
inclusion before the government decided on the matter.283 These discussions focused on 
emphasising the link between patent rights and innovation and how domestic firms that 
specialised in information technology, consulting and software-related services were 
affected in terms of future business opportunities, should the government remain 
defensive on IPR issues.284 
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Also chiming in was Pai Pannadikar, Secretary of FICC, who stressed ‘better 
patent protection would encourage foreign investment and technology transfer that India 
needs.’285 FICC’s hope was to get the government to ‘globalise Indian industry’ by 
encouraging Indian firms to establish links with innovative international firms so Indian 
firms ‘could better service global customers and markets.’286 Rejecting negotiations and 
rules on patents, CEI and FICC claimed, would have effectively made India less 
attractive to foreign investment. This fear was not just an abstraction; in the late 1980s, 
both India and the U.S were in the midst of signing and executing bilateral agreements 
in science and technology, including projects in areas like material sciences, health 
sciences, software and telecommunications that were worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars.287 In fact, an American trade official privately conveyed to Indian negotiators 
that without a satisfactory agreement on IP, “you can forget all about technology 
transfer and trade expansion.”288 India’s disengagement on IPR issues could have 
imperilled these projects and this factored into the decision made by the Indian 
government. Patents, Chowdhary and Tarun Das, CEI Secretary, claimed stood in the 
way of greater integration, already threatened by retaliatory trade pressures from the 
U.S.289 
 
 The lobbying of these two business groups on IPR issues prevailed over the 
qualms of another domestic group wary of the Indian government’s decision to 
negotiate IPR issues. The other key interest group was the National Working Group on 
Patent Laws (NWGPL), a New Delhi based non-profit group that specialised on issues 
related to India’s 1970 Patent Act. Largely composed of lawyers, the NWGPL worked 
to clarify the impact of international patent rules and laws on India’s domestic patent 
system to protect the rights of Indian citizens against international organisations and 
corporations.290 The group lobbied against patent liberalisation. Initially, NWGPL was 
formed in response to TRIPS negotiations to resist pressures on to reform India’s patent 
system but the group evolved to become a focused voice against patent reform.291  
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As IPR negotiations progressed, NWGPL sought to ensure that the Indian 
government did not extend the rights of process patent owners to product patents given 
the importance of the domestic pharmaceutical industry to public health.292 Specifically, 
NWGPL articulated concerns over the increased costs of medicines and 
pharmaceuticals from new rules on patent protection.293 India’s TRIPS negotiators, 
however, were aware of these issues. Former TRIPS negotiator Jayshree Watal recalls 
her chief concern during negotiations was to save ‘India’s compulsory license/license of 
right system to the extent possible.’294 India’s initial IP proposal called for freedom and 
flexibility in sectors like food and pharmaceuticals and focused on the provision on 
compulsory licensing that gave developing countries the right to suspend patent 
protections when required.295 
 
 As the TRIPS agreement neared finalisation, NWGPL refocused their attention 
on India’s IPR concessions. In September 1993, the group convened the first People’s 
Commission on TRIPS issues to debate the constitutional issues of TRIPS agreement 
that included the participation of former Judges of the Supreme Court of India and the 
retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court.296 The Commission’s report highlighted 
the implications of TRIPS agreement on access to medicines that would effectively 
conflict with the Indian Patents Act and the Indian Constitution’s right to life guarantee 
enshrined in Article 21.297 The NWGPL framed the TRIPS agreement as a human rights 
issue, given the potential costs to Indian citizens heavily reliant on life-saving 
medicines, whose access would be compromised due to intellectual property 
protections.298 
 
Though receptive to the pleas of domestic groups on patents and medicines, the 
Narasimha Rao-led Congress government did not amend its position on TRIPS or 
instruct negotiators to reject the agreement. What made NWGPL’s views less palatable 
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at that juncture was the fact that Indian trade negotiators had managed to secure 
exemptions on patents for developing countries through compulsory licensing which 
neutralised their fears. The government also made the political case for the TRIPS 
agreement by explaining that parts of the agreement provided exemptions for 
developing countries like India on product patents in the event of an emergency or 
crisis. In addition, the government reassured parliament and the Indian public of the 
potential benefits from the entire Uruguay Round agreement, including gains made on 
other matters like agriculture, textiles and services. These gains, the government argued, 
stood to be compromised by rejecting the TRIPS agreement.  
 
Clinching the Agreement 
 
Unexpectedly, the Dunkel draft brought the ferocious domestic politics around IPR 
issues to the forefront in India. The Congress government looked to soft pedal the 
matter to avoid a direct confrontation with other political parties that feared the 
government was conceding on a matter of national importance.299 Public opinion had 
soured since the previous government’s decision to consider IP issues at the round.300 In 
March 1993, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) moved a resolution to 
invalidate the IP agreement but this move was rejected by the government who insisted 
the Dunkel draft did not constitute an outright concession on intellectual property 
rights.301 Parliamentary debates on the TRIPS agreement in 1992 and 1993 increased 
pressure on the Indian government to disclose details of concessions made on 
intellectual property and trade in services.302 
 
Through 1993 and early 1994, parliamentary debates were marred by rancour 
toward the Uruguay Round. Disinformation and rumours pervaded. A phalanx of 
cabinet ministers defended the government’s position and approach, given future 
economic gains from intensified trade negotiations with other member states.303 
Opposition parties like the BJP, JD and CPI (M) kept the pressure up, castigating the 
government for ‘selling out India’s sovereignty’ on an agreement that ‘could not bring 
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suggested gains.’304 For opposition parties, the conditions imposed on India’s policies 
on agriculture and intellectual property rights were articulated as traps laid by 
developed countries or as they put it, ‘neo-colonialism through the backdoor.’305 
Nonetheless, time had run out to make substantive changes to the main trade 
agreement.306 Backing out of the TRIPS agreement now could compromise gains 
secured through other trade agreements, namely various goods and services. 
 
Publicly, the government made the case that rejecting the trade agreement was 
tantamount to exiting the multilateral trade system ‘which was unthinkable.’307 In 1993, 
a parliamentary committee was formed to examine the Dunkel draft and ascertain if the 
TRIPS agreement and provisions on patent protections harmed Indian interests. After 
deliberations, the committee endorsed the government’s position,  
 
‘there are differing opinions on the desirability of India binding 
itself to the Uruguay Round. There is no denying the fact that the 
final outcome is not in the best interests of India on every count. 
But in multilateral agreements, it is always a question of give and 
take. Undoubtedly, in today’s world, with increasing 
interdependence of nations multilateral agreements with MFN 
status for all participants are decidedly advantageous as compared 
to bilateral agreements. Every country has the sovereign right to 
stay out of GATT and it cannot be argued that India’s interests 
would be best served by giving up the membership of forum.’308 
 
Criticism from opposition parties did not cease with the judgment but the government’s 
position was vindicated. Some opposition members from the JD and CPI (M) 
clamoured for India to withdraw from GATT and exit Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Largely lost in this melee were public assurances from the Commerce Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee and Prime Minister Rao that commensurate space existed in the TRIPS 
agreement for exceptions through compulsory licensing.309 In June 1993, Commerce 
Secretary A.V. Ganesan reiterated in a public interview that ‘we don’t have a choice on 
patents,’ and that India would have to accept the Dunkel draft but clarified, ‘sufficient 
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306But this did not mean that details of the agreements were finalized. On several issues including services 
and TRIPS, countries had to work after the GATT agreement was signed to clarify their commitments. 
307“Anti-GATT Protests baseless propaganda,” The Sunday Times, April 10, 1994, 1. 
308Jayshree Watal, Patents: An Indian Perspective, 309. 
309“Options open on GATT: Pranab,” The Times of India, April 22, 1994, 1. 
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protections existed to minimise the impact of high drug prices’ through price control 
mechanisms and importantly compulsory licensing.310 However, the political wrangling 
continued. The government was lambasted for not standing up with other developing 
countries, turning its back on decades of leadership as a leader of developing countries 
on trade issues.311 Nonetheless, the government remained firm on its support to the 
agreement.  
 
With some modifications, agreements on trade in goods and services, investment 
measures and intellectual property rights were accepted by GATT member state 
representatives in December 1993 and Commerce Ministers in April 1994.312 Ministers 
from 125 countries, including India, signed the Uruguay Round trade agreement on 
April 15 1994.313 India ratified the agreement on December 9 1994.314 The agreement 
created a new international trading system alongside the largest package of market 
concessions negotiated by GATT member states. GATT member states agreed to cut 
tariffs by an average of 37 percent.315 The final trade agreement also replaced GATT 




India negotiated and ratified the Uruguay Round trade agreement to secure additional 
market access for Indian exporters and further boost India’s revived economic 
trajectory. Moves taken by Ministry of Commerce (MOC) to liberalise export and 
import rules improved output in several sectors including textiles, chemicals and 
manufacturing items. Agricultural output was on the ascent. Services received a fillip 
through policy efforts to develop India’s technological base. India’s proactive intent to 
secure additional market access at trade negotiations for goods like textiles and 
agriculture grew from the spate of trade policy reforms adopted that sensitised Indian 
trade officials to the range of international trade restrictions stifling India’s export 
output and the range of opportunities that existed in areas like trade in services and 
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intellectual property rights. To remove existing constraints and capitalise on 
opportunities, Indian trade officials sought to procure additional market access in 
developed countries for Indian textiles and agricultural commodities while protecting 
India’s development interests at negotiations on trade in services and intellectual 
property right issues.  
 
Second, the market access drive of Indian trade negotiators at the Uruguay 
Round was supported by a coalition of business groups and lobbies that advocated for 
liberalisation and additional market access on key goods and for the government to 
negotiate rules in trade in services and intellectual property right issues given their 
implications to their business prospects and India’s economic growth. Various business 
lobbies and groups from the textile, agriculture and services industries conveyed their 
preferences to the Ministry of Commerce for greater market access for their goods. In 
areas like services and intellectual property rights, lobbies like the Confederation of 
Engineering Industry (CEI), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FICC) and 
the National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) urged the 
Commerce Ministry to amend their defensive outlook and participate to negotiate rules 
given the implications of these rules to their current and future business prospects. The 
material benefits accruing to these lobbies and firms they represented were high from 
additional market access to their goods in developed countries and from the 
government’s decision to negotiate on trade in services and intellectual property rights 
that ensured concessions gained on non-tariff barriers and trade in goods and services 










This thesis has investigated how and why India negotiated four specific international 
rules – Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (FCCC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and GATT’s 
Uruguay Round Trade Agreement. The fundamental gap that the thesis attempts to fill 
is the lack of scholarly attention given to empirically chronicling and explaining how 
India negotiates international rules and what drives India’s behaviour in this regard. 
Gaps from the literature review on Indian foreign policy revealed that a focus on 
elucidating how the political economy – interests, institutions and interest groups – 
around these four rules would help in excavating the Indian government’s approach at 
negotiations and whether it ratified the rule or not. The empirical focus was on four 
specific international rules that India has negotiated – Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, Framework Convention on Climate Change, Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and the GATT Uruguay Round trade agreement.  
 
Political economy matters to explain why and how India negotiates international 
rules. It is vital to map how key state institutions and domestic interest groups act and 
how they determine India’s core interests toward a particular rule. State institutions that 
interface on international negotiations greatly affect how India negotiates a particular 
international rule. Concretely, it is worth investigating if the ministry overseeing 
international negotiations has a robust understanding of the policy problem 
necessitating negotiations and is able to coherently present and defend incumbent 
interests at negotiations. Influencing state institutions during this process are domestic 
interest groups that were or stood to be affected by a particular international rule that, at 
times, triggers their advocacy to influence the government’s approach at negotiations. In 
the end, ratification or rejection of an international rule hinges on how key institutions 
and interest groups internally negotiate the incumbent trade-offs accompanying the rule. 
 
When the interests and objectives of the bureaucracy overseeing international 
negotiations and interest groups affected by the international rule converge, India will 
likely seek to shape and ratify the international rule as seen through its behaviour while 
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negotiating the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Before FCTC negotiations, 
the government not only sought to pass a comprehensive tobacco control law (COTPA) 
but gradually disengaged from domestic tobacco production. Concurrently, New Delhi 
urged domestic tobacco farmers to find alternate livelihoods away from tobacco 
production. Tobacco control became a clear priority for the BJP-led coalition 
government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee. These measures gave the Indian health 
ministry a robust understanding of tobacco consumption and how India was buffeted by 
the growing problem. With political support from the Prime Minister, legislature and 
domestic tobacco control groups keen on strengthening laws around tobacco use, the 
Indian delegation arrived at negotiations to negotiate a tough framework convention that 
constrained international tobacco commerce and promoted tobacco cessation and 
prevention. Interest groups, specifically the Advocacy Forum for Tobacco Control 
(AFTC), pushed Indian officials to suggest and accept tougher controls at FCTC 
negotiations given the raging tobacco consumption problem at home. Their knowledge-
based advocacy trumped countervailing pressures from the tobacco industry since the 
Indian government was prepared to tackle rising tobacco use.  
 
India behaved similarly at the Uruguay Round trade negotiations where trade 
negotiators battled to secure additional foreign market access for Indian exporters, 
particularly for goods in agriculture, textiles and services, given the estimated material 
benefits to Indian firms and the Indian government that was on a reform path. The 
government’s focus on economic reforms, particularly production and international 
trade from the mid-1980s, compelled Indian trade officials to push for additional market 
access for producers keen to boost exports abroad. India’s textile, agricultural and 
services exporters also stood to gain materially through additional market access for 
their goods and services; these groups represented by various business and commerce 
associations conveyed their preferences to Ministry of Commerce officials before and 
during trade negotiations. Business lobbies in agriculture, textiles and services 
supported further liberalisation and worked to assuage the anxieties of trade officials on 
opening up protected sectors through the final trade agreement.  
 
On climate change, the Indian government was less aware of the implications of 
potential international efforts to mitigate global warming. As global warming emerged 
on the international landscape as an issue, New Delhi’s focus was on industrialisation 
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and growth. The government sought to ease controls stymieing industrial production 
without recourse to see whether or if the environment was affected; this approach, 
however, harmed the broader environmental state of the country. Moreover, 
environmental officials did not adequately acquaint themselves with the emergent 
global warming problem having been preoccupied with concerns related to pollution 
and enforcement. Given a weak knowledge base on climate change, Indian diplomats 
drew from the concerted advocacy of domestic environmental groups like the Centre for 
Science and Environment (CSE) and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) to 
adopt a narrow approach that boiled climate change from a scientific and technical issue 
to a developmental issue with clear political implications. Both CSE and TERI realised 
the implications of adopting an environmental approach at negotiations would have 
compromised growth rates and the ability to shield India’s poorest citizens from climate 
mitigation commitments. This tack benefitted both CSE and TERI whose own work and 
advocacy on the environment was closely tied to development. 
 
In contrast, when international rules clash with or compromise core interests of 
the Indian government and interest groups seeking to influence the government’s 
position are putatively split on the rule, India will be less inclined to ratify the rule. This 
scenario sums up India’s behaviour at negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. When negotiations did not meaningfully reduce the nuclear gap between India 
and existing nuclear weapon states and discounted universal nuclear disarmament, 
Indian negotiators voiced their reservations toward the treaty while holding out for 
some progress. The government’s ability to forge its own path and reject the CTBT was 
abetted by fragmented domestic perspectives regarding the treaty from the strategic 
community. Domestic security experts held differing views on how the Ministry of 
External Affairs should negotiate the CTBT; these commentators advocated for the 
government to either - accept the treaty with certain conditions, reject the treaty and test 
nuclear weapons or withdraw altogether to keep the testing option open. The diversity 
of preferences impinged on the government’s ability to settle on a clear policy stance 
with respect to the CTBT; but, multiple views, however, gave the Indian government 
more leeway to categorically rule on the issue. Eventually, Indian officials rejected the 
CTBT. Given these findings that testify to the importance of political economy, I 
consider whether we need a new approach to make sense of how rising powers 
negotiate international rules in the next section.  
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Is India a Rising Power when Negotiating International Rules?  
 
The world is experiencing major shifts in the distribution of power. The ascent of rising 
powers and their intentions generally arouse concern. Fundamental questions of war and 
peace, economic growth and social welfare may depend on how rising powers perceive 
international rules and organizations designed to address collective action problems 
afflicting the international order. Scholarly attention on rising powers during power 
transitions has focused largely on classifying rising powers on the basis of their 
economic capabilities, which purportedly propel them to challenge the hegemon leading 
to war.317 Unfortunately, the transition process does not capture institutional interactions 
with the international order that allows rising powers to focus on enhancing their 
growth trajectories. Moreover, there is very little evidence to suggest rising powers like 
India will not be interested in interacting with various aspects of the international order 
to facilitate their economic growth and solidify their position as a key state.  
 
Through the case studies, in fact, this thesis shows that how India negotiates and 
whether it ratifies or rejects a particular international rule matters to global governance 
writ large. India’s approach and positions at FCCC and FCTC negotiations affected 
how countries conceptualised climate change and tobacco control at negotiations that 
influenced provisions and rules designed to address both policy issues. For climate 
change, India’s clear-eyed political stances, given development-related implications, 
influenced negotiations and helped produce a framework convention that was defensive 
in terms of how countries would mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, the 
robust tobacco-control approach adopted by Indian negotiators at FCTC negotiations, 
widely endorsed by other developing countries, resulted in a framework convention that 
expected WHO member states who ratified the agreement to progressively reduce 
tobacco use. At the Uruguay Round, the proactive tack adopted by Indian trade 
negotiators to increase market access for developing country goods and reduce the 
intensity and use of subsidies and non-trade barriers on exports like agriculture and 
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textiles by developed countries helped produce GATT agreements that liberalised trade 
access with protections added for developing countries. India’s behaviour behoves us to 
further investigate how other rising powers behave toward international rules and what 
drives their behaviour.  
 
But to better understand and explain this dynamic, we may have to come up 
with a more refined and possibly differentiated understanding of rising powers that 
allows us to distinguish between some rising powers like Japan, Russia, Germany and 
South Korea that have increased their material capabilities and are able to use 
incumbent institutional and political resources to facilitate their rise in the international 
order and other rising powers like India, Brazil and perhaps China that may face 
difficulties in this regard. These constraints could affect their behaviour in the 
international order.  
 
Instead, we could conceptualise these latter rising powers as Premature Powers 
or rising powers that generally have to deal with numerous development-related policy 
challenges as their growth trajectories rise.318 That is, they appear to be, at once, rising 
powers when measured in terms of aggregate material capabilities (GDP) but also large 
populous developing countries where per capita incomes are low and the range of 
development challenges confronted are high. This latter feature could constrain these 
specific rising powers from extracting the necessary resources to build their material 
capabilities. Moreover, we cannot take for granted the institutional capacity of these 
states that facilitate their rise nor can we assume that these states act of their own 
accord, largely independent of domestic political pressures. As a result, Premature 
Powers may be categorised as states that have a marked global footprint in terms of 
aggregate output (GDP), levels of investment and trade but are also large, populous 
developing countries that face challenges in terms of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition 
and disease, etc. As a result, these states bear a unique dilemma – balancing 
                                                
318I have drawn this conceptualisation from Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s neologism 
of Premature Powers. Saran claims certain powers are premature powers or rising powers that have to 
confront and address myriad development challenges while shouldering major burdens vis-à-vis global 




international responsibilities and burdens that grow with their footprint and the needs 
and aspirations of citizens striving for socio-economic mobility.319  
 
This feature distinguishes them from how rising powers are generally 
understood in the International Relations discipline. For IR scholars, rising powers 
possess the necessary political and institutional capabilities to accumulate power in the 
international order; moreover, their rise, when measured in economic terms, is generally 
not encumbered by domestic constraints or interests. In other words, rising powers are 
considered to be strong states adept at managing domestic pressures - both economic 
and political.320 What they overlook is the politics associated with economic growth and 
development. Without understanding the politics of development and the constraints 
posed by that process, it is difficult to explain how these rising powers increase their 
material capabilities. In fact, in 2015, of the top twenty economies in the G-20, seven 
had GDP per capita that was less than 10,000 (US$); these countries also ranked in the 
middle or amongst lower income countries in the 2015 Human Development Index – 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey.321 Some of these 
countries are generally referred to as ‘Emerging Markets’ or countries marked by high 
annual economic growth rates distinguishing them from other middle and lower income 
                                                
319I have drawn this conceptualisation from Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s neologism 
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countries.322 This understanding, though, obscures the fact that some of these emerging 
markets are still developing countries that face a litany of development-oriented policy 
challenges. As mentioned earlier, this feature distinguishes them from other rising 
powers like – Japan, South Korea, Russia - that are wealthier, have achieved high levels 
of development, have stronger institutional capacities and are generally able to muster 
the requisite domestic resources, political and institutional, to facilitate their rise.  
 
It may be helpful conceptualising these particular states as Premature Powers 
that are rising powers but also large populous developing countries that possess and 
manage an array of institutional deficits as they rise. These deficits affect how public 
policy is formulated and implemented to address key policy challenges. Moreover, as 
underdeveloped states, they are, possibly, more susceptible to be influenced by 
domestic interest groups that push the state to act in their interest. Negotiating and 
acceding to international rules thus could involve acute trade-offs and adjustments for 
domestic groups and interests. This scenario could precipitate their advocacy into the 
policy process that governments in these rising powers have to be sensitive to. These 
two features, as a result, could acquire salience when trying to infer how rising powers 
behave toward international rules. 
 
Looking Ahead – Implications for Future Research 
 
As just pointed out, the existing IR literature on rising powers has overlooked the 
texture and variation in rising power behaviour in the international order particularly 
with respect to their attitudes toward international rules. Understanding why rising 
powers behave differently thus could require a new approach, one that is, as suggested 
in the previous section, more sensitive to political economy constraints that some rising 
powers face. This focus of inquiry can be further extended.  
 
 Looking at India, this thesis has considered and explained its multilateral 
behaviour by covering how it negotiated four particular international rules. A recent 
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edited volume on India’s multilateral behaviour argued that India’s interests have grown 
in the international order resulting in India acting as a rule shaper, rule taker or rule 
breaker.323 But the volume does not ask what precipitated these attitudes or why India 
behaved in a particular way. If we extend the political economy approach used here to 
consider India’s positions and decisions on other international agreements like the 
Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, International Health Regulations, 
intellectual property rights agreements and internet governance, we can better 
substantiate whether India’s multilateral behaviour and choices made thereof are 
contingent on certain conditions. This work is worth pursuing to build the literature on 
Indian multilateralism.  
  
While this thesis has focused on India’s approach and behaviour toward 
international rules, the findings can shed light on how other rising powers like China 
and Brazil behave provided we make necessary analytical adjustments as suggested 
earlier. Conceptualising these rising powers as Premature Powers and using a political 
economy approach to probe their behaviour could possibly help in explaining their 
positions on issues like climate change, international development cooperation and 
emergent issues like cyber security where rules are being drafted. Such questions could 
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